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"Fair is foul, and foul is fair."
The Three Witches, Macbeth, Act 1, Scene 1.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, the Supreme Court of the United States held that whole-
sale copying of entire television programs by millions of individual
viewers was not copyright infringement.' The Court reasoned that
noncommercial copying of individual television programs in the
home, for the purpose of viewing them at a later time, was fair use.2
In its very next Term, however, the Court ruled that borrowing 300
words from a 200,000-word, unpublished manuscript on an issue of
great public importance was not fair use but was actionable copyright
infringement. To the average lawyer, let alone the layperson, these
apparently contradictory decisions are difficult to reconcile. Indeed,
the doctrine of fair use has been described as "the most troublesome
in the whole law of copyright."4
The fair use doctrine developed under the laws of England over
200 years ago' and has been characterized as an "equitable rule of
reason." 6 It has a worthy purpose-to cushion the hard edges of
copyright law and permit others to build upon the foundations of ear-
lier copyrighted works, without negotiating a license in every case.
1. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
2. See id. at 447-56.
3. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985); id. at
579, 598 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting length of underlying work).
4. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 475 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Dellar v. Samuel
Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (courts ought to decide other copyright issues
before considering fair use)).
5. See generally W. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 6-17 (1985)
(tracing early development of fair use doctrine at common law in England). Copyright law
began with the Statute of Anne in 1709. See 12 Anne c. 19 (1709). According to Patry, the
first fair use case was Gyles v. Wilcox. See Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (No. 130) (1740)
(holding that an abridgement was fair use); see also W. PATRY, supra, at 6-7.
6. H.R. REP. No: 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5679 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT], quoted in Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at
560. But see W. PATRY, supra note 5, at 4-5 (arguing that fair use is not a "child of equity,"
but a flexible judicial accommodation of the strictures of statutory copyright law to a practical
demand: the need to use existing works in creating new ones).
7. The defense of fair use may be viewed as a judicially enforced subsidy of others'
creative activity by the owner of copyright in the original work. See infra note 172. One
commentator has argued that such a subsidy is appropriate only when market mechanisms are
unable to facilitate private licensing of productive uses. See Gordon, Fair Use as Market
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After a period of development at common law, the United States'
branch of the doctrine was codified in Section 107 of the Copyright
Act of 1976.8
The fair use doctrine is a paradigmatic "catch-all." It is designed
to absolve unauthorized users of copyrighted works from liability for
copyright infringement when all the technical prerequisites for an
infringement action are met, but legal liability would be unfair or
inappropriate to the goals of copyright protection. The doctrine has
no crisp outlines, no precise standards, and no obvious center or
core.9 Its flexibility allows judges to adjust the contours of copyright
protection to fit individual circumstances as they arise, in the true
common law tradition'
Codification of fair use did not alter the doctrine. Congress
clearly stated its intention not to change the law."° Yet Congress also
set forth four nonexclusive factors that courts must consider in deter-
mining whether a use of copyrighted material is fair."' In so doing,
Congress said it was attempting to call forth form from the void-to
provide an analytical structure and some guidance for the courts.1 2
Congress appears to have done its job well. Properly construed, the
words of the copyright statute and its legislative history distill the
witches' brew of fair use into four distinct ingredients, making the
potion more useful and palatable without appreciably changing its
taste. It remains unclear, however, whether the Supreme Court has
respected the purity of Congress' product or has adulterated it with
crude home-made elixirs.
The Supreme Court never addressed the fair use doctrine before
its codification. 3 In the last few years, however, the Court rendered
Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 30 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 253 (1982).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982); see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 65 (fair use "given
express statutory recognition for the first time in section 107"). For a discussion of the U.S.
codification of fair use, see infra text accompanying notes 117-28. The corresponding "fair
dealing" doctrine in English law has been codified since 1911. See W. PATRY, supra note 5, at
27 & n.53.
9. Before codification, one court complained that "[t]he doctrine is entirely equitable and
is so flexible as virtually to defy definition." Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp.
130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), paraphrased with approval in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony
Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 969 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). See also Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068
(2d Cir. 1977) (Fair use "cannot be determined by resort to any arbitrary rules or fixed
criteria."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). For discussion of the doctrine's flexibility after
codification, see infra text accompanying notes 124 & 127.
10. See infra note 127.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 117-28.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 125-26.
13. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
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two major decisions on the subject: Sony Corp. of America v. Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc. 14 and Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises."5 In these decisions, the Court in large measure forsook
the congressional prescription, mixed the prescribed ingredients in
unintended proportions, and added rough medicine in the form of
simplistic presumptions that Congress never intended.
This Article attempts to distill the witches' brew once again and
produce a clearer solution to the problem of fair use. Section II of
this Article identifies the five exclusive statutory rights enjoyed by
copyright holders and discusses limitations on those rights, including
the dichotomy between idea and expression and the fair use doctrine.
It then examines the nature and purposes of the fair use doctrine and
its underlying policies and reviews treatments of those policies in the
lower courts and legal commentary. Finally, Section II explores the
codification of fair use in Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976
and Congress' purpose in codifying the doctrine.
Section III analyzes the impact of the Supreme Court's opinions
in Sony and Nation Enterprises on the fair use doctrine. Section IV
attempts to put some of the Court's more sweeping statements in
these opinions in proper statutory perspective, particularly certain
"presumptions" developed by the Court. Section V then proposes a
coherent framework for fair use analysis based on the purpose, intent,
and logic of each of the four statutory factors and their treatment in
decisions of the lower courts. It continues by examining two nonstat-
utory factors that the courts have identified, and it ends with a re-
evaluation of the Sony and Nation Enterprises decisions. Finally, Sec-
tion VI concludes by offering a prognosis for the future of fair use.
II. THE COPYRIGHT OWNER'S EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS
AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution 6 empowers Congress
to protect the "[w]ritings" of "[a]uthors."' 7 In Section 102(a) of the
Copyright Act, Congress restricted the protected field to "works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."'" In theory,
14. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
15. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. Id.
18. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). Congress purposely made this statutory phrase narrower
than the constitutional phrase "Writings" of "Authors" in order to avoid giving the courts
"the alternative of holding copyrightable something that Congress clearly did not intend to
protect, or of holding constitutionally incapable of copyright something that Congress might
one day want to protect." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 51.
[V€ol. 43:233
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both the constitutional and statutory phrases function as limitations,
but in practice the scope of copyright protection is as broad as the
grasp of the human mind."1 Among the things explicitly mentioned
in the Copyright Act or its legislative history are books,20 computer
programs,21 disks,22 films, 23 fine art,24 globes, 25 graphic art,26 maps,27
motion pictures,2s musiC,29 sculpture a3 video disks 3 and videotape.3 2
Like copyright law itself, fair use doctrine must address all these cate-
gories of copyrightable works, as well as all the myriad ways in which
they might be used.
As the word "copyright" suggests, the most basic right of the
copyright holder is the exclusive right to control copying or reproduc-
tion of a protected work. 3 This right alone, however, may not cover
all possible forms of unauthorized use of the many types of copy-
righted works. For example, the right to control reproduction may
protect a composer against unauthorized proliferation of her sheet
music, but it cannot prevent unauthorized performance of her work.
To provide adequate protection for various works in various media,
the Copyright Act gives copyright holders five exclusive rights. These
are the rights to control reproduction, distribution, preparation of
derivative works, public performance, and public display of the copy-
righted works.3 4
Were these five exclusive rights of copyright holders enforced
without exception, cultural and intellectual life as we know it would
grind to a halt. Teachers could not copy news reports of interest to
19. According to the statute, copyright covers all "original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "[i]iterary works").
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "computer program"); see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 117 (limitations on exclusive rights in computer programs).
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "[ljiterary works").
23. See id. (definitions of "[a]udiovisual works" and "[i]iterary works").




28. See id. (defined).
29. See id. (definition of "[s]ound recordings").
30. See id. (definition of "[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works").
31. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 63 (discussing exclusive right, of public
performance).
32. See id.
33. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1982).
34. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). The first three rights apply to all types of works, but the
latter two apply only to those for which they are appropriate. See id. at § 106(4), (5).
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their students. Lovers could not recite copyrighted poems, other than
their own.3" Researchers could not copy scientific articles to build on
the work of their predecessors. Movie and television producers would
have to excise from their programs any frame that happened to con-
tain a glimpse of a copyrighted painting, sculpture, or magazine
cover. At least in theory, cheerful early risers would be subject to
civil liability for whistling copyrighted music on the subway. 36 Cer-
tain limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright holders help avoid
these absurd results.
The fair use doctrine is of course one such limitation, but it is not
the only one. There are a number of specific statutory limitations on
the exclusive rights of copyright holders. 3 In general, however, these
35. Unauthorized recital would violate the copyright owner's exclusive right of public
performance, at least if done in public. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1982). Cf HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 6, at 63 (singing a song included in definition of "perform[ing]" in Section 101).
36. See supra note 35. Cf Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980). ("The doctrine of fair use, originally
created and articulated in case law, permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright
statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to
foster.").
37. Arguably the specific exceptions affect application of the fair use doctrine through the
well-known principle of statutory construction that the specific governs the general. When a
defendant's use of a copyrighted work falls close to one of the specific exceptions, but not
within it, the plaintiff might argue that fair use is displaced by the force of the specific
exception and therefore is unavailable as a defense.
In one instance, Congress foreclosed this argument unequivocally. In providing specific
conditions for duplication of copyrighted works by libraries and archives, Congress stated
explicitly that those conditions do not displace the general doctrine of fair use. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 108(f)(4) (1982).
Yet even where Congress was not so explicit, specific exceptions should not displace the
general doctrine of fair use for three reasons. First, the language of Section 107 reads very
broadly, and the House Report indicates that Congress intended to give the judiciary broad
powers to modulate the strictures of copyright law. See infra note 127.
Second, there is no hint in the House Report that specific exceptions displace fair use. As
for Section 108, hotly negotiated changes were made in it nearly up to the date of passage of
the statute. See generally Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works, July 31, 1978, Library of Congress (1979), at 89-104
(summarizing legislative history of library photocopying issue). For example, as late as
August 3, 1976, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice reported an amendment to the then-pending copyright reform bill,
adding language to resolve a dispute over interlibrary lending of photocopies. President Ford
signed the bill on October 19, 1976. See id. at 102-04. Library representatives undoubtedly
requested the "safe harbor" language in Section 108 to guard against the vagueness of language
drafted in last-minute legislative compromise. It thus seems inappropriate to derive from that
language any intention to restrict the application of fair use doctrine generally.
Finally, a wooden application of the rule that the specific governs the general would
nullify the purpose of Section 107-allowing courts to balance the rights of copyright holders
against those of users, on a case-by-case basis, in order to reconcile the goals of encouraging
creativity and wide use of copyrighted works. See infra text accompanying notes 55-59.
Therefore, absent explicit language in the statute or its legislative history to the contrary,
FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT LAW
limitations are narrowly tailored to fill gaps in the law or to reflect
political compromises in particular industries, and their impact on the
doctrine of fair use is therefore incidental. 38 A more fundamental lim-
the doctrine of fair use should apply in any field, whether or not that field is covered by one of
the more specific exceptions in Sections 108 through 119. Cf Gordon, supra note 7, at 320
n.297 (arguing that whether Congress intended specific exceptions from copyright liability for
home audio recording and whether recording is fair use are separate issues).
38. Perhaps the most important is the "first sale" doctrine, now codified in Section 109(b),
which deprives the copyright owner of exclusive control over distribution or display of an
authorized copy or phonorecord after its first sale. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1982). This
doctrine, for example, allows the buyer of a book to lend or sell it without permission from the
author or publisher.
In addition, there are specific statutory exceptions to a copyright holder's exclusive rights
for all of the following:
(1) copying by libraries of unpublished works for preservation or interlibrary deposit, see
id. at § 108(b);
(2) copying by libraries to replace lost or damaged copies of published works, see id. at
§ 108(e);
(3) copying by libraries for their patrons, see id. at § 108(d), (e);
(4) "performance or display ... by instructors or pupils in the course of face-to-face
teaching activities of a nonprofit educational institution," id. at § 110(1);
(5) transmissions of the "performance of a nondramatic literary or musical work or
display of a work . . . [in] instructional activities of a governmental body or a nonprofit
educational institution," id. at § 110(2)(A);
(6) performance of certain works in religious services, see id. at § 110(3);
(7) nontransmitted, noncommercial performances of nondramatic literary or musical
works without admission charge, or for charitable purposes, id. at § 110(4);
(8) communication of broadcast transmissions received on home-type receivers without
direct charge or further transmission to the public, see id. at § 110(5);
(9) performance of nondramatic music by nonprofit organizations or government at
agricultural or horticultural fairs, see id. at § 110(6);
(10) promotional performances of nondramatic music by music stores, see id. at § 110(7);
(11) performance of nondramatic literary works by transmission to the blind, deaf, or
similarly handicapped, and the making of certain copies of those transmissions by government
or nonprofit transmitters, see id. at § 110(8), § 112(d);
(12) "performance on a single occasion" of ten-year-old dramatic works by transmission
to the blind or similarly handicapped, see id. at § 110(9);
(13) nonprofit, charitable performances of nondramatic literary or musical works during
social activities of veterans' and fraternal organizations, see id. at § 110(10);
(14) secondary transmissions by no-charge hotel and apartment antenna systems (so-
called "passive carriers") and governmental or nonprofit community antenna systems, see id.
at § 111(a);
(15) secondary transmissions required to be carried to a specific group under the FCC's
"must carry" rules, see id. at § 111o(b);
(16) secondary transmissions by cable systems (including certain delayed transmissions)
under a statutory compulsory license, see id. at § 11 l(c)-(e);
(17) making single copies or phonorecords of transmitted performances or displays for
temporary (six months) or archival use by organizations entitled to make transmissions, see id.
at § 112(a);
(18) making up to thirty copies or phonorecords of transmitted performances or displays
for temporary (seven years) or archival use by government or nonprofit transmitting
organizations entitled to make transmissions, see id. at § 112(b);
(19) a government or nonprofit organization's making of copies or phonorecords of
1988]
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itation is the dichotomy between idea and expression.
A. The Dichotomy Between Idea and Expression
Although copyright in a work of authorship protects the author's
particular manner of expression, it does not protect the underlying
facts or ideas.39 This dichotomy between idea and expression serves
two purposes. First, it prevents copyright law from restricting the
nondramatic religious music without charge for distribution of one copy or phonorecord to
each legitimate transmitting organization for a single legitimate performance, see id. at
§ 112(c);
(20) "making, distribution, or display of ... photographs" of works embodied in useful
articles for purposes of "advertisement or commentaries related to... distribution or display
... or news report[ing]," id. at § 113(c);
(21) performance of sound recordings, but not of underlying musical works, see id. at
§ 114(a);
(22) imitation of sound recordings, but not of underlying musical works, see id. at
§ 114(b);
(23) under statutory compulsory license, and subject to payment of statutory royalties,
making and distributing phonorecords of nondramatic musical works after their distribution in
phonorecords to the U.S. public, see id. at § 115;
(24) performance of nondramatic music in jukeboxes under licenses negotiated pursuant
to special authority to use common agents and arbitration, or, in the absence of such licenses,
under statutory compulsory license, subject to payment of royalties set by Copyright Royalty
Tribunal, see id. at §§ 116, 116A, as amended by the Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 4, 102 Stat. 2853, 2855-57 (October 31, 1988);
(25) making, by "the owner of a copy of a computer program," of adaptations and
backup and operating copies of the computer program as needed for computer operation or
archival use, see 17 U.S.C. § 117;
(26) performance and display of "published nondramatic musical works and published
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" (and copying and distribution of programs for
transmission) by noncommercial educational broadcast stations pursuant to compulsory
licenses or licenses negotiated under special antitrust exemption, see id. at § 11 8(d)(1), (d)(2);
(27) off-the-air recording of temporary copies (used for up to seven days) of performances
and displays of "published nondramatic musical works and published pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works" by government or nonprofit organizations for use in face-to-face classroom
teaching activities of nonprofit educational institutions, see id. at § 118(d)(3); and
(28) satellite carriage of television transmissions to the public for home viewing under
statutory compulsory license, see id. at § 119, as added by the Satellite Home Viewer Act of
1988, Title II of Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, 3949 (November 16, 1988).
39. See generally I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §§ 2.03[D],
2.11[A] (1988). The dichotomy between idea and expression is a fundamental feature of
copyright law. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101-03, 104-05 (1880) (source of the
dichotomy: copyright does not protect system of accounting forms); Miller v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1370-72 (5th Cir. 1981) (reporter's research on facts in "news"
not protected); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978-79 (2d Cir.) (facts
and speculation regarding historical event not protected), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980);
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966) (biographical
facts not protected), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). Congress codified the principle in the
Copyright Act of 1976. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982); HouSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 57
("[B]asic dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged.").
[Vol. 43:233
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free flow of information necessary in a free society,4° and thereby
avoids a conflict with first amendment values. Second, it preserves
the distinction between patents and copyrights.4 ' Although the
dichotomy between idea and expression was first recognized at com-
mon law,42 it is now codified in Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of
1976. 43
Although easy to state, the dichotomy is often difficult to apply.
Idea and expression are inevitably fused, and the precise boundary
between them is difficult to locate. As Judge Learned Hand observed,
"Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever
can."'  Courts seldom make such a determination in the abstract,
however. Instead, they usually apply the dichotomy between idea and
expression in tandem with the "substantial similarity" standard for
40. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 582 (1984)
("This limitation on copyright also ensures consonance with our most important First
Amendment values.") (Brennan, J., dissenting); Miller, 650 F.2d at 1372 (reporter's research
not protected); Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 978-80 (historical facts and speculation not protected).
41. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (holding that statuette used as lamp
base is protected by copyright though it might have been protected by design patent, and
observing that copyright does not conflict with patent protection because copyright covers
only expression of idea); Baker, 101 U.S. at 103-04 (distinguishing the use of system from
expression in book explaining it); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797
F.2d 1222, 1236-37 (3d Cir. 1986) (idea of computer program for running dental laboratory is
not copyrightable, but structure and organization of program is), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877
(1987); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)
("Idea" of jeweled bee pin is not copyrightable.).
The rationale for treating copyrights and patents separately is that patentable inventions
must meet the stringent statutory requirements for novelty, utility, and nonobviousness set
forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1982). See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,
229.31 (1964) (requirements for patent are far more stringent than the weak originality and
creativity requirements of copyright protection). For a discussion of the originality and
creativity requirements of copyright protection, see infra note 51. If an author could have
exclusive rights in an idea simply by writing it down and claiming copyright in the result,
copyright law would serve a function broader than patent law, and inventors could circumvent
the stringent requirements for patent protection.
Some cases also base the dichotomy between idea and expression on the requirement for
originality. Since an author does not create facts, they do not originate with the author and
therefore do not qualify for copyright protection. See Miller, 650 F.2d at 1368-69 (citing 1 M.
NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.03[E], at 2-34.1 (1980)). This
reasoning provides a poor basis for the doctrine, however, because it falsely suggests that
original creative ideas in the abstract are protected by copyiight-a proposition that would
erase the dichotomy.
42. Recognition of the dichotomy originated in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). See
supra note 39.
43. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
44. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1931).
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copyright infringement and compare similarities between the original
and accused works at varying levels of particularity.45 In this process,
courts seek to determine whether there is enough similarity in expres-
sion, as distinguished from similarity of idea or fact, to support a find-
ing of infringement. 6 The process of comparison is called the "levels
of abstraction" test4 because it matches the two works at successively
higher levels of particularity.
Related to the dichotomy between idea and expression is the
enigmatic status of so-called "fact works."48 These are compilations
of information, such as dictionaries, directories, and databases, whose
primary function is to convey information, and whose manner of
expression is secondary. Such works enjoy copyright protection
under the explicit terms of the Copyright Act of 1976,49 as well as
longstanding precedent, 0 but their protection is difficult to reconcile
45. Perhaps the best way to illustrate the process of comparison is to juxtapose two leading
opinions of Judge Learned Hand, both of which considered claims that a motion picture
infringed a preexisting work. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54-
56 (2d Cir.) (infringement found because details of plot, character, incident, and sequence were
copied), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936); Nichols, 45 F.2d at 122-23 (no infringement found
because only general theme was copied). Judge Hand hinted at the complexity of the process
when he complained in Nichols about the "length of the record." Id. at 123.
46. For more recent illustrations of the process of comparison, see, e.g., Olson v. Nat'l
Broadcasting Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1454 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming judgment for defendant,
notwithstanding the verdict, because defendant's television show was not substantially similar
to plaintiff's proposed show even under "extrinsic" test for similarity of ideas); Whelan
Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1238-40, 124248 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987). Despite lack of literal copying, the Third Circuit
found that one computer program infringed another, based on similarities in origin, structure,
sequence, and organization. Id. at 1242-46. The court, however, separated its discussions of
infringement and the dichotomy between idea and expression. See id. at 1235-39.
47. The phrase is Professor Nimmer's. See 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[A], at 13-23 (1988). However, the process owes its origin to Judge
Learned Hand, who spoke of applying a "series of abstractions" of increasing generality to the
accused and original works in order to determine the dividing line between protected
expression and unprotected ideas. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
48. See generally Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of
Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516 (1981); Gorman, Copyright Protection for
the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (1963).
49. The statute defines a "compilation" as "a work formed by the collection . . . of
preexisting... data," 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982), and states that compilations are proper subject
matter for copyright protection, see id. at § 103. The House Report indicates that "[a]
'compilation' results from a process of selecting, bringing together, organizing, and arranging
previously existing material of all kinds, regardless of whether the individual items in the
material have been or ever could have been subject to copyright." HousE REPORT, supra note
6, at 57; see also Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1370 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Directories should be recognized as "being in a category by themselves" because the
Copyright Act of 1909 and case law make them copyrightable, despite the fact they are merely
collections of "facts" or "ideas.").
50. See, e.g., United Tel. Co. of Mo. v. Johnson Publishing Co., 855 F.2d 604, 607-09 (8th
Cir. 1988) (protecting new listings in telephone directory); Schroeder v. William Morrow &
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with the dichotomy between idea and expression. For example, a tele-
phone directory contains nothing more than items of information
(names, addresses, and telephone numbers) that are in the public
domain, coupled with an alphabetical arrangement that lacks even the
minimal originality and creativity required for copyright protection.51
Courts are obliged to protect such works because the copyright stat-
ute clearly covers them.52 Yet the theoretical difficulty of supporting
protection for an unoriginal combination of unprotectable elements
Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1977) (protecting directory of gardening nurseries with narrative
descriptions); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 485-86 (9th Cir. 1937) (protecting
telephone directory); Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d Cir.)
(protecting directory of jewelry outlets), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922); National Business
Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89, 92-95 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (collecting cases);
see also Denicola, supra note 48, at 527 ("Compilations of facts have long rested securely
within the scope of copyright.").
51. All copyrighted works must satisfy the requirements of originality and creativity. See
Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 668-69 & nn.5-7
(7th Cir. 1986) (telecasts of baseball games met both requirements), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941
(1987); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (plastic copy of
antique cast iron "Uncle Sam" bank failed to meet originality requirement), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 857 (1976); Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 552, 554 (7th Cir. 1956) (hymn based upon old
ethnic folk song was original).
Unlike the "novelty" requirement for patent protection, which copyrighted works need
not satisfy, see Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 668 n.6, the "originality" and "creativity"
requirements for copyright protection are not particularly stiff. A work may be original under
copyright law if it contains something more than mere copying. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884) (work is "original" if it "owes its
origin" to the "author"); Soptra Fabrics Corp. v. Stafford Knitting Mills, Inc., 490 F.2d 1092,
1094 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (minor modifications to fabric pattern made in repeating it to
cover a whole bolt of cloth and to join it smoothly at edges satisfy originality requirement);
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951) (mezzotint
engravings of old master's paintings satisfy requirement: author need only contribute
"something more than a 'merely trivial' variation."). The "creativity" requirement-a
creation of the courts--is similarly modest. See Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859,
862-63 (2d Cir. 1984) (directory of 18,000 baseball cards that classified 5,000 as "premium"
cards satisfies "creativity" requirement).
Nevertheless, the requirements do have substance. For example, the Second Circuit
upheld a finding that a compilation of index cards listing the issuers, call dates, call prices, and
similar information for callable bonds did not satisfy the "independent creation" requirement
and therefore could not be copyrighted. See Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors
Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 207-08 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 79 (1987). An
alphabetical array of names and addresses would seem to have little more originality or
creativity than these "called bond cards."
52. The Second Circuit is the most niggardly of the federal appellate courts in providing
copyright protection for fact works. See Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d at 207 (There
was "insufficient proof of 'independent creation' to render . . . Daily Bond Cards
copyrightable."). Compare Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d
Cir.) (labor of research not protected), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980), with Schroeder, 566
F.2d at 5 (labor of preparing compilation protected). Nevertheless, even the Second Circuit
has protected directories that met its standards for creativity. See Eckes, 736 F.2d at 863.
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makes the extent and basis of that protection uncertain.53
The dichotomy between idea and expression affects fair use anal-
ysis in two ways. First, the rule that copyright does not protect ideas
serves as the primary safety valve for first amendment concerns,
thereby relieving some of the pressure to tip the scales of fair use anal-
ysis in favor of the public interest.54 Since copyright does not protect
53. Professor Denicola has identified and compared three different judicial approaches to
compilations of data, which focus on (1) the arrangement of the data, (2) the labor involved in
collecting the data, and (3) the selection or choice of particular data. See Denicola, supra note
48, at 527-32. He finds all three approaches to some degree theoretically and practically
unsatisfactory and concludes that "[i]t is impossible to dictate in advance the extent of an
appropriation of information necessary to justify a finding of infringement." Id. at 532.
54. The dichotomy between idea and expression "strike[s] a definitional balance between
the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while
still protecting an author's expression." Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (quoting with approval Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)).
In Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the public importance
of material borrowed by an accused work should predispose courts to find fair use. See Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. at 559; infra text accompanying notes 212-17. The Court thus implicitly
placed the weight of accommodation with the first amendment squarely upon the dichotomy
between idea and expression. See also Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The public interest in the free flow of
information is assured by the law's refusal to recognize a valid copyright in facts."); Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir.
1977) (The "idea-expression line represents an acceptable definitional balance as between
copyright and free speech interests.") (quoting Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1192-93 (1970)).
See generally Note, Copyright Infringement and the First Amendment, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
320, 324-26 (1979) (discussing the importance of the dichotomy between idea and expression
as a device for accomodating free speech interests).
This result appears reasonable because the core of first amendment concern is not the
details of expression, but the ideas and facts expressed. The precise manner of expressing an
idea has little effect on the "free marketplace of ideas" under the first amendment, except
perhaps in the rare case in which the manner of expression is an important idea or historical
fact in itself. See infra text accompanying notes 378-402.
Even in such cases, however, copyright doctrine may avoid a collision with first
amendment values because expression itself loses copyright protection when it merges with the
underlying idea. When an idea can be expressed in only a limited number of ways, both the
idea and the few alternative forms of expression are ineligible for copyright protection. See,
e.g., Educational Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 539-40 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding
standardized test questions capable of expression in sufficient variety to avoid merger
doctrine); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir.
1983) (remanding case for further fact finding to determine whether computer operating
system software can be expressed in alternative ways), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984);
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (jewel-
encrusted "bee" pin cannot be protected because idea is "indistinguishable" from expression);
Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant accused of copying plaintiff's two-paragraph rules for promotional
sweepstakes, and holding expression to be merged with idea).
Even where the number of possible modes of expression is not so limited as to invoke the
merger doctrine, courts may restrict the scope and strength of copyright protection if the
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the facts and ideas in a work, they may be used freely by later authors
and need not be considered in applying the fair use calculus. Second,
because copyright does not protect ideas, fact works are disfavored in
fair use analysis." Other things being equal, a finding of fair use is
more readily made when the work used is a fact work, than when, for
example, it is a work of fiction or a creative work of art. By loosening
the chains of copyright exclusivity for fact works, this interpretation
helps to maintain a free flow of ideas and information.
B. The Fair Use Doctrine
Neither the dichotomy between idea and expression nor the
numerous specific statutory exceptions give copyright law real flexibil-
ity. Although the line between idea and expression is often hard to
discern, its location is not intended to vary, and the specific statutory
exceptions generally have only limited scope. In contrast, the fair use
doctrine applies to any copyrighted work and is intended to soften the
contours of copyright law as the circumstances may demand. It
therefore can give copyright law great flexibility. The nature and
extent of that flexibility, however, depends on the underlying policies.
This Section identifies those policies, explores how they have been
perceived in the legal community, and notes how those perceptions in
some cases differ from the history of fair use doctrine and Congress'
intent in codifying it.
1. POLICIES UNDERLYING FAIR USE
Copyright law seeks to encourage not only the creation of works
of authorship, but also their wide dissemination and use. It addresses
both goals by giving copyright holders the exclusive right to profit
from the dissemination and use of copyrighted works.56 By allowing
expression of a work is closely intertwined with underlying facts or ideas. See, e.g., Hoehling,
618 F.2d at 980 (historical work is protected only against infringers who "bodily appropriate
the expression"); Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir.) (holding
in the alternative that (1) protection of legal forms does not extend to language "incidental" to
use of underlying idea, and (2) forms were in public domain), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 375-78.
56. One of the Supreme Court's most memorable statements of this policy appeared in
Mazer v. Stein:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort
by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in "Science and useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to
such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services
rendered.
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
Other decisions, however, focus less on the reward to the author and more on the incen-
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copyright holders to control the reproduction and dissemination of
their copyrighted works, however, copyright law may inhibit the free
flow of information and impede the creation of new works based upon
old ones. 7 Thus the incentive for creativity that copyright seeks to
foster may conflict with the goal of encouraging wide use of copy-
righted works once created.
In attempting to accommodate these conflicting policies, the fair
use doctrine addresses the fundamental paradox of copyright law, and
indeed of all intellectual property law: the exclusive rights granted to
authors may hinder the creation of new works from old ones, while at
the same time providing the financial incentives without which the old
works might never have been created. By loosening the chains of
exclusivity under appropriate circumstances, the fair use doctrine
strikes a balance between the policies of fostering creativity and
tive that the reward creates. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 546 (1985) ("[T]he monopoly granted by copyright actively served its intended pur-
pose of inducing the creation of new material of potential historical value."); Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (Copyright "is intended to motivate
the creative activity of authors ... by the provision of a special reward."); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The copyright law, like the patent stat-
ute, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.... [R]eward to the author or artist
serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius.").
In the related field of patent law, courts also have stressed the goal of inducing investment
in creative activity. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974)
(Patent grants encourage inventors "to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research
and development."); Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599, modified on other
grounds, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985), quoted with approval in Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd.,
781 F.2d 861, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The encouragement of investment-based risk is the funda-
mental purpose of the patent grant .... ").
Encouragement of investment in creative effort is no less a worthy goal in copyright law.
Indeed, investment becomes more significant with increases in the costs of new media of
expression and of services of creative personnel, such as writers, directors, actors, singers, and
set designers.
57. See, e.g., Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 549. The Court stated that an author's consent to
"fair use" had always been implied "as a necessary incident of the constitutional policy of
promoting the progress of science and the useful arts, since a prohibition of such use would
inhibit subsequent writers from attempting to improve upon prior works and thus... frustrate
the very ends sought to be obtained." Id. (quoting H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND
LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)); see also Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429 (Patent and
copyright law "involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the
control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's
competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand.");
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d Cir.) ("Knowledge is expanded
as well by granting new authors of historical works a relatively free hand to build upon the
work of their predecessors." (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Meeropol v.
Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977) (Fair use balances "the exclusive right of a
copyright holder with the public's interest in dissemination of information affecting areas of
universal concern, such as art, science, history, or industry." (citation omitted)), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
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encouraging wide dissemination and use of creative works."8 In the
58. In his recent article, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, Professor Fisher recognizes
the importance of the balance between incentives for creativity and broad dissemination of
copyrighted works, which he calls "social utility." Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use
Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1687-88 (1988). However, he discerns three alternative
values in the text of the Sony and Nation Enterprises opinions: (1) authors' natural rights to
the fruits of their labors, see id. at 1688-89; (2) authors' rights to privacy and creative control,
see id. at 1690; and (3) "propriety and custom," see id. at 1678-81, 1691. Observing that the
four values together are inconsistent, Professor Fisher implies that the fair use doctrine has no
firm normative foundation and therefore attempts to rebuild it. See id. at 1691-92.
Although the alternative norms that Professor Fisher perceives may fairly be found in the
text of the Sony and Nation Enterprises opinions, their importance as fundamental values
wanes to the vanishing point when one looks beyond those cases. Since the founding of our
nation, alternative norms have been clearly subordinated to the overriding goal of "social
utility." The framers emphatically rejected a "natural rights" approach to intellectual
property in favor of a utilitarian approach, as the Supreme Court has recognized. See Graham
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8-9 & n.2 (1966) (in part quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Mr. Isaac McPherson (August 13, 1813) from VI THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
180-81 (Wash. ed. 1861)); Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 29
(1923) (dictum: distinguishing right under patent to exclude others from inventors' natural
right to practice processes for making alcoholic beverages, which had been extinguished by
prohibition); United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 247 (1897) (patent rights
are statutory, not "natural" rights). Moreover, the framers' value choice is explicit in the
Constitution, which requires copyright and patent law "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Respecting this constitutional directive, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the primacy of "utilitarian" aims-incentives for
creativity-over rewards per se as goals of copyright law. See, e.g., Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. at 158; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (citing Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131); see generally supra note 56. Under American law, financial rewards to authors exist
not in recognition of any natural rights in their labor, but as a means to an end-the
promotion of further creativity by them and by others. Indeed, all the Justices on both sides in
Sony and Nation Enterprises seem to have recognized this fundamental point. See supra note
56; infra note 276 and accompanying text.
Professor Fisher's other alternative norms appear more as factors to be considered under
specific circumstances than fundamental values of the copyright system. Privacy has little
relevance to published works (which comprise the vast majority of works for which copyright
protection is asserted), although it has some importance for unpublished works. See infra
Sections IV(B), V(E)(2). Creative control also may have some relevance to the scope of fair
use in unpublished or unfinished works. See infra text accompanying note 209; Fisher, supra,
at 1773-74, 1780 (arguing that creative control should be considered for any unfinished work,
whether or not it is published). *Yet raising creative control to the level of a fundamental
copyright norm overemphasizes its importance and ignores American courts' consistent
rejection of the protection of authors' creative control found in some foreign copyright laws
under the rubric of moral rights. See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846
F.2d 1485, 1498-99 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (observing that analogues to moral rights in American
law rely on statutes and common law other than copyright), cert. granted on other grounds,
109 S. Ct. 362 (1988); Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976)
("American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or provide a
cause of action for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than
the personal rights of authors."); 134 CONG. REC. S14,549, 14,557-58 (daly ed. Oct. 5, 1988)
(remarks of Sen. Hatch on Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, reviewing
American courts' consistent rejection of moral rights under U.S. copyright law); Final Report
of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, reprinted in 10
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 513, 547-57 (1986) (U.S. protection of moral rights under noncopyright
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process, it helps to avoid a collision between copyright law and the
first amendment.
2. POLICY BALANCING BY COURTS AND LEGAL COMMENTATORS
Throughout the development of fair use doctrine, courts have
realized that it both expresses and helps to resolve the tension
between these conflicting copyright policies. Two leading cases illus-
trate how the courts have tried to balance these policies in applying
the fair use doctrine.5 9
a. Judicial Treatment
The first case, Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House,
Inc., I involved the reclusive billionaire inventor Howard Hughes. To
satisfy his "passion for personal anonymity," Hughes tried to prevent
publication of an unauthorized biography of him that Random House
was preparing.6 To do so, he incorporated Rosemont Enterprises,
which acquired the copyrights in certain Look magazine articles
about Hughes that had been used in preparing the biography.62
Hughes then had Rosemont sue Random House for copyright
infringement, seeking an injunction against publication of the biogra-
phy.63 The district court granted the injunction," but the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.65
For purposes of vacating the preliminary injunction, the Second
Circuit found the use of the Look articles fair,66 relying in part on the
statutory and common law is sufficient to meet moral rights requirements of Article 6 of the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.); Kwall, Copyright and
the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 17-34 (1985)
(discussing the weaknesses of American statutory and common law compared to foreign
protection of moral rights).
Finally, although a few courts have considered notions of "custom and propriety" in
applying the fair use doctrine, the inconsistency of these notions with the fundamental
utilitarian values underlying copyright law seems reason to deemphasize them, not to
reconstruct the doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 511-26. In short, over two
hundred years of history have clarified the fundamental values underlying U.S. intellectual
property law in general, and our copyright law in particular. A decent respect for those values
may require reconstruction of the Sony and Nation Enterprises opinions but should not require
reconstruction of the fair use doctrine as codified in 17 U.S.C. Section 107.
59. Both cases were decided before the Copyright Act of 1976 and its codification of "fair
use" became effective.
60. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
61. Id. at 304-05.
62. See id. at 305; Id. at 312-13 (Lumbard & Hays, JJ., concurring).
63. See id. at 304-05 (majority opinion).
64. See id. at 304.
65. See id. at 311.
66. See id. at 309-l1.
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public's right to know about famous public figures like Hughes. Two
judges concurred on the ground that Hughes had caused the copy-
right to be purchased solely to suppress the biography.67 They there-
fore would have denied injunctive relief under the equitable doctrine
of "unclean hands." 68
In the second case, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,69 a
publisher of medical journals sued the National Institutes of Health
and the National Library of Medicine for copyright infringement. 70
These research institutions had standard procedures for systematic
photocopying, with some limitations, of entire articles from any of
three thousand medical research journals at the request of medical
researchers. 71 The Court of Claims found the evidence insufficient to
prove that the publisher would be substantially harmed by these prac-
tices 72 and, "convinced that medicine and medical research [would]
be injured by holding these particular practices to be an infringe-
ment,"'73 held the use fair.74 An equally divided Supreme Court sum-
marily affirmed this decision without opinion. 75
Both Rosemont and Williams & Wilkins illustrate the importance
of policy in fair use analysis. In Rosemont, the dissemination interest
at stake was the public's right to know about a well-known public
figure 76-a ight with clear first amendment overtones. 77 In Williams
& Wilkins, the dissemination interest at stake was somewhat different:
the public's interest in medical researchers' efficient and free access to
medical literature, which presumably leads to progress in medicine.78
The cases differed, however, in the strength of the countervailing
67. See id. at 311-13 (Lumbard & Hays, JJ., concurring).
68. See id. at 313.
69. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd without opinion, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam).
70. See id. at 1346-47. The suit was for "reasonable and entire compensation" under 28
U.S.C. § 1498(b), which authorizes damage actions against the federal government for patent
and copyright infringement. The Court of Claims was not empowered to grant injunctive
relief. See Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1346 n.l; id. at 1386 (Nichols, J., dissenting).
71. See id. at 1347-49. In his dissent, Chief Judge Cowen described the Institutes'
photocopying practices as follows: "What we have before us is a case of wholesale, machine
copying, and distribution of copyrighted material by defendant's libraries on a scale so vast
that it dwarfs the output of many small publishing companies." Id. at 1364 (Cowen, J.,
dissenting). Only four of the plaintiff's journals were involved, however. See id. at 1347.
72. See id. at 1357-59 (discussing inferences of the trial judge).
73. Id. at 1354.
74. Id. at 1362-63.
75. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam).
76. See Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
77. In their concurring opinion, Judges Lumbard and Hays explicitly recognized the first
amendment basis of the decision. See id. at 311 (Lumbard & Hays, JJ., concurring).
78. See Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1354, 1356-57.
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policies. In Rosemont, the interests of the copyright holder were
weak. The articles that were allegedly used unfairly had been written,
published, and paid for more than a decade before the infringement
action arose,79 and Hughes' apparent intention was to suppress fur-
ther publication."0 Thus it was hard to argue that incentives for crea-
tivity required a narrow interpretation of the fair use doctrine.
Indeed, the only substantial countervailing interest to the public's
right to know was Hughes' interest in privacy. Yet this interest was
hardly compelling, at least insofar as the Look articles were con-
cerned, because they had already been published.
In Williams & Wilkins, however, the balancing of policies was
more difficult. As the dissenters pointed out, two of the plaintiff's
four medical journals had lost subscribers, and three had suffered rev-
enue losses, during portions of the relevant time period.8, Moreover,
the publisher had licensed a separate entity to provide photocopies of
out-of-print articles for a fee.8 2 Thus, there was both some evidence
of an adverse impact on the copyright holder's revenue-and hence,
on the incentive to create 83 -and an existing mechanism for providing
copyrighted material subject to payment of royalties, at least for out-
of-print articles. The court concluded, however, that the accused
copying practices had not caused the plaintiff any loss, citing as proof
the plaintiff's general increases in subscription levels over the relevant
time period.84
79. See Rosemont Enters., 366 F.2d at 310 ("There is no suggestion that the Look articles
are in current publication or ever have been since their single appearance in 1954.").
80. See id. at 313 (Lumbard & Hays, JJ., concurring) (purchase of copyrights part of plan
to suppress biography).
81. See William & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1370 (Cowen, C.J., dissenting).
82. See id. (The Institute of Scientific Information was licensed to provide photocopies of
out-of-print articles.). The dissenters also pointed out that supplying back issues and copies
was an important new source of revenue for journal publishers. See id.
Today, the Copyright Clearance Center and a number of similar organizations undertake
to provide researchers with copies of articles from scholarly literature for relatively
insubstantial fees. For a discussion of the operations of the Copyright Clearance Center, taken
in part from its own brochure, see Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.
793, 805 (1982) (denying the Center tax-exempt treatment).
83. The effect of a use alleged to be fair upon the copyright holder's potential market is of
predominant importance in modern fair use jurisprudence. See infra text accompanying notes
156-57, 180-81, 296-300, 468-70.
84. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1357-58 (Ct. Cl. 1973),
aff'd mem., 420 U.S. 376 (1975). The late Professor Nimmer criticized this decision as
"seriously in error" because, in his view, it confused the distinct issues of liability and damages
and denied liability for lack of proof of damages. See 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note
47, § 13.05[E][4][c], at 13-104 to -105.
Proof of damages was not an element of a copyright infringement claim under the
Copyright Act of 1909-the statute applied in Williams & Wilkins. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.
§ 101(a) (1970) (injunctive relief available to restrain further infringement); id. at § 101(b)
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In any event, the real basis of the Williams & Wilkins decision
appears to be the majority's fear that medical research would suffer if
researchers had to request copies of medical articles by mail and per-
haps wait weeks for them to arrive, or if they had to wait in line to use
the few library copies available. s5 Apparently the majority saw the
need for rapid and efficient dissemination of medical literature as
more important than the speculative and arguably minor adverse
impact of copying on subscription revenues demonstrated on the rec-
(minimum statutory damages, in lieu of actual damages and infringer's profits); see also Fred
Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (L. Hand, J.) (providing injunctive
relief and minimum statutory damages for infringement of eight-note "ostinato" in popular
song, although popularity of both plaintiff's and defendant's songs had faded and actual
damage was unlikely).
Nor is proof of damages an element of copyright claims today. See 17 U.S.C. § 502
(1982) (injunctive relief); id. at § 504(c) (copyright owner may elect to recover statutory
damages in lieu of actual damages and infringer's profits at any time before final judgment); see
also Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 92-93, 100 (2d Cir.) (granting preliminary
injunction against paraphrasing of unpublished letters of a famous author), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 213 (1987).
Nevertheless, Nimmer's criticism appears to miss the point. The majority on the Court of
Claims addressed the issue of liability and found the use fair. They did so by in part balancing
the potential for harm to the copyright holder's interests against the harm to research and the
public interest that might result from a finding of infringement. See Williams & Wilkins, 487
F.2d at 1353-54.
If the Williams & Wilkins court erred, its error lay in two other directions. First, the
court failed to consider the impact on the publishers' potential market for new subscriptions,
reprints, and back issues. Instead, it focused on the publishers' slight increase in actual
subscription rates. The dissenters rightly took the court to task for application of an incorrect
legal standard-a focus on actual rather than potential market injury. See Williams &
Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1367-68 (Cowen, J., dissenting). The publishers' revenue might have been
higher still if the medical laboratories had been forced to buy extra subscriptions or reprints.
Second, the court seemed to confuse requiring compensation for photocopying with
stopping it altogether. Because the court lacked the power to impose a "compromise" solution
such as compulsory licensing, it feared that a finding of infringement might lead to injunctions
in other courts, against nongovernmental libraries, or might otherwise curtail photocopying
for research purposes. See id. at 1360-61, 1363. The dissenters, however, pointed out that a
contrary decision would not stop photocopying. See id. at 1386 (because the Court of Claims
has no power to grant injunctive relief); id. at 1386-87 (because other courts have equitable
discretion to avoid negative impacts on research); id. at 1371 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (because
the plaintiffs did not want to stop the photocopying, but rather to be paid for it-and then only
in amounts that the dissenters estimated to be hundreds of dollars per year). In any event, the
majority's decision appears to have been motivated partly by the putative effect of a finding of
infringement on nongovernmental research in laboratories not before the court.
85. See Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1358. Apparently the court assumed that
researchers would forego obtaining extra copies of the articles rather than pay for them. See id.
at 1357. Although the court did not stress the time-delay factor, it did point to the "wholly
inadequate" mechanisms for supplying reprints and back issues and the "unrealistic"
expectation that the libraries would purchase extra subscriptions "on the chance that an
indeterminate number of articles in an indeterminate number of issues will be requested at
indeterminate times." Id. at 1356, 1357.
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ord.8 6 Seeing no practical way both to keep the wheels of medical
research turning and to compensate the copyright holders, the court
chose to subordinate the copyright holders' interests to the greater
public good. The even split among the Supreme Court Justices under-
scores the closeness of this court's 4-3 decision.87
Given the peculiar facts of Rosemont, it is inconceivable that its
outcome would discourage a single author from writing for fear of
losing the economic benefits of his work. Because the accused work
was on a subject of clear public interest and deserved wide dissemina-
tion, the Second Circuit's finding of fair use seems unremarkable. The
decision in Williams & Wilkins was more difficult, but the balance
struck by the Court of Claims also seems justified, if one accepts the
majority's view of the research world at that time.8 8 Although both
harm to the publisher and harm to medical progress were far from
certain, an adverse effect of a finding of infringement on medical
research appeared more imminent and more important than a some-
what speculative decrease in the publisher's income. Accordingly,
sensitivity to copyright policy probably justified the findings of fair
use in both cases.
b. Commentary
As important as policy may have been in these two cases, balanc-
ing of broad policies alone cannot serve as a general prescription for
applying the doctrine of fair use. The law must govern by rules and
standards, turning to policy only in close cases. Otherwise, courts
would usurp the function of the legislature, and their decisions would
be difficult to predict.
The problem is that fair use, as a general and flexible doctrine, is
not susceptible of expression in precise rules or simple standards.
Congress therefore did not prescribe any rules or standards, but
instead provided four nonexclusive factual considerations that courts
86. In the absence of a statutory compulsory licensing scheme, the court was reluctant to
make a decision that might serve as a precedent for injunctive relief in other courts, and
thereby leave the progress of medical research to the tender mercies of publishers' self-interest.
See id. at 1360; supra note 84.
87. An equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Claims' decision without
opinion. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). Justice Blackmun
took no part in the decision. See id.
88. In the majority's view, there was no practical means, consistent with law, to
compensate the copyright holders and yet retain the benefits of impromptu photocopying. See
supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. Today, with the benefit of hindsight, the Court
might find practical methods, including photocopying by third-party licensees, to distribute
copies of research literature at reasonable cost. See supra note 82. Apparently these copyright
clearance institutions were only in their infancy when Williams & Wilkins was decided.
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must weigh in applying the doctrine in specific cases.89 In so doing,
Congress tried to avoid oversimplification. Yet, at the same time, it
apparently wanted to impart direction and specificity to courts' delib-
erations in fair use cases, perhaps in the hope that consistent rules or
standards would emerge over time-if not for all classes of cases, at
least for specific fact patterns. In codifying fair use, Congress appar-
ently hoped to move the state of the law from ad hoc balancing of
policy to an intermediate station on the road, perhaps, to the develop-
ment of predictable standards.
Unfortunately, commentators have been slow to appreciate the
value of what Congress has done. For example, Leon Seltzer has pro-
posed a standard that would do no more and no less than institution-
alize ad hoc policy balancing.90 In a similar vein, Professor Wendy
Gordon has proposed a three-part standard that would rule a use fair
when: "(1) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to defend-
ant is socially desirable; and (3) an award of fair use would not cause
substantial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff copyright owner."'"
Although Professor Gordon's first factor reflects an important theo-
retical contribution-the introduction of economic market concepts
into the fair use calculus92 -the latter two appear similar to Seltzer's
policy-balancing test.93
Professor Gordon proposes adding both a procedural and a sub-
stantive gloss to the balancing test. She would require that market
failure be demonstrated before courts could begin policy balancing94
89. See infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
90. Seltzer's proposed fair use statute would read: "Fair use is use that is necessary for the
furtherance of knowledge, literature, and the arts and does not deprive the creator of the work
of an appropriately expected economic reward." Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in
Copyright: The "Exclusive Rights" Tensions in the New Copyright Act, 24 BULL. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 215, 243 (1977) (emphasis omitted), reprinted in L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND
FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 31 (1978). The scales of the balance of course would turn on judicial
interpretation of the word "appropriately." See Seltzer, supra, at 244.
Even before adoption of the Copyright Act of 1976, there was little need to codify such
policy balancing because courts, conscious of the fundamental policies underlying copyright
law, were aware of the broad policies to be balanced. The task for the codifiers was to take the
next step, away from balancing acts and toward detailed and consistent handling of relevant
factual circumstances.
91. Gordorn supra note 7, at 271.
92. See id. at 259-71, 288-98. For a discussion of economic market concepts, see infra text
accompanying notes 334-44.
93. "The third and final part of the test is designed to maintain the appropriate balance
between the incentive and dissemination interests discussed earlier. Fair use should be denied
whenever a substantial injury appears that will impair incentives." Gordon, supra note 7, at
275-76. See generally id. at 298-312 (balancing social benefits of use against impact on
incentives under various circumstances).
94. See id. at 272, 298, 301 n.210, 302 n.213.
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and would give the defendant the burden of proving market failure
and social utility of the use. 95 Once the defendant had carried this
burden, Professor Gordon would require the plaintiff to come forward
with evidence of a "substantial" injury to incentives in order to rebut
the fair use defense. 96 In addition, she would encourage courts to
consider certain special circumstances, such as the plaintiff's implied
or likely consent to the use 97 or the improbability of such consent in
cases of negative criticism and parody. 98 Nonetheless, apart from the
threshold requirement for a showing of market failure, Professor
Gordon's analysis bears a striking resemblance to a process of balanc-
ing in which the social benefit of the use is weighed against the injury
to incentives that the use is likely to cause.99
Professor Fisher's recent article" is of the same genre. It
divines four fundamental values in Sony and Nation Enterprises,"10
views them as inconsistent, and concludes that their centrifugal force
will tear the fair use doctrine asunder.1 1 2 It therefore proceeds to
reconstruct the doctrine and its underlying values from scratch. 1 3 In
doing so, it explores two different approaches: an economic
calculus, 4 which Professor Fisher admits is far too complex and
unwieldy for practical use,"°5 and a normative approach based on Pro-
95. See id. at 285.
96. See id. at 286 (burden of proof); id. at 277-78, 310-12 (substantial injury).
97. See id. at 305-10.
98. See id. at 294-95. But see id. at 295-96 (antidissemination motives do not always show
market failure).
99. Professor Gordon recommends that courts make a finding of injury separately from
the balancing test in order to clarify analysis. See id. at 310-11. She does not say how this
finding would differ from application of the fourth (market effect) factor specified by Congress.
See text accompanying note 118.
100. See Fisher, supra note 58.
101. See id. at 1686-91. For a discussion of these values, see supra note 58.
102. See id. at 1691-92.
103. Professor Fisher is forthright about the sweeping nature of his proposals. See id. at
1695-98. Although he asserts that the current statute would support their adoption by the
judiciary, he advises "[r]eaders who disagree [to] treat the proposed reforms as suggestions for
amendments to the copyright statute." Id. at 1698 n.193.
104. See id. at 1698-1744.
105. See id. at 1718-19, 1739 ("Few judges would be willing ... to attempt an analysis of
[this] sort .... Of those inclined to commence such a project, few would succeed."). For an
outline of the analysis based on simplifying assumptions, see infra note 502.
In Professor Fisher's view, the chief practical value of his economic calculus lies in four
general principles that he derives from it: (1) a ranking of each putative use of a copyrighted
work according to its "incentive/loss ratio" (which Professor Fisher defines as the increase in
incentives for creativity that would flow from prohibiting the use, divided by the
corresponding loss in economic efficiency of dissemination of the copyrighted work), see id. at
1705-17, 1740; (2) a broad conception of economic harm to copyright owners flowing from
allegedly infringing uses, see id. at 1740-41; (3) a reluctance to permit uses that impair the
ability of the copyright owner to practice "price discrimination" by exploiting the work at
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fessor Fisher's view of "the good life" and his reading of philosophy
and jurisprudence.1 6 It then proposes a set of analytical factors,
which Professor Fisher derives from his notions of "the good life" and
the economic analysis. 107 Both its economic and philosophical analy-
ses virtually ignore the statute.
Like Professor Gordon's approach, Professor Fisher's exegesis
on economics and jurisprudence appears to be based upon an unstated
assumption: that Congress accomplished nothing by codification.
Professor Fisher's analysis begins and ends with Sony and Nation
Enterprises. °8 The inconsistent values that his article identifies as
underlying the doctrine of fair use are derived primariliy from the text
of those opinions.'09 Thus his article never asks, let alone answers,
whether the Supreme Court, and not Congress, might have failed. It
never explores whether the Supreme Court, by relying too heavily
upon Congress' stated intention not to freeze the law,' "° might have
ignored not only Congress' equally explicit intention to give the
courts some guidance,"' but also well-established precepts of case law
and the legislative mandate that the four fair use factors in Section
107 "shall" be considered."12
In any event, tests and standards based solely on policy do little
to advance the state of fair use analysis for three reasons. First, policy
balancing is not a new approach." 3 Second, because balancing tests
allow courts to weigh the policies that are placed in balance, they do
little to control and guide judicial discretion. As a result, decisions
based on balancing often turn on the personal value systems of
different prices under different terms and in different media, see id. at 1742-43; and (4) a
respect for "productivity," under which an "activity that improves upon or makes some
creative use of copyrighted material should be permitted more readily than an activity that
does not." Id. at 1743.
106. See id. at 1744-95. This section of Professor Fisher's article is aptly titled "Utopian
Analysis." It also prescribes values for the "Good Society." See id. at 1751-55.
107. See id. at 1780-83. Professor Fisher applies these factors to the facts of the Sony and
Nation Enterprises decisions and concludes that Sony was probably wrongly decided, but that
Nation Enterprises, a closer case, may have been decided correctly. This is similar to the
conclusions that this Article reaches, albeit by quite a different route for Sony, but the analysis
here would probably reverse the outcome in Nation Enterprises. See infra Section V(F).
108. See Fisher, supra note 58, at 1664-86, 1783.94.
109. See id. at 1686-92.
110. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 125-26.
112. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982), quoted infra in text accompanying note 118. Professor
Fisher's appeals to "the good life" are unlikely to impress the Supreme Court because a
majority of Justices now sitting on the Court appear to profess scant inclination, and to
disclaim any power, to make unfettered value choices in applying the nation's statutes.
113. For a discussion of policy balancing in Rosemont Enterprises and Williams & Wilkins,
see supra text accompanying notes 59-88.
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judges-for example, the extent to which they personally value such
things as scientific research in comparison with the commercial pros-
pects of publishers of scholarly journals.I14 Although selection among
competing values by judges is often unavoidable, building the doctrine
of fair use on such a foundation can hardly be said to promote consis-
tent and predictable decisions. Finally, Congress has spoken. How-
ever much generalized balancing of policies may have figured in fair
use analysis prior to codification, the present statute apparently was
intended to reduce courts' balancing of policies in the abstract.
In Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress appears to
have prescribed a remedy for unfettered judicial value judgment,
unfocused decisionmaking, and unpredictable results.' " That pre-
scription was pondered for some twenty-one years, 1 6 yet only ten
years have passed since the statute became effective. Perhaps courts
should give the congressional prescription a chance to work.
3. CODIFICATION
When Congress codified the fair use doctrine for the first time,' 17
it carefully hedged its language, reflecting the difficulty of reducing an
essentially unquantifiable doctrine to words. Section 107 reads as
follows:
114. It is hard to escape the conviction that the decision in Williams & Wilkins was
motivated by a personal choice of basic values. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
Despite the decision's clear basis in a choice between two conflicting values, see Williams
& Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1353-54, 1362-63 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd without
opinion, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). Williams & Wilkins purported to apply the four fair use factors
codified in Section 107, which then were part of the copyright revision proposal before
Congress. See id. at 1352-53 (citing H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1967). The
court, however, took pains to note that its decision had no center of gravity, and that no single
factor was decisive. See Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1353, 1362.
115. The late Professor Nimmer argued: "It is open to question . . . whether even [the]
modest goal [of aiding analysis] is achieved by the amorphous language of the statute. [Nation
Enterprises] demonstrates the almost infinite elasticity of each of the four factors, and their
concomitant inability to resolve difficult questions." 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note
47, § 13.05[A][5], at 13-82.
However, it seems to be the Court's opinions in Sony and Nation Enterprises that are
flawed, not the statute. If properly construed, the statute can provide substantial help in
clarifying and systematizing the law of fair use. Even Nimmer recognized that the four factors
"do offer some guidelines." Id. at § 13.05[A][5], 13-67. In any event, there is a fundamental
reason why courts and commentators should restrain their impulses to ignore the statute and
frolic through the fields of jurisprudential metaphysics: it happens to be the law of the land.
116. For a capsule history of the effort to revise copyright law, see Mills Music, Inc. v.
Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 159-61 (1985); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 462 n.9 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The revision of copyright law
under the Copyright Act of 1976 has been called more an "overhaul" than an amendment. See
Comment, Commissioned Works As Works Made for Hire Under the 1976 Copyright Act:
Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1290 (1987).
117. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 [setting forth the
exclusive rights of copyright owners], the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or pho-
norecords or by any other means specified by that section, for pur-
poses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work."'
Four points inhere in this language, and all are corroborated by
the legislative history. First, fair use is a complete defense to an
action for infringement of copyright. A use that is fair "is not an
infringement of copyright," even if all the legal prerequisites for a
claim of infringement otherwise are met." 9 Second, use for a purpose
stated in the statute is not automatically fair. The entire fair use cal-
culation must be applied to the enumerated uses as to any others. 120
Third, the words "shall include" make clear that the four factors
118. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
119. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 66.
120. The position of the words "the fair use" in the first sentence of Section 107, as well as
Congress' use of the definite article, indicate that the enumerated uses are only examples of the
type of conduct that may be fair use if the general requirements of the doctrine are met. See 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
In addition, the House Report strongly suggests that Section 107's explicit reference to
such things as news reporting, lack of profit motive, photocopying and multiple copies for
classroom use were not intended to create presumptions. Rather, those references were
intended to provide examples of circumstances that often involve fair use when all relevant
factors are considered. See House REPORT, supra note 6, at 65-66. The following excerpt
from The House Report is illustrative:
The Committee has amended the first of the criteria to be considered-"the
purpose and character of the use"-to state explicitly that this factor includes a
consideration of "whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit
educational purposes." This amendment is not intended to be interpreted as any
sort of not-for-profit limitation on educational uses of copyrighted works. It is an
express recognition that, as under the present law, the commercial or non-profit
character of an activity, while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and
should be weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions.
Id. at 66.
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specified in Section 107 are nonexclusive.' 21 Other factors may be
considered and in particular cases may be even more important than
the enumerated ones.1 22 Finally, the word "shall" clearly indicates
that courts must consider the four specified factors, whatever else they
may consider.123
Understanding the statute, however, becomes more problematic
upon examination of its legislative history. The House Report begins
by acknowledging the flexibility and generality of the "fair use" doc-
trine, stating:
Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use
doctrine over and over again, no real definition of the concept has
ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of
reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case
raising the question must be decided on its own facts.124
Having acknowledged that fair use is a witches' brew, the House
Report next seeks to justify its distilling the brew into four fractions:
On the other hand, the courts have evolved a set of criteria which,
though in no case definitive or determinative, provide some gauge
for balancing the equities. These criteria have been stated in vari-
ous ways, but essentially they can all be reduced to the four stan-
dards which have been adopted in section 107.125
Thus, although Congress recognized the need to apply the fair use
doctrine on a case-by-case basis, it felt that its four fractions offered a
reasonable substitute for the real witches' brew. 26
121. See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)
("The factors enumerated in [Section 107] are not meant to be exclusive.").
122. For example, the Nation Enterprises Court attached great importance to the
unpublished status of the underlying work in deciding that its use was unfair. See id. at 550-
55, 564. There are good reasons for considering unpublished status, but as an analytically
separate fair use factor. See infra Sections IV(B), V(E)(2).
123. Although Congress recognized its lack of omniscience by allowing other factors to be
considered, it apparently thought that the four factors in the statute would be sufficient to
resolve most cases. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
124. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 65. For additional legislative history, see H.R. REP.
No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5810; S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
Although the Senate Report addressed an earlier version of the copyright revision bill,
which was modified in significant respects before reaching final form, the language of Section
107 in that earlier version was not changed. Consequently, much of the Senate Report's
general commentary on the law of fair use was adopted verbatim in the House Report.
125. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 65.
126. Congress did not itself divine the four factors. Three of them date back to one of the
first American fair use decisions, in which Justice Story observed:
In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature
and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used,
and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work.
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The language of the statute and the House Report indicate Con-
gress' intention to provide a solid analytic basis for fair use doctrine.
Yet the House Report disclaims any intention to change the law or
hobble its progress. 27 The views of Congress as expressed in the
House Report therefore can be boiled down to three propositions:
first, no exact rules are possible; second, the statute does not freeze the
law; and third, the statute does not change the law.
These propositions may seem hard to reconcile with the clear
language of the statute, which demands that the four nonexclusive
factors always be considered. Can other factors, which are not likely
to be relevant in every case, be the sole source of flexibility in the law?
The answer appears to be no; there must be additional ways to pro-
vide the flexibility that Congress desired in order to accommodate
current law and adapt to rapid technological change. Two
approaches are plausible. First, in deciding individual cases, courts
might vary the weight given to each of the four enumerated factors
and find that one factor is more important in a given case, based on
the specific facts of that case, rather than on general principles of law.
Second, courts might vary the interpretation of each of the four fac-
tors based on the specific facts of each case. Although both of these
approaches lead to greater flexibility, the former appears preferable
because reinterpretation of the four factors from case to case would
render the factors uncertain and defeat Congress' attempt to provide a
consistent and coherent framework for analysis. Accordingly, courts
may decide fair use cases with greater consistency by considering
additional factors and, when appropriate, varying the weight of the
four factors that Congress enumerated, rather than by allowing the
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
Comparing this passage with Section 107 shows that, almost 150 years ago, Justice Story
identified three of the four factors-all except the "nature of the copyrighted work." See W.
PATRY, supra note 5, at 24-25.
127. The House Report states:
However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of
circumstances that can rise [sic] in particular cases precludes the formulation of
exact rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the
judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in
the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change. Beyond a
very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria
applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular
situations on a case-by-case basis. Section 107 is intended to restate the present
judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.
HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 66; see also Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder
Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980) (Congress "in no way intended to
depart from Court-created principles or to short-circuit further judicial development.").
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factors themselves, like images seen through a melting lens, to fade in
and out of focus.
In any event, one thing is manifest in both the statute and its
legislative history: Congress intended to replace the witches' brew of
equity and ad hoc policy balancing with more finely refined elixirs,
but without curtailing development of the doctrine in the common
law tradition. Now that the fair use doctrine has been codified, equity
and policy cannot be the sole basis for decision, or even a first resort.
Nor can policy be balanced in the air. To be sure, Congress recog-
nized the difficulty of the problem it was addressing and imposed no
simple rules or broad presumptions. Indeed, it would have abhorred
presumptions as oversimplification. Nonetheless, it did prescribe four
factors for analysis, and each decision must begin by considering
them.
III. THE RIDDLES OF SONY AND NATION ENTERPRISES
Prior to codification the Supreme Court had never addressed the
fair use doctrine. Twice the Court had the opportunity, but on both
occasions it was equally divided and summarily affirmed the lower
court's ruling without opinion. 2  Thus the large body of case law
that Congress intended to incorporate in Section 107 is devoid of
binding Supreme Court precedent, and the Court's opinions in Sony
and Nation Enterprises, following codification, assume particular
importance.
In each decision, however, the Supreme Court was badly
divided.'29 In each, there was a vehement dissent, and both the
majority and the dissent polluted the congressional prescription with
unwarranted broad presumptions. The results can hardly be called a
clarification of the law.
128. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 476 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The two cases in which the Court was divided were Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States and Benny v. Loew's Inc. See Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d 1345
(Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd without opinion, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); Benny, 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956),
aff'd without opinion sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43
(1958).
Like other decisions affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court, these two provide no
binding precedent for sister circuits, but serve only as the "law of the case" between the parties
involved. See Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1910).
129. In Sony, the Court voted 5-4 in favor of a liberal reading of fair use. Justices
Blackmun, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist dissented. In Nation Enterprises, the vote was 6-3
for a narrow reading of fair use, with Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall dissenting. These
votes reveal little, however, about doctrinal alignments on the Court because the facts of the
two cases were so different.
[Vol. 43:233
FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT LAW
A. An Analysis of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. (the "Betamax" Case)
In Sony, producers of copyrighted television programs sued mak-
ers and vendors of video tape recorders ("VTR's") for contributory
infringement of copyright.1 a0 The complaint alleged that users of
VTR's had infringed copyrights in the television programs by record-
ing them off the air without authorization, and that the defendants
were liable for the infringement because of their marketing of the
VTR's.' I  No consumers (users of VTR's) were named in the
complaint. 132
As the Court recognized, 13 3 the Copyright Act of 1976 does not
mention contributory infringement of copyright. There are, however,
specific statutory provisions governing contributory infringement of
patents.134 Under these provisions, the sale of an unpatented machine
is not contributory infringement unless the machine is a "material
part of the invention" known by the seller "to be especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement ... and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfring-
ing use."' 135 This rather narrow definition of contributory patent
infringement is firmly grounded in policy: if a patent holder could
enjoin the sale of a staple article of commerce merely because it could
be used to infringe the patent, he could extend the coverage of his
patent beyond its proper statutory and constitutional bounds. 36
In Sony, the Supreme Court borrowed this patent doctrine, con-
strued it in light of earlier copyright decisions on vicarious liability,
and created a new standard for contributory infringement of copy-
right. 3 7 It held that the sale of copying machines such as VTR's for
general use does not constitute contributory infringement if the
machines are "capable of substantial noninfringing uses. a13
By accepting this standard for contributory copyright infringe-
ment, the Supreme Court made its work easier, for determining
whether copying machines are "capable" of "substantial noninfring-
ing uses" does not require a detailed inquiry into the uses to which
they are actually put. It was therefore unnecessary to remand the
130. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 420, 437, 442.
131. See id. at 420.
132. See id. at 420, 434.
133. See id. at 434.
134. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)-(d) (1982); see also id. of § 271(b) (inducing infringement).
135. See id. at § 271(c).
136. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 440-41.
137. See id. at 440-42.
138. Id. at 442.
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case for further findings of fact on this issue, or to compile and com-
pare usage statistics. All that was required was to determine whether
"the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable
purposes."' 1
39
In Sony, the evidence showed that the predominant practice of
VTR owners was noncommercial taping of broadcast television pro-
grams in order to view them at a later time." 1 The VTR owners pri-
marily copied programs from "free" television for the purpose of
"time-shifting," not retaining library copies for repeated use.'41
Moreover, a significant number of owners of copyrights in sports, reli-
gious, educational, and other programs testified that they did not
object to private, noncommercial time-shifting for home use. 42
Indeed, some of them encouraged such time-shifting because it
enlarged their effective audience. 143
These authorized uses alone might have provided sufficient non-
infringing use to support the Court's ruling of no contributory
infringement. In the Court's words:
If there are millions of owners of VTR's who make copies of tele-
vised sports events, religious broadcasts, and educational programs
... and if the proprietors of those programs welcome the practice,
the business of supplying the equipment that makes such copying
feasible should not be stifled simply because the equipment is used
by some individuals to make unauthorized reproductions of
respondents' works. 44
Given the strength of that statement, the Court could have ended its
analysis there, but it did not. Instead, it went on to examine whether
unauthorized, noncommercial time-shifting for home use--which the
139. Id. The Court's use of verbal formulas was not terribly consistent. Compare id.
("[T]he product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.") with id. ("capable of
substantial noninfringing uses") and id. ("capable of commercially significant noninfringing
uses").
Although the Court's language was inconsistent, it differed from the dissent's formulation
in an important respect. The Sony majority would have excused the sale of copying machines
that are capable of commercially significant uses other than infringement, regardless of how
they are actually used. The dissenters, however, would have required a showing of actual
noninfringing use. See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
140 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 421, 423-24 & n.4.
141. A substantial number of surveyed consumers apparently had accumulated libraries of
recorded programs. See id. at 423 & n.3. But the plaintiffs apparently did not rely on this
point in their argument.
In any event, the case did not involve pay or cable television, the transfer of tapes, the
replaying of programs for profit, or any commercial purpose. See id. at 425.
142. See id. at 424, 443-47. Sony had taken a survey indicating that 7.3% of Betamax use
was to record such programs. See id. at 424.
143. See id. at 445-46 & n.27.
144. Id. at 446.
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evidence had shown was the predominant use of VTR's--constituted
copyright infringement. Because there was no question that time-
shifting involved copying, and that the copying was unauthorized,
this use seemed clearly to violate the copyright holders' exclusive
right of reproduction under Section 106(1) of the statute. Therefore,
in order to determine whether this use also was noninfringing, the
Court had to reach the issue of fair use.14 5
The Court's application of the fair use calculus in Sony is a
remarkable piece of work. Not only did the Court fail to address all
of the statutory factors that Congress decreed "shall" be considered,
but it also heavily relied upon nonstatutory "presumptions" that it
conjured out of thin air. In addressing the first of the four fair use
factors-the "purpose of the use"-the Court said:
Although not conclusive, the first factor requires that "the com-
mercial or nonprofit character of an activity" be weighed in any
fair use decision. If the Betamax were used to make copies for a
commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would presump-
tively be unfair. The contrary presumption is appropriate here,
however, because the District Court's findings plainly established
that time-shifting for private home use must be characterized as a
noncommercial, nonprofit activity.' 46
The juxtaposition of the first and second sentences of this passage is
one of the most remarkable nonsequiturs in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence. Beginning with the proposition that the commercial character
of a use must be considered as part of the single "purpose" factor in a
multifactor analysis, the Court concluded that commercial activity
raises a presumption against fair use.'47 Apparently, the Court
145. There are two possible explanations for the Court's apparent eagerness to reach this
issue, despite the lack of any compelling need to do so. First, although a decision based only
on authorized time-shifting may have resolved the legal problems of VTR manufacturers, it
would have left millions of individual VTR users vulnerable to potential direct infringement
actions by producers. Perhaps the Court sought to foreclose this possibility by judicial fiat.
Second, the Court may have reached the fair use issue because of the relative unimportance of
authorized time-shifting in the case. Perhaps the Court felt that noninfringing use at a level of
7.3% was not enough to justify rejection of contributory infringement claims.
A reluctance to rely on such a small percentage of noninfringing use is not unreasonable,
for the contributory infringement doctrine is a vital linchpin in the structure of patent law, and
such reliance might have significant unforeseen repercussions in that field. If this was the
reason for the Court's reaching fair use, however, it did not say so. At any rate, if the Court
had been concerned about the relative proportion of authorized and unauthorized time-
shifting, its proper course would have been to remand the case for further fact finding, as the
evidence before the Court on this point did not appear conclusive. The dissenters
recommended this course, although for different reasons. See infra text accompanying notes
165-68.
146. Sony, 464 U.S. at 448-49 (footnotes omitted).
147. This conclusion is the more remarkable because the Court, to support the proposition
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applied the presumption not just to the single "purpose" factor under
discussion, but to the entire fair use calculus. 148
The Court's statement that commercial activity raises a presump-
tion against fair use is even more remarkable because that branch of
the Court's presumption was entirely unnecessary to decide the case.
The district court had found, and the Supreme Court acknowledged,
that the use at issue was noncommercial.1 49 It is therefore tempting
to dismiss at least this branch of the twin "presumptions" as obiter
dictum. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reinforced it by repeating it
two paragraphs later 5 ° and by relying on it in its decision in Nation
Enterprises.'
Ignoring entirely the second fair use factor, "the nature of the
copyrighted work," the Court then turned to the third statutory fac-
tor, the "amount taken." Without further discussion, ittossed off this
factor as follows:
Moreover, when one considers the nature of a televised copy-
righted audiovisual work ... and that time-shifting merely enables
a viewer to see such a work which he had been invited to witness in
its entirety free of charge, the fact that the entire work is repro-
duced ... does not have its ordinary effect of militating against a
finding of fair use.' 52
In this attempt to appeal to common sense, the Court ignored both
the need to justify the substantiality of the amount taken with refer-
ence to the policies underlying copyright protection' 53 and much of
the history of fair use, throughout which the taking of an entire work
has rarely been viewed as fair. 154
Notwithstanding the Sony Court's startling nonsequitur regard-
that commercial character must "be weighed," quoted a passage from the House Report which
can only be construed as eschewing presumptions. See id. at 449 n.32 (quoting HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 6, at 66, quoted in part in supra note 120).
148. Given the brevity of the Court's discussion of fair use and its failure to address
seriously the middle two factors, the Court's decision must rest largely on its self-generated
presumption. The effect of the presumption, however, became less clear after the Court's
decision in Nation Enterprises. See infra text accompanying notes 219-23 & 277-85.
149. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 425.
150. See id. at 451, quoted infra at note 157.
151. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561-63 (1985).
152. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50 (citations omitted).
153. See infra Sections V(C)(l), V(C)(2).
154. See generally 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 47, § 13.05[A], at 13-79; id. at
§ 13.05[D], 13-90.10 to -93; infra note 420 and accompanying text. Before Sony, one of the
very few cases permitting appropriation of entire works was Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States. See Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd without opinion, 420 U.S.
376 (1975), discussed supra at Section II(B)(2)(a). Yet surely the purpose of the use in
Williams & Wilkins, progress in medical research, deserves more weight than the purpose of
the use in Sony, personal entertainment free of charge.
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ing presumptions, its treatment of the final, or "market effect," factor
is perhaps the most significant aspect of its decision. In its analysis,
the Court relied on the policy of incentives for authorship and
acknowledged that even noncommercial copying might undermine
that policy.' 55 After noting that "a use that has no demonstrable effect
upon the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work
need not be prohibited,"' 56 the Court continued as follows:
Thus, although every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege
that belongs to the owner of the copyright, noncommercial uses are
a different matter. A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copy-
righted work requires proof either that the particular use is harm-
ful, or that if it should become widespread, it would adversely
affect the potential market for the copyrighted work. Actual pres-
ent harm need not be shown; such a requirement would leave the
copyright holder with no defense against predictable damage. Nor
is it necessary to show with certainty that future harm will result.
What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence
that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists. If the
intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be pre-
sumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood
must be demonstrated.157
The Court then upheld the findings of the district court that the plain-
tiffs had demonstrated no likelihood of market effect.'5 "
Several twists of fair use jurisprudence emerge from the Court's
statement just quoted. First, the twin "presumptions" arising out of
the commercial or nonprofit character of the use rear their ugly heads
again. Apparently the Court hoped to infuse them by repetition with
what they lack in logic, authority, and consistency with the congres-
sional command. '59 Second, by strongly linking the statutory "mar-
ket effect" factor with the notion of "commercial use"-an aspect of
the "purpose" factor-the Court appeared to deprive the "market
effect" factor of much of its independent significance. Third, by-
requiring the plaintiff to show some likelihood of harm "by a prepon-
derance of the evidence" in cases involving noncommercial use, the
Court apparently shifted the burden of proof on the issue of fair use to
the plaintiff in those cases.'" Finally, and most important, by its ref-
155. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 450.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 451 (emphasis in original).
158. See id. at 451-56.
159. See infra Section IV(A).
160. Traditionally, fair use has been an affirmative defense in all cases. See W. PATRY,
supra note 5, at 477 & n.2 (citing cases under Copyright Act of 1909). Indeed, in its very next
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erence to "some meaningful likelihood of future harm" the Court
appeared to open the door to speculation concerning the likely effect
of similar uses of copyrighted works in the marketplace.' 61
Having opened the door to speculation in theory, at least for
future cases, the Court next slammed it shut in the plaintiffs' faces. In
the district court, the Sony plaintiffs had argued that noncommercial
time-shifting created three adverse market effects.' 62 First, they had
argued that people watching delayed recordings of broadcasts would
not be counted in the live audience by television rating services,
thereby causing the programs' ratings and advertising revenues to suf-
fer. Second, they had claimed that consumer replays of television
broadcasts would cut into revenues from live television and movie
attendance. Finally, they had claimed that time-shifting would
reduce the audience for television reruns and film rental exhibitions.
The Court, however, dismissed these claims in a few short sentences,
without substantive discussion, relying entirely on the district court's
conclusory findings of "no harm."' 163 The Court cited the district
court's oft-repeated conclusion-that any harm was "speculative and,
at best, minimal"-and observed that noncommercial time-shifting is
beneficial to the public because it extends the reach of broadcast tele-
vision audiences.164
fair use decision, the Court noted that "[t]he drafters [of section 107] resisted pressures from
special interest groups to create presumptive categories of fair use, but structured the provision
as an affirmative defense requiring a case-by-case analysis." Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (citing H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 37
(1967); W. PATRY, supra, at 477 & n.4). The plaintiff should have the burden of proof of the
"market effect" factor in the fair use calculus, but the defendants should bear the burden of
proof of fair use as a whole. See infra Section V(D)(l).
161. See infra Sections IV(C), V(D)(3).
162. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 452-53 (1984).
163. See id. at 452-54. The quality of the district court's reasoning is reflected in the
following points, which were summarized in the Supreme Court's opinion: (1) Betamax users
could not escape commercials because they had to watch the programs while recording them,
and fast-forwarding through commercials would be "too tedious," id. at 452 n.36; (2) VTR
usage would not impede watching television or going to movies because "Betamax owners will
play their tapes when there is nothing on television they wish to see and no movie they want to
attend," id. at 453 n.37; and (3) theater and film rental exhibitions will not suffer because
"time-shift recording entails viewing and erasing, so the program will no longer be on tape
when the later theater run begins," id. at 453 n.39. The district court reached the latter
conclusion despite evidence that a substantial number of surveyed consumers had accumulated
libraries of recorded programs. See id. at 423 & n.3.
As the dissent's analysis showed, see id. at 483 n.35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), the factual
findings of the district court were clearly erroneous. See infra note 185. Indeed, with the aid
of hindsight, the district court's reasoning appears laughable to any owner of a VTR. Every
rental of a prerecorded videocassette has added one more nail to the coffin of the court's
factual findings, so that today not even Count Dracula could emerge.
164. See id. at 454.
[Vol. 43:233
FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT LAW
The four dissenters in Sony took issue with nearly every aspect of
the majority's opinion. Regarding the standard for contributory
infringement of copyright, they viewed the majority's focus on the
capability of the copying machine, as distinguished from its actual
use, as creating too weak a prohibition against infringement. 65
Instead, the dissenters would have determined whether "a significant
portion of the product's [actual] use is noninfringing'" to assess lia-
bility for contributory infringement. The dissenters also disagreed
with the majority on the central issue of unauthorized time-shifting
for home use. They would have found that use unfair. 67 Accord-
ingly, to decide whether noninfringing uses were significant, the dis-
senters would have remanded the case to the district court to
determine the relative proportions of authorized and unauthorized
time-shifting.'68
In their fair use analysis, the dissenters were more careful than
the majority to respect the dictates of Congress. Unlike the majority,
they discussed all four of the statutory factors enumerated in Section
107.169 After discussing the doctrinal difficulties and the intent of
Section 107,70 they turned to questions of policy, balanced the goal of
creating incentives for creativity against the goal of encouraging free
dissemination of ideas, and concluded that a productive purpose is
critical to a finding of fair use.17 ' As an example, they compared
copying by an "ordinary user" to copying by a scholar and found the
former's use less deserving of protection. 7 2
165. See id. at 490-91 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 491 (emphasis in original).
167. See id. at 485-86.
168. See id. at 492-93.
169. See id. at 496-98. The dissenters took the majority to task for ignoring the second and
third factors. See id. at 496-97.
170. See id. at 475-76.
171. See id. at 477-80. The dissenters noted that all of the purposes explicitly mentioned in
the statute as likely candidates for fair use are productive. See id. at 478. They concluded as
follows: "Purely consumptive uses are certainly not what the fair use doctrine was designed to
protect, and the awkwardness of applying the statutory language to time-shifting only makes
clearer that fair use was designed to protect only uses that are productive." Id. at 496. Their
argument implicitly approved the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, which had relied heavily on
the unproductive nature of home copying in reversing the decision of the district court. See
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 971-72 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd,
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
172. Sony, 464 U.S. at 477-80 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
When the ordinary user decides that the [copyright] owner's price is too
high, and forgoes use of the work, only the individual is a loser. When the
scholar forgoes the use of a prior work, not only does his own work suffer, but
the public is deprived of his contribution to knowledge. The scholar's work, in
other words, produces external benefits from which everyone profits. In such a
case, the fair use doctrine acts as a form of subsidy-albeit at the first author's
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Applying these principles to the "purpose" factor, the dissenters
would have held in favor of the plaintiffs. They noted that time-shift-
ing was nothing less than the copying of entire works for their original
(primarily entertainment) purposes, and that the copiers added noth-
ing to those works.' 73 Unlike the majority, the dissenters rejected the
argument that the producers had made their broadcasts available for
free and therefore could not complain if users wished to copy and
view them at a later time.'74 They pointed out that the copyright
holder's exclusive performance right, which includes the right of
broadcast, is independent of the right of reproduction; the exercise of
one does not preclude the exercise or withholding of the other.175
Addressing the "nature of the copyrighted work," the dissenters
would have weighed this factor against fair use. 176 They noted that
80% of the programs recorded by VTR users were entertainment 177
and thus entitled to greater protection than informational works.' 71
Because VTR users copied entire television programs, they also would
have weighed the amount taken against fair use. Indeed, they thought
that the amount taken "might alone be sufficient to preclude a finding
of fair use.' ' 79
Turning to the final "market effect" factor, the dissenters gener-
ally agreed with the majority on the appropriate legal standard. Like
the majority, they focused on potential, not actual, harm to the copy-
right holder's market. 180 Accordingly, they would have required the
plaintiff to show only "a reasonable possibility that harm will result
from the proposed use," rather than any "actual ... or even probable
expense-to permit the second author to make limited use of the first author's
work for the public good .... But when a user reproduces an entire work and
uses it for its original purpose, with no added benefit to the public, the doctrine of
fair use usually does not apply. There is then no need whatsoever to provide the
ordinary user with a fair use subsidy at the author's expense.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
173. See id. at 480.
174. See id. at 497 n.49.
175. See id. at 480.
176. See id. at 496-97.
177. Sony's own consumer survey had produced this figure. See id. at 497.
178. See id. at 496-97. Works of fiction are generally entitled to a narrower scope of fair use
than "fact works." See infra notes 375-78 and accompanying text.
179. Sony, 464 U.S. at 497 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Except where "the effect on the
author is truly de minimis," as when one copies a newspaper clipping to send to a friend, the
dissenters felt unproductive copying of entire copyrighted works was not fair. See id. at 481-82.
180. "[A] particular use which may seem to have little or no economic impact on the
author's rights today can assume tremendous importance in times to come." Id. at 482
(quoting HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PT. 6, Supp. REP.
OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1965).
[Vol. 43:233
FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT LAW
harm.", 8 '
Yet despite this apparent agreement on the legal standard, the
dissenters differed with the majority on both the application of the
standard and the ultimate result in the case. Relying on its self-gener-
ated "presumption" in favor of noncommercial use, the majority
placed the burden of proving possible harm on the plaintiff.18 2 In con-
trast, the dissenters would have placed the burden on the defendant
because the use was nonproductive."8 3 Also unlike the majority, they
would have rejected the factual findings of the district court."8 4 In a
footnote, the dissenters methodically and correctly refuted the district
court's rejection of the producers' claims of harm. 185 Moreover, they
saw the VTR users' willingness to pay substantial sums for VTR's and
tapes as an independent basis for a finding of potential harm. If users
would pay for the ability to copy television programs, they reasoned,
then users also would pay for copies of the programs. Therefore their
free recording of those programs, without payment to the copyright
181. Id. Although this verbal formula differs from the majority's-"some meaningful
likelihood of future harm"-the difference appears to be more rhetoric than substance. See id.
at 451 (majority opinion). The dissenters, however, would have restricted their "reasonable
possibility of harm" standard to cases of nonproductive use and were unwilling to extend it to
the productive uses traditionally accorded fair use status. See id. at 482 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
182. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
183. "Rather, the infringer must demonstrate that he had not impaired the copyright
holder's ability to demand compensation from (or deny access to) any group who would
otherwise be willing to pay to see or hear the copyrighted work." Sony, 464 U.S. at 485
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). A fair reading of the dissent as a whole reveals an intent to place
the burden of proof on the defendant. See id. at 483-84 (district court applied incorrect
substantive standard and misallocated burden of proof); id. at 484 (copyright holders should
not bear risk of uncertainty created by rapid development of technology). However, one
reference to burden of proof was inconsistent. See id. at 482 ("[C]opyright holder need prove
only a potential for harm to the market." (emphasis in original)).
184. See id. at 483-86.
185. The dissent stated:
A VTR owner who has taped a favorite movie for repeated viewing will be
less likely to rent or buy a tape containing the same movie, watch a televised
rerun, or pay to see the movie at a theater. Although time-shifting may not
replace theater or rerun viewing or the purchase of prerecorded tapes or discs, it
may well replace rental usage; a VTR user who has recorded a first-run movie for
later viewing will have no need to rent a copy when he wants to see it. Both
library-builders and time-shifters may avoid commercials' the library-builder
may use the pause control to record without them, and all users may fast-forward
through commercials on playback.
Id. at 483 n.35.
The dissenters also noted expert testimony that showed a likely decrease in studio reve-
nues as a result of both time-shifting and library-building and the district court's own findings
that substantial library building had actually occurred. See id. For a discussion of the district
court's findings, see supra note 163.
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holders, by itself demonstrated an adverse market impact.1"6
B. An Analysis of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enterprises
In the very next Term after its Sony decision, the Supreme Court
again addressed the issue of fair use in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enterprises."7 This time, however, fair use was the only
issue. The defendant, the publisher of The Nation magazine, in effect
had conceded copyright infringement in the absence of fair use.'
The case involved the autobiography of former President Gerald
R. Ford, which Harper & Row and the Reader's Digest had agreed to
publish shortly after he left office.'8 9 Ford had given the publishers
the right to publish the autobiography in book form, as well as the
exclusive right to license prepublication excerpts.190 To protect these
rights, both Ford and the publishers had agreed to maintain confiden-
tial treatment of the manuscript. 191
Ford prepared the manuscript, consisting of some 200,000
words, 19 2 and the publishers licensed Time magazine to publish
excerpts of 7,500 words before the book was published. Time agreed
to pay $25,000 for this privilege in two installments-half in advance
and half upon publication. 193
Two or three weeks before the scheduled release of Time's arti-
cle, Victor Navasky, then editor of The Nation, received a copy of
Ford's entire manuscript from an unidentified source. Although
Navasky knew that he was not authorized to have the copy, he sensed
that the manuscript contained "hot news" and hastily prepared a
2,250 word article for immediate publication in The Nation.' His
article included a number of verbatim excerpts from Ford's manu-
script, but contained no original research or new material.' 95 After
The Nation published Navasky's article, Time cancelled its plans to
186. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
187. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
188. The defendant "admitted to lifting verbatim quotes of the author's original language
totaling between 300 and 400 words." Id. at 548.
189. See id. at 542.
190. See id.
191. The publishers agreed to keep the manuscript confidential. See id. at 564. Ford agreed
to "endeavor not to disseminate" any of the "unique information" in it through the public
news media. See id. at 603 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting publishing agreement).
192. See id. at 579, 587.
193. See id. at 542-43.
194. See id. at 543.
195. See id. The article was "composed of quotes, paraphrases, and facts drawn exclusively
from... [Ford's] manuscript." Id. Three hundred words were appropriated verbatim. See id.
at 544-45.
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publish excerpts from Ford's book and refused to pay the second
installment of the license fee. The publishers then sued The Nation
for copyright infringement, among other things. 196
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York found copyright infringement and no fair use and awarded
actual damages of $12,500-the unpaid amount of the license fee
due.197 Although recognizing that the historical facts in Ford's man-
uscript were not eligible for copyright protection, the court found the
"totality of these facts and memoranda collected together with Ford's
reflections" eligible for copyright protection.'9"
A divided United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed. 199 It rejected the district court's "totality" approach and, as
a result, its refusal to find fair use. In the Second Circuit's view, ideas
and facts were unprotectable, whether as part of a "totality" or other-
wise.2" Therefore it stripped away the ideas and facts from the man-
uscript, leaving "at most, approximately 300 words that are
copyrighted."' 20 1 With respect to the taking of those words, the Sec-
ond Circuit analyzed the four statutory factors and found fair use.202
It found Time's cancellation of its release to have been due to The
Nation's use of unprotected facts and ideas in Ford's manuscript,
rather than to appropriation of the 300 words protected by copy-
right.20 I Accordingly, it held the taking fair.2°
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit in a 6-3 deci-
sion. Avoiding both the "totality" issue and the task of distinguishing
idea from expression, the Court focused on the 300 words admittedly
taken verbatim.205 In its fair use analysis, however, the Supreme
Court differed with the Second Circuit as to each of the four statutory
factors and therefore ruled the use unfair.20 6
Before turning to the four statutory factors, the Court addressed
196. See id.
197. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072-73
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
198. See Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 544 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 471
U.S. 539 (1985)).
199. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 208-09 (2d Cir.
1983), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
200. See id. at 208.
201. See Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 544-45 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 206 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)).
202. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d at 207-08.
203. See id. at 208.
204. See id.
205. See Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 548-49.
206. See id. at 545, 560-69.
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two important issues of fair use doctrine. First, it held that unpub-
lished works are entitled to special protection in fair use analysis. 20 7
After reviewing the copyright statute's legislative history and Con-
gress' intention to preserve preexisting fair use doctrine, the Court
concluded that a special concern for unpublished works under preex-
isting law survived codification.208  As a matter of policy, it reasoned
that special protection of unpublished works would secure authors'
rights to privacy, promote full gestation of their creative effort, foster
artistic integrity, and preserve the significant economic value of the
right of first publication. °  Moreover, the Court perceived in these
interests a constitutional dimension derived from the first amend-
ment, namely, a freedom not to speak.210 Accordingly, it concluded
that "[u]nder ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control
the first public appearance of his undisseminated expression will out-
weigh a claim of fair use." 21'
As a second preliminary point, the Court rejected The Nation's
argument that Ford's status as an important public figure dictated a
finding of fair use.212 Because public figures, like other authors, are
motivated by financial incentives, the Court reasoned that expansion
of the fair use doctrine for their works might reduce the incentive to
produce those works, thereby undermining one of the most crucial
goals of copyright protection.21 3 It also noted that public figures, like
others, have a first amendment right not to speak. 2 4  Finding the
dichotomy between idea and expression 215 sufficient to protect the
first amendment interest in the dissemination of information, the
207. See id. at 549-55.
208. See id. at 552-55.
209. See id. at 554-55.
210. See id. at 559-60.
211. Id. at 555. Although the Court may have created a presumption that use of an
unpublished work is unfair, it did not specify the precise legal effect of the presumption. The
dissenters at first accused the majority of creating "a categorical presumption against
prepublication fair use." Id. at 595 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Later, however, they said the
majority opinion "is ambiguous as to whether it relies on the force of the presumption against
prepublication fair use or an analysis of the purpose and effect of this particular use." Id. at
596.
To the extent the Court did not actually apply the presumption in its analysis, the
majority's statement in text might be viewed as dictum. If indeed the Court applied a
presumption, it did not say whether the presumption applied to the fair use calculus as a
whole, to a single factor in that calculus, or to a combination of factors. Nevertheless, the
Court's opinion made clear that unpublished status deserves substantial weight in fair use
analysis. See Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 564, 568-69.
212. See id. at 559-60.
213. See id. at 559 ("It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to accord
lesser rights in those works that are of greatest importance to the public."); id. at 560.
214. See Id. at 559-60; supra text accompanying note 210.
215. See supra text accomapnying notes 39-47 and note 57.
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Court refused to "create what amounts to a public figure exception to
copyright. 2 16 It therefore ruled that copying from public figures'
works "must be judged according to the traditional equities of fair
use."
217
Turning to the four statutory fair use factors, the Court first ana-
lyzed the "purpose" factor and considered whether news reporting is
a favored purpose.218 It noted congressional resistance to "pressures
from special interest groups to create presumptive categories of fair
use" 219 and therefore refused to give news reporting the benefit of a
presumption of favorable treatment, even one limited to the "pur-
pose" factor.22 ° It next reviewed The Nation's commercial motive in
using the Ford manuscript, its intention to "scoop" first publication
by Time, and its knowing exploitation of "a purloined manuscript.1221
In the Court's view, these facts, coupled with the "presumption"
against the fairness of commercial use, tilted the scales of the "pur-
pose" factor against the defense.222
Although the Court's general conclusion as to the "purpose" fac-
tor was clear, it did not explicitly weigh and balance the facts it cited.
Nor did it say whether, in the absence of these peculiar facts, a news
reporting function would tilt the scales of the "purpose" factor
toward fair use. Thus, it left the general status of news reporting
unclear.
Addressing the "nature of the work" factor, the Court acknowl-
edged the distinction in fair use analysis between "factual works" and
"works of fiction or fantasy. '223 It conceded the factual nature of the
Ford memoirs, but it noted that The Nation had taken some of Ford's
expression as well as his facts224-- an observation not germane to the
"nature" factor. In any event, the Court found the published status
of Ford's manuscript "a critical element of its 'nature.' ",225 It rea-
soned that The Nation's publication of excerpts had impaired the
author's legitimate interest in confidentiality and creative control of
216. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 560.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 561.
219. Id. at 561. For the complete quotation, see supra note 160.
220. "The fact that an article arguably is 'news' and therefore a productive use is simply one
factor in a fair use analysis." Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 561.
221. See id. at 561-63.
222. See id. at 562-63.
223. See id. at 563; infra text accompanying notes 375-78.
224. See Nation Enters, 471 U.S. at 563-64; see also infra note 378 and accompanying text
(noting the relativity of the distinction between fact and fiction).
225. Nation Enters, 471 U.S. at 564.
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an unpublished work, and therefore was unfair.226 In support of its
position, the Court cited the copyright holder's agreement to "keep
the manuscript confidential," which it seemed to interpret as allowing
the author to maintain creative control of the work.227
With respect to the "amount taken" factor, the Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's finding that The Nation had taken the
"heart of [Ford's] book. ' 228  It acknowledged that the, test for
infringement is how much of the plaintiff's work is taken, rather than
how much of the defendant's work is borrowed. 229 Nevertheless, it
reasoned that a defendant's use of excerpts for a substantial portion of
its own work is evidence of the "qualitative value" of the excerpts in
both works. 230 Noting that the excerpts used by The Nation consti-
tuted thirteen percent of The Nation's own article, the Court weighed
the "amount taken" factor against fair use.23'
Finally, the Court addressed the "market effect" factor, calling it
"undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use. "232 The
Court viewed Time's cancellation of the planned publication of
excerpts and refusal to pay the last installment of the license fee as
rare evidence of both immediate market effect and actual damages.233
Yet it did not stop there. Quoting from its decision in Sony, the Court
226. See id.
227. See id. Evidently, the Court felt that Ford would have more freedom to shape the
work in the absence of public comment about it during its preparation. See id.
Unlike the dissent, the majority did not address the significance of Ford's agreement to
forego publicity regarding "unique information" in the manuscript. This counteragreement
lent credence to the argument, which the Second Circuit accepted, that the publishers and the
public cared about the facts and information at Ford's command-which copyright does not
protect-rather than his artistic expression. See supra text accompanying notes 39-47.
228. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 565. "A Time editor [had] described [the portions taken]
as the most interesting and moving parts of the entire manuscript." Id.
229. See id. For a discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 411-19.
230. See Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 565.
231. See id. at 565-66.
232. See id. at 566 (citing inter alia Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1615
(1982)).
233. See id. at 567. In apparent response to the dissenters' argument that the offending
article's use of unprotectible ideas, rather than protected expression, caused the cancellation,
the Court observed that Time had cited The Nation's article as a reason for cancellation. See
id. The Court also pointed out that copyright law requires the defendant to show causes of
damage other than copying of protected expression once the plaintiff has shown a loss of
revenue or the amount of the defendant's gross profits from an alleged infringement. See id.;
see also Blackman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 1160, 1163-64 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(photographer entitled to recover magazine's $3.9 million gross revenue for publication of
infringing copies of photograph when magazine failed to prove deductions or show other
causes of revenue); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 1981) (defendants have
burden "to establish what portion of [gross] receipts was not profit from their use of the
infringing song."); 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1982) (entitling copyright owner to recovery of
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reaffirmed its view that "market effect" analysis must address the
"potential market for the copyrighted work," including the market for
derivative works.234 It reasoned that Time's cancellation of its own
article clearly showed the potential of The Nation's use to affect the
market for prepublication excerpts.2 35 The Court concluded as fol-
lows: "Placed in a broader perspective, a fair use doctrine that per-
mits extensive prepublication quotations from an unreleased
manuscript without the copyright owner's consent poses substantial
potential for damage to the marketability of first serialization rights in
general. "236
The dissenters in Nation Enterprises criticized the majority for
giving an "exceedingly narrow" scope to the doctrine of fair use,
thereby impeding the dissemination and use of existing copyrighted
works to prepare new ones.2 37 Although the majority had limited its
analysis to the 300 words admittedly taken verbatim, in order to avoid
the difficult task of separating idea from expression,2 38 the dissenters
found that the Court's "failure to distinguish between information
and literary form permeate[d] every aspect of the Court's fair use
analysis and [led] the Court to the wrong result in this case."-239
Aside from this broad point, the dissenters' fair use analysis dif-
fered from the majority's in several significant respects. In addressing
the "purpose" factor, the dissenters would have ruled that news
reporting, "[i]n light of the explicit congressional endorsement in
§ 107 ... strongly favors a finding of fair use.' ' 24  Moreover, they
would have ignored countervailing considerations that were persua-
sive for the majority. Noting that nearly all news reporting is under-
taken for profit, the dissenters concluded that failure to recognize
news reporting and criticism as favored categories of use because they
infringer's profits attributable to the infringement and requiring defendant to prove deductions
from gross revenue and absence of causation).
The majority's reasoning, however, failed to meet the thrust of the dissent's argument.
Time's statement was self-serving at best. More important, although Time may have canceled
its own publication because of The Nation's "scoop," it is unclear whether the gist of the
"scoop" was Ford's ideas or expression.
234. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 568 (emphasis in original). See also infra note 496.
235. See id. at 567.
236. Id. at 569.
237. See id. at 579 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
238. Because the dissenters found the small amount of direct borrowing a fair use, they had
to reach the issue whether Navasky's summaries and paraphrasing also were fair. After a
careful review of the dichotomy between idea and expression and its underlying policies,
including its first amendment overtones, the dissenters found the summaries and paraphrasing
fair as well. See id. at 580-87.
239. Id. at 590.
240. Id. at 591.
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are "published for profit is to render meaningless the congressional
imprimatur placed on such uses. '241 As for the majority's arguments
based on The Nation's intentional "scooping" of Time and use of a
"purloined manuscript, ' 242 the dissenters pointed out that "scooping"
is the goal of every good news reporter,243 and that there was no legal
basis for finding that the defendant had acted in bad faith-both
because the plaintiffs had dismissed all common law causes of action
and because the copyright claims had been of uncertain merit. 2"
Regarding the "nature of the copyrighted work," the dissenters
criticized the Court's heavy reliance on the manuscript's unpublished
status.245 To the extent the majority relied on "a categorical pre-
sumption against prepublication fair use," the dissenters found that
reliance "unwarranted on its own terms" 246 because the purpose and
effect of prepublication use could vary dramatically depending on the
circumstances. 247 They also found any such reliance "unfaithful to
congressional intent" because it substitutes a "two dimensional"
approach for the "sensitive balancing of interests" that Congress
required. 248 To the extent that the majority relied on the actual effect
of prepublication use in this case, namely, cancellation of the Time
article, the dissenters viewed this as confusion between the "market
effect" factor and the "nature of the copyrighted work" factor under
discussion.249 The dissenters would have kept the two factors analyti-
cally separate and consequently would have viewed the "nature" fac-
tor as favoring the defendant because the original work was a "fact
work." 250
The dissenters had fewer differences with the majority regarding
the "amount taken." They agreed with the majority that some of the
borrowed parts of Ford's language were "drawn from the most poign-
241. Id. at 592.
242. See id. at 562-63 (majority opinion).
243. See id. at 593 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
244. See id. at 592-94.
245. See id. at 595-98.
246. Id. at 595. The dissenters had some doubt whether the majority actually applied a
categorical presumption against prepublication fair use. See id. at 596; supra note 211.
247. See Nation Enters, 471 U.S. at 595-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 595-97 & 595 n.19. The dissenters referred the Court to footnote 40 of the
Court's opinion in Sony, see id. at 596, in which the Sony Court had rejected a dichotomy
between productive and nonproductive uses in considering the "purpose of the use" factor and
had stated, "Congress has plainly instructed us that fair use analysis calls for a sensitive
balancing of interests." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455
n.40 (1984).
249. See Nation Enters, 471 U.S. at 597-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
250. See Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 594, 598 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ant expression in the Ford manuscript." '251 They also agreed that
analysis of the "amount taken" is not merely quantitative, but
requires an "evaluation of substantiality in qualitative terms.- 252
However, they thought that the amount taken by The Nation was not
inappropriate or excessive for the favored purpose of news
reporting.253
Turning to the final "market effect" factor, the dissenters agreed
with the majority's assertion that it is the most important considera-
tion.2 4 They disagreed, however, on the actual market effect in the
case. According to the dissenters, Time cancelled its article as a result
of The Nation's taking of Ford's ideas and facts, not his expression. 255
Because those ideas and facts are not protected by copyright, the dis-
senters viewed the cancellation as ineligible for consideration in fair
use analysis.256 Finding other potential market effects to be nothing
more than "sheer speculation," they concluded that the "market
effect" factor weighed in favor of fair use.257 After balancing the fac-
tors, the dissenters therefore would have found the use fair.258
IV. PUTTING SONY AND NATION ENTERPRISES IN PERSPECTIVE
Hard cases often make bad law. Certainly both Sony and Nation
Enterprises were hard cases, as the Supreme Court's split decisions
show. A different result in Sony might have damaged the video tape
recorder industry. Because Japanese firms dominated the industry,
the impact on international trade would have been severe. More
important, a refusal to find fair use in Sony would have raised the
specter of sheriffs armed with injunctive orders 259 entering consumers'
251. Id. at 598. The dissenters selected six brief quotations as constituting appropriation of
protected expression. See id. at 599 n.22.
252. Id. at 598.
253. See id. at 601. The dissenters asserted that the same quotations appearing in a critical
review would have gone unquestioned, and they felt that news reporting deserved no less
deference from the courts. See id.; see also infra note 379 (quoting the dissent's evaluation of
the portions taken).
254. See id. at 602 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
255. See id. at 602-03.
256. See id. The dissent cited Ford's "confidentiality" agreement as evidence that both the
heart of the book and what the publishers sought were the information at Ford's disposal, and
not Ford's expression. See id. at 603.
257. See id. at 604.
258. See id. at 604-05. Unlike the majority, the dissent explicitly weighed and balanced the
fair use factors to reach a reasoned conclusion. See id. at 604.
259. Although there are criminal sanctions for copyright infringement, they apply only to
acts of infringement done "willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private
financial gain." 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982); see also HoUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 163
(characterizing criminal copyright offenses as "willful infringement for profit, fraudulent use of
a copyright notice, fraudulent removal of notice, and false representation in connection with a
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homes to stamp out unauthorized taping. The Court therefore was
palpably reluctant to require a decree that could not be practically
enforced,26" or perhaps to upset the balance of international trade. As
for Nation Enterprises, it pitted the interests of a conservative succes-
sor to a discredited conservative president against one of the primary
organs of the liberal establishment.
Of course the law is supposed to be oblivious to politics and pub-
lic obloquy. In reading the opinions, however, it is hard to escape the
conviction that the majority and dissent in both cases were respond-
ing to their unseen influences. Portions of the opinions, on both sides
and in both cases, read like briefs. After the introductions, there is
little acknowledgement of the complexity of the issues, but much that
sounds like argument. Writing for the majority in Sony, Justice Ste-
vens determined that the taking of an entire creative work verbatim
did not tilt the "amount taken" factor against fair use because the
work was broadcast free over television.26' Writing for the majority
in Nation Enterprises, Justice O'Connor appeared so intent on demon-
strating that The Nation had overstepped the proper bounds of news
reporting that she never explained whether or not, under other cir-
cumstances, news reporting might be a favored category of use.262
Writing for the dissent, Justice Brennan argued not that Time's can-
cellation of its article was an unimportant market effect, or one out-
weighed by other factors, but that it was not a market effect
cognizable under copyright law at all.263 As a result of this posturing,
the opinions in both cases reek with intellectual dishonesty and faith-
lessness to congressional intent.
copyright application"). Accordingly, there was never any question that individual consumers
would go to jail for copying television programs for personal use; the only issue was civil
liability.
260. The popular press had criticized the Ninth Circuit's holding in Sony (that consumers'
home copying was not fair use) because it raised the specter of remedies against individual
consumers. See Gordon, supra note 7, at 280 n. 124 (noting humorists' "image of persons being
arrested in their homes," but failing to note that the statutory language precludes criminal
liability for noncommercial, nonprofit use).
The question of remedy was also a source of disagreement between the district court and
the Ninth Circuit in Sony. Compare Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F.
Supp. 429, 465-68 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (rejecting plaintiffs' plea for an order either forbidding the
sale of VTR's, or requiring them to be modified to prevent unauthorized copying), rev'd, 659
F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) with Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony
Corp. of Am. 659 F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir. 1981) (proposing statutory damages, reconsideration
of injunctive relief, and court-imposed continuing royalties), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
261. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984); supra
text accompanying note 152.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 218-23.
263. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 602-03 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Four troubling aspects of Sony and Nation Enterprises are worthy
of emphasis. First, the Sony Court created the twin "presumptions"
regarding the commercial character of use out of thin air.2" Second,
the Nation Enterprises Court made another "presumption"-against
prepublication fair use-but left its precise legal effect unclear.26 5
Third, in both Sony and Nation Enterprises, the Court gave the con-
cept of potential market effect broad scope, while neglecting any
quantitative evaluation, thus encouraging courtroom speculation.266
Finally, in both decisions, the Supreme Court failed to weigh and bal-
ance the separate fair use factors that Congress had enumerated in
light of the policies underlying copyright law. Indeed, the Sony
majority mentioned only two of them.
A. The Commercial/Nonprofit Presumption: The
Witches' Brew Adulterated
Of all the puzzling aspects of Sony and Nation Enterprises, the
twin presumptions regarding commercial and nonprofit use are the
most troubling. Created by the Sony Court out of whole cloth, these
presumptions have no basis in the copyright statute, its legislative his-
tory, logic, or copyright policy. They only adulterate the purity of the
congressional prescription.
Although Section 107 mentions the commercial or nonprofit
nature of a use, it does so only as a single consideration to be weighed
in evaluating one of the four statutory factors.267 No presumption is
mentioned, nor can one fairly be implied. Moreover, in discussing the
exclusive rights of copyright holders under Section 106, Congress
stated its aversion to facile distinctions between commercial and non-
profit use.268 It is difficult to see why the Court, having recognized
Congress' rejection of a presumption against nonproductive fair use,
264. See supra text accompanying notes 145-51.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 207-11 and note 211.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 157, 232-36.
267. For the text of Section 107, see supra text accompanying note 118.
268. The House Report stated:
The line between commercial and "nonprofit" organizations is increasingly
difficult to draw. Many "non-profit" organizations are highly subsidized and
capable of paying royalties, and the widespread public exploitation of
copyrighted works by public broadcasters and other noncommercial
organizations is likely to grow. In addition to these trends, it is worth noting that
performances and displays are continuing to supplant markets for printed copies
and that in the future a broad "not for profit" exemption could not only hurt
authors but could dry up their incentive to write.
HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 62-63.
Although this excerpt focuses on Congress' reason for abandoning a "for-profit" limita-
tion on exclusive performance rights, its logic is equally applicable to the doctrine of fair use.
19881
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:233
nevertheless established its own equally sweeping presumption against
commercial fair use.269
With the aid of commercial hindsight, it is easy to find justifica-
tion for Congress' aversion to presumptions in the facts of Sony itself.
Since the Sony decision, there has been a veritable explosion in the
market for the sale and rental of videotapes. A significant portion of
this market undoubtedly consists of motion pictures and special pro-
grams that have been broadcast on television. It therefore appears
likely that unrestrained home copying of television programs by con-
sumers, albeit only for time-shifting purposes and not for profit,
severely impacts the videotape market.270 Without the right to record
a program that is broadcast at an inconvenient time, consumers
would have no choice but to rent a commercial copy or forego watch-
ing the program entirely. The fact that their use is "noncommercial"
does not mitigate this substantial effect on the market and hence on
television producers' incentives to create.
More important, the Sony Court's twin presumptions for com-
mercial and nonprofit use appear to conflict with the aims of Con-
gress. As Justice Brennan correctly observed in his Nation Enterprises
dissent, "Many uses § 107 lists as paradigmatic examples of fair use,
including criticism, comment, and news reporting, are generally con-
ducted for profit in this country, a fact of which Congress was obvi-
ously aware when it enacted § 107."' 1  It seems unlikely that
The impact of a particular use on the market for a copyrighted work may have little to do with
the user's profit motive, or lack thereof.
Professor Gordon argues that the financial straits of a user do not by themselves make a
use fair:
[C]ourts should ... take care that they do not tax copyright owners to
subsidize impecunious but meritorious users under the guise of maximizing
value. Only when the public interest to be served is great, and the damage to the
[copyright] owner small, does the need for this caution diminish.
Gordon supra note 7, at 293-94 (footnote omitted). This reasoning appears correct: neither
the user's penury nor motive is relevant. Rather, the question is the effect on the dual copy-
right incentives for creation and dissemination of works of authorship.
Indeed, in two cases decided under the Copyright Act of 1909, but applying the then-
proposed Section 107 factors for guidance, the Second Circuit explicitly ruled that a commer-
cial motive, standing alone, was insufficient to negate fair use. See Iowa State Univ. Research
Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 & n.5, 61 (2d Cir. 1980); Meero-
pol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068-69 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
269. In rejecting the Ninth Circuit's presumption against nonproductive fair use in Sony,
which the dissent implicitly adopted, the Sony Court admonished that "the question is not
simply two dimensional" and that Congress required a "sensitive balancing of the interests."
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984).
270. The dissent in Sony recognized the market impact of consumers copying television
programs without the aid of hindsight. See id. at 483 n.35; supra note 185.
271. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 592 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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Congress intended a separate reference to "commercial nature" to
undermine favorable treatment for categories of uses that it explicitly
mentioned as candidates for fair use. Moreover, any presumptive
effect of commercial motives would give public broadcasting entities a
copyright advantage over commercial news media-an advantage
that Congress expressly disapproved.272
As for logic, the Court's own attempt to define the distinction
between "commercial" and "nonprofit" uses of copyrighted, works
reveals the absence of any principled and generally applicable basis
for doing so. In an apparent attempt to clarify what it had done in
Sony, the Court in Nation Enterprises defined the distinction as fol-
lows: "The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the
sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to
profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying
the customary price. ' 273 To the extent this standard focuses on the
defendant's "stand[ing] to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted
material, ' 274 it is circular. To the extent it focuses on the defendant's
failure to pay a price, the standard is useless, for it is the defendant's
failure to pay the copyright holder that necessitates resort to the fair
use doctrine in the first place, and therefore every fair use defendant
will have failed to pay a price. Finally, to the extent the Court's stan-
dard focuses on what price is "customary," it will involve courts in
second-guessing the pricing of creative properties-a task for which
the judiciary is ill-prepared.275
As for policy, the fundamental goal of copyright law under the
Constitution is to provide financial incentives for creation and dissem-
ination of works of authorship.276 Whenever an author uses preexist-
272. See supra note 268.
Perhaps the Sony Court meant to restrict the "noncommercial" category to "consumer"
uses, i.e., uses by individuals for personal, family, or household purposes. If so, it failed to give
any indication of that restriction. More important, favoring personal, nonproductive uses over
uses that, although commercial, create new works would contradict fundamental copyright
policy and traditional fair use doctrine, as the Sony dissent observed. See supra notes 171-72
and accompanying text.
273. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 562.
274. Id.
275. Moreover, it can be argued that one of the primary functions of the doctrine of fair use
is facilitating uses of existing creative works for which no market price is or can be established.
See supra text accompanying notes 90-95. If this view is correct, then the fair use doctrine
applies only when no customary price exists, and the Court's standard is utterly useless.
276. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. The majority and dissent in both Sony
and Nation Enterprises recognized this fundamental point. See Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (19841" id. at 477-78 (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 545-46; id. at 580-81 (Brennan, J., dissenting). They differed,
however, as to where courts should draw the balance between encouraging creation of new
works and fostering uses of old ones.
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ing copyrighted material to create a new work, the promise of profit
from that use serves the constitutional purpose by providing an incen-
tive for the act of creation. Only if marketing the new work impairs
marketing of the underlying work-thereby undermining the incen-
tive for creation of new works like the underlying work-is the consti-
tutional incentive impaired. Yet there is no necessary relation
between the profit enjoyed by the creator of a copyrighted work and
that enjoyed by another who uses that work to create a new work.
Indeed, the success of the second work may actually add to that of the
first.2 77 Thus, the "profit" factor does not point consistently in a sin-
gle direction, and its variable effect on copyright incentives cannot
justify a presumption against commercial fair use that would destroy
the "sensitive balancing of interests" desired by Congress.2 71
Not only did the Sony Court create "presumptions" with little
support in the statute, its legislative history, logic, or policy; it also
failed to explain how the "presumptions" are to be applied. Do they
apply solely to the "purpose of the use" factor, to the "market effect"
factor, to the "purpose of the use" and "market effect" factors
together, or to the entire fair use calculus? Some support can be
found in the Sony and Nation Enterprises decisions for each of these
propositions.2 79 Thus it is not surprising that the lower courts have
277. See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1264 (2d Cir. 1986) (priest's
commentary on book of interviews with women who had abortions might "stimulate further
interest" in book), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2201 (1987). For an extreme example of this
phenomenon, see New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217
(D.N.J. 1977). There the defendant had prepared an index of personal names cited in The New
York Times, but the index referred to the newspaper's own index, rather than to the pages of
the newspaper directly. Thus, no one could use the defendant's secondary index without
access to the plaintiff's index. See id. at 223.
278. Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40.
279. Some of the Court's language in Sony seems to imply that commercial use raises a
supervening presumption applying to the entire fair use calculus. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 448-49,
451. Yet the Sony Court's original discussion of the presumption occurred in the course of its
analysis of the "purpose" factor, so perhaps the presumption applies only to it. On the other
hand, the Sony Court also stated that commercial use raises a presumption of adverse market
effect, thus tying the presumption to that factor. See supra text accompanying note 157.
Because the Sony Court did not weigh and balance the four fair use factors (and in fact
discussed only two of them), it is difficult to divine precisely what effect the Court wished its
presumption to have.
In an apparent attempt to resolve the confusion, the Nation Enterprises Court opined that
"commercial as opposed to non-profit [use] is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a
finding of fair use." Nation Enters, 471 U.S. at 562. Although one might interpret this
statement as relegating the commercial character of use to the status of a fifth nonstatutory
factor, the statement appeared in the Court's discussion of the "purpose" factor, and the
Court's reasoning, if not its language, seemed to limit the presumption to that factor. In any
event, the Court never explained the effect of its presumption on the traditional view that fair
use is an affirmative defense of which the defendant bears the burden of proof. See supra note
160.
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applied the presumption against commercial fair use to the fair
use calculus as a whole2 80 to the "purpose" and "market effect" fac-
tors separately,28' to the "purpose" and "market effect" factors
together,282 to the "purpose" factor alone,28 3 and hardly at all.284
Given that the Court did not explain how to apply the "presump-
tion," let alone its foundation, the lower courts are justified in restrict-
ing its application to the "purpose" factor and in liberally permitting
its rebuttal. Indeed, allowing the presumption to have any greater
effect would disturb the delicate balancing among the four statutory
factors that Congress explicitly commanded.28 5
280. The Sony opinion "could hardly have been more lucid on this point," and "requires
that we recognize a presumption of unfair use... arising from [the defendant's] commercial
use of the copyrighted material." Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Servs.,
Inc., 751 F.2d 501, 508-09 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 79 (1987). Interestingly, the
Second Circuit in this opinion noted three distinct and different statements made by the Sony
Court regarding the presumption. See id. at 508 n.4.
281. See Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1496, 1497 (11 th Cir. 1984) (evaluating
two factors separately and applying presumption to each), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985).
282. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437-38 (9th Cir. 1986) (analyzing "purpose" and
"market effect" factors together because "[tihe defendant can rebut the presumption by
convincing the court that the parody does not unfairly diminish the economic value of the
original").
283. See, e.g., United Tel. Co. of Mo. v. Johnson Pub. Co., 855 F.2d 604, 609 (8th Cir.
1988) (applying presumption to "purpose" factor without detailed explanation); Maxtone-
Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1261-62 (2d Cir. 1986) (considering the commercial
character of the use together with alleged errors and distortions under the "purpose" rubric,
and denying that Sony "alter[ed] the traditional multifactor fair use inquiry"); Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that
the presumption affects the "purpose" factor only and is rebutted by evidence of additional
purpose, namely, countering alleged personal attack on subject of parody).
284. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 96-97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 213 (1987). Here, the Second Circuit ruled that a biographer's purpose in using J.D.
Salinger's unpublished letters "to enrich his scholarly biography weighs the first fair use factor
in [the biographer's] favor, notwithstanding that he and his publisher anticipate profits." Id. at
96. Based on other factors, however, the Second Circuit found the use unfair. See id. at 99-
100; see also Jackson v. MPI Home Video, 694 F. Supp. 483, 489 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (weighing
favorably as news reporting defendant's dissemination of videotapes of Jesse Jackson's speech
at the Democratic National Convention, notwithstanding plaintiff's contention that it was
done for profit).
285. Pre-Sony decisions of the lower courts rightly eschewed any presumption regarding
commercial use. See, e.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981) ("While
commercial motivation and fair use can exist side by side, the court may consider whether the
alleged infringing use was primarily for public benefit or for private commercial gain."); Iowa
State Univ. Research Found v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980)
(Commercial use "is relevant" but does not alone negate fair use.); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560
F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court might simply admit its mistake, abjure the presumption,
and return to traditional fair use doctrine in its next fair use case. Yet however desirable this
may be from the standpoint of logic, policy, and consistency with congressional intent, it seems
unlikely. In Nation Enterprises, the majority used the presumption to its advantage. See supra
text accompanying notes 220-22. Even the dissent reaffirmed it, at least for uses not specially
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B. The Presumption Against Prepublication Fair Use
Unlike the presumption against commercial fair use, the Nation
Enterprises Court's presumption against prepublication fair use is not
easy to dismiss. As that Court noted,286 unpublished works were spe-
cially protected at common law,287 and the legislative history of the
Copyright Act of 1976 suggests continued support for their special
treatment.288 Unpublished works resound with overtones of pri-
vacy, 289 and the right of first publication--commercially vital in the
entertainment business-is unquestionably an important incentive for
the production of creative works. Thus there is ample support for
special treatment of unpublished works in fair use analysis.
Although the Nation Enterprises Court recognized the need for
special treatment, it did not specify precisely what that special treat-
ment should be. It spoke of a presumption and appeared to allow this
presumption to color the entire fair use calculus.29° In its detailed
analysis, however, the Court cited the unpublished status of Ford's
manuscript as a "critical element of its 'nature.' ",291
mentioned by Congress, although its language underscores the presumption's illogic: "When a
court evaluates uses that Congress has not specifically addressed, the presumption articulated
in Sony Corp. is appropriate to effectuate the congressional instruction to consider 'whether
such use is of a commercial nature.'" Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 592 n.16 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1982))
(emphasis added).
286. See id. at 551-54.
287. See 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 39, § 2.02, at 2-16.
288. The Nation Enterprises majority cited the Senate Report for the proposition that,
although fair use doctrine favors classroom use of out-of-print works, it does not favor such
use of unpublished works, because their unavailability may be "the result of a deliberate choice
on the part of the copyright owner." Id. at 553. This language does not appear in the House
Report because the material on copying for classroom use was replaced by negotiated
guidelines incorporated into the legislative history. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 68-
70. However, the House Report explicitly endorsed the Senate Report's analysis. See id. at 67.
Congress' concern for unpublished works was not limited to classroom use. In adopting
the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress explicitly preempted state common-law copyright. See
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982). In so doing, it deprived authors of common-law copyright
protection for unpublished works, which lasted for a potentially unlimited term, in exchange
for statutory copyright protection of finite duration. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 134-
35. Because Congress feared this exchange might seem a bad bargain, it had a special concern
for authors' rights in unpublished works. See id.
289. In their seminal article on privacy, Warren and Brandeis argued that protection of
unpublished works under common-law copyright reflected deeply rooted notions of privacy.
See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198-213 (1890). This
rationale, however, may not be applicable to every sort of copyrighted work. See infra Section
V(E)(2).
290. See Nation Enters, 471 U.S. at 553 ("[B]alance of equities" for unpublished work
"inevitably shifts."); see also id. at 555, quoted in part supra at text accompanying note 211; id.
at 569 (unpublished status referred to four times in summation).
291. See id. at 564.
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Certainly the English meaning of the word "nature" is broad
enough to encompass the unpublished status of a work. Nevertheless,
it appears inappropriate to treat unpublished status as part of the
"nature" factor in fair use analysis, particularly if unpublished status
is given presumptive effect. As early as 1966, the Second Circuit rec-
ognized that favoring use of "fact works" in fair use analysis would
encourage the free flow of information,2 92 and Congress must have
had this reasoning in mind when it adopted the Copyright Act of
1976.293 More important, the policies underlying the first amendment
and the dichotomy between idea and expression demand that fair use
doctrine give greater play to use of works whose content is primarily
factual. Therefore a work's place on the spectrum from fact to fancy
is truly a critical element of its nature for fair use purposes, and care-
ful attention to the place of the work used on that spectrum is just the
sort of sensitivity that proper fair use analysis demands.294 A pre-
sumption against prepublication fair use, however, would obliterate
that sensitivity. It would make no distinction between an unpublished
autobiography-with all its overtones of privacy-and an unpub-
lished series of statistical abstracts. To avoid this infelicity, unpub-
lished status should be treated as a separate nonstatutory factor, apart
from the "nature of the copyrighted work. ' ' 295 So treated, it could be
evaluated and weighed along with the intrinsic qualities of the work
and the other three statutory factors.296
C. The Market Effect: Speculation Run Rampant?
Although the Court's handling of its presumptions against com-
mercial and prepublication fair use was perhaps inartful, the most dif-
292. See Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
293. Indeed, the "nature" factor is the only one of the four fair use factors that was not
anticipated by Justice Story in 1841. See supra note 126. Its inclusion may well have been due
to the increasing importance of fact works in our information society.
294. Even the Sony Court, which entirely slighted the "nature" factor in its opinion, stated:
[I]t is not true that all copyrights are fungible. Some copyrights govern
material with broad potential secondary markets. Such material may well have a
broader claim to protection because of the greater potential for commercial
harm. Copying a news broadcast may have a stronger claim to fair use than
copying a motion picture.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40. (1984).
More important, as the dissent in Nation Enterprises recognized, the effect of a use on the
market for an unpublished work will depend greatly on its nature. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 246-47.
295. Congress contemplated that courts would consider factors other than the four
statutory ones. See supra text accompanying note 121.
296. For an elaboration of this point, see infra Section V(E)(2).
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ficult questions raised by the Sony and Nation Enterprises decisions
relate to the market effect. The Nation Enterprises Court unani-
mously named this the most important of the four statutory fair use
factors.297 That conclusion is undoubtedly correct, for the effect of a
subsequent use on the potential market for the original work directly
implicates the incentives for creativity that copyright law provides
and that the Constitution requires. Recognizing this, the majority in
both Sony and Nation Enterprises construed the "market effect" factor
broadly, and the dissent in Sony would have gone even further. Over-
all, the Supreme Court endorsed a broad notion of potential markets
that includes not only the accused use and a proliferation of similar
uses, but also derivative works of the underlying work and other
potential uses, including potential markets not yet addressed.298
Certainly a broad view of potential markets supports the consti-
tutional incentive for creativity. The exclusive opportunity to exploit
all existing and potential markets creates a powerful incentive to cre-
ate. Yet the Court's endorsement of a market effect inquiry almost
unlimited in scope is troubling because it invites speculation. The
chief evil of this speculation is that it can be dead wrong, as was the
district court's "no harm" conclusion in Sony.299 Yet error is not its
only evil. Whether right or wrong, speculation produces uncertainty,
and judicial hunches are institutionally inappropriate bases for deci-
sions by courts. Several fair use decisions-not the least of which is
Sony-illustrate the proposition that speculation can lead judges to
diametrically opposed positions, although they begin at the same
point.300
Yet if speculation is anathema how can courts recognize the
pecuniary interest of authors that is so vital to the copyright incen-
297. See supra notes 232, 254 and accompanying text.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 157, 180-81.
299. See supra notes 163, 185 and accompanying text; Sony, 464 U.S. at 452-54.
300. Compare Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 452-55
(1984) (endorsing district court's speculative prediction of no market effect) with id. at 483-85
& 483 n.35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (speculative, but correct, assessment of some market
effect); compare Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir.
1986) (members of Moral Majority would not read Hustler magazine, and back issues would
be purchased for "other attractions," not parody, ergo no market effect) with id. at 1158-59 &
n. I (Poole, J., dissenting) (accused parody might be included in compilations that Moral
Majority members would read, or they might purchase back copies of magazine to see parody
in its original form, or to see how "shocking" the "other contents" of magazine are); compare
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1051 (2d
Cir. 1983) ("probably few people would order" back issue of Consumer Reports just to obtain
rating of lightweight vacuum cleaners), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984) with Consumers
Union of the United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 730 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J.,
dissenting) (consumer seeing broadcast can see which vacuum cleaner tested best without
purchasing magazine), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).
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tive? Markets for works of authorship can change quickly in unpre-
dictable ways, especially during times of rapid technological change
like the present. 30 1 Few foresaw, for example, that cable television
would emerge in less than twenty years from its precarious beginnings
to threaten the major television networks in both the production of
entertainment and the dissemination of news. Neglecting considera-
tion of these vast and rapidly changing potential markets for fear of
"speculation" would ignore commercial reality and therefore would
slight the constitutional incentive to create. Perhaps a solution to this
dilemma is a more quantitative approach to determining the market
effect.30 2
D. A Multifactor Analysis: Did Congress Really
Mean What It Said?
The final troublesome aspect of the Sony and Nation Enterprises
decisions is the Court's opinions themselves. In neither case did the
majority review all four statutory fair use factors and weigh and bal-
ance them together,30 3 as Congress apparently intended. In Sony, the
omission was egregious. Not only did the Court fail to discuss all of
the four factors, but it relied heavily on its self-created presumption in
favor of noncommercial use. Although it discussed the "market
effect" factor in light of the district court's finding that the harm to
the plaintiff's market was speculative,3 °4 it did not explicitly weigh
301. For examples of rapid development of new markets that cured apparent market
failure, see infra text accompanying notes 338-42. The dissenters in Sony noted that the then-
new VTR technology had created a new market consisting of people who want to watch
broadcast television programs at other times. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 485 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). They thought that the copyright holders should have had the rights to revenue
from this new market. Id.
Certainly the potential market consisting of the accused user, and others of his kind, is
worthy of recognition in fair use analysis. See United Tel. Co. of Mo. v. Johnson Publishing
Co., 855 F.2d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 1988) (by copying plaintiff's new listings without
authorization, defendant reduced plaintiff's potential revenue from licensing them); Telerate
Systems, Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (users' unauthorized copying of
portions of financial database has negative market effect because database owner could charge
for privilege of copying); Gordon, supra note 7, at 304-05 & n.221. Both the Williams &
Wilkins and Sony decisions implicitly recognized this; the accused uses in both cases were
noncommercial, and therefore the users themselves were the only potential market at issue.
302. See infra text accompanying notes 501-06.
303. In Sony, the majority neglected to discuss the second and third factors, see supra text
accompanying notes 151-152, 169, and the dissent did not weigh or balance the factors
together, see Sony, 464 U.S. at 497-98. The Nation Enterprises majority addressed all four
factors but devoted its summation to criticizing the decision of the Court of Appeals. See
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 569. Only the dissenters in Nation Enterprises explicitly weighed
and balanced the four factors. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 604-05 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
304. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 451-55.
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the finding of no market effect against the other three fair use factors,
all of which should have weighed strongly against a finding of fair use.
In Nation Enterprises, the Court paid obeisance to the congres-
sionally mandated factors and discussed each in turn. 305 In its appar-
ent zeal to demonstrate that each factor favored its conclusion,
however, the Court failed to keep the four factors analytically dis-
tinct. For example, it introduced arguably extraneous "good faith"
considerations into the "purpose" factor,3° confused the "purpose"
and "market effect" factors by including discussion of The Nation's
"scooping" of Time in the former,30 7 and appeared to ignore the
intrinsic qualities of the copyrighted work while emphasizing its
unpublished status.308 Finally, like the Sony Court, the Nation Enter-
prises Court never explicitly weighed and balanced the four factors
together.30 9
In the twilight zone of fair use, there are no statutory rules, only
factors for consideration. Therefore the form of a judicial opinion
may be as important as its substance. Congress sought to clarify the
law of fair use by distilling the witches' brew into four fractions, and
Congress directed that courts "shall" apply those fractions, as well as
others that are relevant in particular cases. Courts do not advance
Congress' purpose by omitting portions of the congressional prescrip-
tion. Nor do they advance it by mixing one fraction with another,
adulterating the fractions with extraneous matter, or neglecting to
weigh and mix all the fractions in light of copyright policy. Fortu-
nately, the lower courts have hewed more closely to congressional
intent than did the Supreme Court in Sony and Nation Enterprises.
They appear to have drunk deeply of the statutory elixir, with salubri-
ous results.
V. AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR FAIR USE
Because the Supreme Court seldom addresses fair use,310 the task
of clarifying the doctrine falls upon the lower courts. Unlike the
Supreme Court, they appear to be addressing the primary jurispru-
dential goal of Section 107: distilling the witches' brew into the frac-
305. See Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 560-69.
306. See id. at 562-63. For reasons why good faith is extraneous to the "purpose" factor,
and perhaps to the fair use calculation as a whole, see infra Section V(E)(1).
307. See Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 562-63; supra text accompanying notes 221-22.
308. The dissent chided the majority for this. See supra text accompanying notes 249-50.
For a more general discussion of this confusion, see infra Section V(E)(2).
309. Instead, the Court used its concluding paragraph to sum up the errors of the Second
Circuit's decision that it reversed. See Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 569.
310. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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tions specified by Congress in the interests of clarity, certainty, and
consistent development of the law. Over time, the lower courts have
given each of the four statutory factors significant gloss. This Section
analyzes the four statutory factors in light of their treatment in the
lower courts, as well as policy, logic, and legislative history. It then
addresses the two nonstatutory factors, good faith and unpublished
status, that appeared in the Supreme Court's decisions. Finally, it
applies the resulting framework for analysis to the facts of Sony and
Nation Enterprises.
A. The Purpose of the Use
Although the Supreme Court has failed to acknowledge it, Sec-
tion 107 recognizes certain favored categories of use. Indeed, it men-
tions six explicitly: "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, [and]
research. '311 If this language admits of any doubt, the House Report
puts it to rest:
[The following examples] give some idea of the sort of activities the
courts might regard as fair use under the circumstances: "quota-
tion of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration
or comment; quotation of short passages in a scholarly or technical
work, for illustration or clarification of the author's observations;
use in a parody of some of the content of the work parodied; sum-
mary of an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news
report; reproduction by a library of a portion of a work to replace
part of a damaged copy; reproduction by a teacher or student of a
small part of a work to illustrate a lesson; reproduction of a work
in legislative or judicial proceedings or reports; incidental and for-
tuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work located
in the scene of an event being reported." '312
Congress did not create these favored categories by itself. On the con-
trary, a favorable view of productive borrowing merely reflects the
collective judgment of the courts in developing the doctrine of fair use
over the years.3 13 Accordingly, analyses that favor such uses as news
reporting, criticism, comment, teaching, scholarship, parody, and the
311. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
312. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 65.
313. See, e.g., Cary v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680 (No. 170) (1803) (The question is
whether borrowing from an early road atlas was "fairly done with a view of compiling a useful
book, for the benefit of the public, upon which there has been a totally new arrangement of
such matter,--or taken colourably merely with a view to steal the copy-right of the plaintiff.");
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (Story, J.) (criticism), quoted in
infra note 347. See generally W. PATRY, supra note 5, at 19-25 (analyzing Justice Story's
opinion in Folsom as the source of three of the modem fair use factors).
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like provide the continuity in the law of fair use that Congress
intended.3 4
To be sure, Congress did not intend to create a presumption
favoring any specific type of use. The careful phrasing of the intro-
ductory sentence to Section 107 belies any such intention. 31 5 More-
over, as the Supreme Court correctly pointed out,316 the legislative
history of the Copyright Act of 1976 underlines Congress' suspicion
of special interests pleading for special consideration under copyright
law. 3 17  To the extent special pleading was successful, its results
appear in Sections 108 through 119 of the statute,318 but there is no
trace of congressional intent to provide a presumption of fairness for
any specifi6 use under Section 107. Having distilled the witches' brew
into four fractions to aid careful analysis of facts and policy, Congress
allowed no presumptions to pollute them.
Yet Congress' reluctance to impose presumptions does not mean
that it intended to treat all uses alike. On the contrary, the language
of the statute and the House Report reveal that Congress intended to
continue special consideration for traditionally favored categories of
use, as well as other categories having similar significance for copy-
right policy. Congress' reluctance to create presumptions is ade-
quately reflected in the facts that the "purpose and character of the
use" is only one of four statutory factors, and that those factors are
nonexclusive. Because any accused use must satisfy the multifactor
test, in which all factors are weighed and balanced in light of copy-
right policy, there is no need to fear that mere preference for some
categories of use will determine the outcome. Accordingly, the "pur-
pose" factor should have at its core a simple issue: whether the type
and purpose of the use fall within favored categories.
But what are these favored categories? Are they limited to uses
specified in the statute or its legislative history, or to uses recognized
314. The three dissenters in Nation Enterprises-Justices Brennan, White and Marshall-
strongly endorsed this view. See Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 590-91. For a statement of
Congress' intent, see supra note 127.
Professor Fisher's "utopian vision" similarly finds value in uses of copyrighted works that
promote "education," defined in a very broad sense. See Fisher, supra note 58, at 1770-72.
His definition of education encompasses not only teaching, but also activities that "improve
the public's access to information and debate on matters of public importance" (i.e., news). Id.
at 1782. He proposes that "education," so defined, should be a distinct and favorable factor in
the fair use calculation. See id. Yet a separate factor seems unnecessary if the courts interpret
the "purpose" factor as favoring news and education-an interpretation that both the language
of Section 107(1) and its legislative history support.
315. See supra note 120.
316. See supra notes 160, 269.
317. See supra note 160.
318. For a summary of the special statutory exceptions, see supra note 38.
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by the courts prior to January 1, 1978, the effective date of the Copy-
right Act of 1976? Arguably, there should be no such limits.
Although Congress did not intend to change the law of fair use, it also
did not intend to hinder its development.319 Whether or not a cate-
gory of use was specifically mentioned or favored under prior law, it
should be eligible for favored treatment under the "purpose" factor if
it has characteristics that appear favorable in light of copyright pol-
icy. The search for the core of the "purpose" factor thus devolves to a
search for these favorable characteristics.
In its decision in the Sony case, the Ninth Circuit described an
important favorable characteristic: a "productive" purpose. 320 Uses
have this characteristic if they are intended to produce new works of
authorship, whether or not they actually do so. 321 For example, the
accused use in Williams & Wilkins was productive in this sense
because it resulted in medical research that presumably would be pub-
lished in journals like the ones used in that case. The accused use in
Nation Enterprises was similarly productive because it resulted in a
new work, The Nation's news article on the Ford autobiography. In
contrast, the use in Sony was not productive, even in this limited
sense, because it involved only personal entertainment (and perhaps
education), with no particular creative output intended or
expected.322
There are two reasons why a productive purpose, as so defined,
should be favored in applying the "purpose" factor of the fair use
calculus. First, nearly all of the specific uses mentioned in the statute
and its legislative history are of this character.323 The only specified
use that might be excluded from the proposed definition is use in
classroom instruction, which normally does not contemplate produc-
tion of new works of authorship based upon the old. 324 Favorable
treatment of that use, however, is best viewed as a special sort of sub-
sidy for nonprofit education, rather than a consistent portion of the
319. See supra note 127.
320. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 970-71 (9th Cir.
1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
321. Any requirement that an accused use actually produce useful output would be too
restrictive. For example, such a requirement might undermine research because research, by
nature, often leads to dead ends.
322. Professor Fisher concurs on this point. See Fisher, supra note 58, at 1786-87.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 311-12; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
324. Other uses mentioned in the House Report that might be considered nonproductive in
this sense are replacement of damaged or lost portions of library copies and use for personal
study or research. The former use is fair not so much because its purpose is favored, but
because it has little market effect: it merely gives the library the benefit of a bargain it has
already made by allowing it to repair copies that have been fortuitously damaged. Refusing to
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total picture.325 Thus, the language of the statute and its history favor
productive use.326
Second, favoring productive use is consistent with copyright pol-
icy. If a use produces no new copyrighted work, but has any impact
whatsoever on the market for the underlying work, it impairs the
incentive to have created the underlying work without producing any
compensating benefit-at least any benefit that addresses copyright
policy. Such a use reduces the incentive to create copyrighted works
without advancing the goal of fostering their dissemination. On the
other hand, if the use results in new copyrighted works, it serves both
goals of copyright policy: it creates new works at the same time as it
enhances dissemination of material from the old ones.327
Although the Supreme Court twice declined to endorse the con-
cept of preferred categories of use,328 it has noted that the user's pro-
allow libraries to repair damaged copies would give copyright owners a windfall and might
even encourage them to make copies less durable.
Personal study or research with no output is more problematic. To the extent output is
expected but not achieved, this use should probably be favored, for the reason explained in
supra note 321. To the extent output is not anticipated, use for private research might appear
to be more for the purpose of personal consumption than production. Although reading and
study may make a person smarter and later may lead to unanticipated productivity, they may
be too tenuously connected to productivity to deserve special favor in fair use analysis. The
external benefits associated with private study having no immediate productive goal may be
too uncertain, and their value too difficult to estimate, to deserve specific recognition, at least
insofar as the "purpose" factor is concerned.
325. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the restriction to nonprofit education. Certainly for-
profit education can assist productivity to the same extent as nonprofit education, and
Congress made clear that nonprofit institutions can pay their way in copyright matters. See
supra note 268.
326. The favored uses certainly should not be limited to those explicitly mentioned in the
statute. For example, parody is not mentioned in the statute, but appears in the legislative
history and is clearly within the mainstream of traditional fair use doctrine. See supra text
accompanying note 312. For a discussion of parody, see infra Section V(C)(3).
Similarly, use of an earlier work to defend or rebut a personal or political attack is, and
should be, in a favored category when applying the "purpose" factor. According to the House
Report: "When a copyrighted work contains unfair, inaccurate, or derogatory information
concerning an individual or institution, the individual or institution may copy and reproduce
such parts of the work as are necessary to permit understandable comment on the statements
made in the work." HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 73; see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1986) (fundraising goal of
massive copying and distribution of insulting "parody" advertisement outweighed by purpose
of rebutting personal attack).
327. Professor Fisher derives a similar respect for productivity both from his economic
analysis and his exegis on "the good life." See Fisher, supra note 58, at 1743, 1768-69. He
concludes that "creative, transformative use of copyrighted material" should be a new,
favorable factor in the fair use calculation. See id. at 1782. Introducing a new factor seems
unnecessary, however, since the "purpose" factor should subsume the concept if properly
applied.
328. In Sony, the Court's analysis of the "purpose" factor relied almost entirely on the
presumption in favor of noncommercial use. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
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ductivity is relevant.329 It therefore appears to have left open the
possibility that productivity might tilt the "purpose" factor toward
fair use, although not the entire fair use calculus. At least one post-
Sony appellate court applied this sort of reasoning and gave the
absence of a productive purpose substantial weight in refusing to find
fair use.330
In any event, there is no reason to fear that favoritism for pro-
ductive uses will skew fair use analysis. Unauthorized use of a sub-
stantial portion of a preexisting work is rarely fair; 33' and courts
applying fair use doctrine have properly disapproved of a second
author's failure to add something original of his own. 332  Further-
In Nation Enterprises, the Court noted that news reporting was a traditionally favored purpose,
but felt that fact was outweighed by other factors in that case and left the status of news
reporting in general unclear. See supra text accompanying notes 218-23.
329. "The distinction between 'productive' and 'unproductive' uses may be helpful in
calibrating the balance, but it cannot be wholly determinative." Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984). In making this statement, the
Court was reacting to the Ninth Circuit's fair use analysis, which it described as "rigidly
circumscribed by a requirement that every [fair] use must be 'productive.'" Id.
Curiously, the Court's reluctance to endorse the concept of productivity appeared to
derive from a fear that such an analysis might slight socially valuable uses that do not produce
new works of authorship. As examples, the Court mentioned teachers who copy for personal
study, legislators who copy articles of interest to constituents, constituents who copy to decide
how to vote, and copying for the use of blind persons and hospitals. See id.
In this analysis, however, the Court apparently overlooked two points. First, even a
presumption can be rebutted when there is good reason to do so, and favorable treatment of
productive uses under the "purpose" factor would create no presumptions, only a weighing of
one factor in a multifactor test. Second, favorable treatment for productive uses does not
necessarily require unfavorable treatment for nonproductive uses, even in evaluation of the
"purpose" factor by itself. Uses that produce no new copyrighted material might be evaluated
neutrally and approved if socially useful (like those cited by the court), or perhaps disapproved
if solipsistic in nature (like consumers' home copying of televised entertainment). Apparently,
the Court was so enamored of symmetry that it felt presumptions must come in pairs, like the
twin presumptions for profit/nonprofit use that the Court itself created. See supra text
accompanying notes 146, 157.
330. See Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11th Cir. 1984) (sale of
videotaped news features to persons appearing in them is not fair use), cert denied, 471 U.S.
1004 (1985).
In Telerate Systems, Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), the court
applied the Sony presumption to subscribers' unauthorized use of portions of a financial
database and weighted the purpose of the use against fair use because that purpose was
"private commercial gain." Yet lack of productivity would have been a better rationale for the
same result. The users apparently produced no new works but used the database only to make
decisions regarding their and their clients' investments. If the database subscribers had used
the data to prepare financial newsletters, for example, the "purpose" factor should have
favored fair use. Any negative impact of the newsletters on database revenue could then have
been weighed heavily against fair use in considering the more important market effect. See
infra Section V(D)(l), (3).
331. See infra note 420 and accompanying text.
332. The following classic quotation is from Justice Story's opinion in Folsom v. Marsh,
commenting on an abridgement: "There must be real, substantial condensation of the
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more, the other three statutory factors, plus the possibility of adduc-
ing even more, 333 should preclude presumptions from polluting the
congressional potion. Accordingly, the statute's language, legislative
history, and policy argue for favoring a productive purpose in consid-
ering the "purpose and character of the use" under Section 107(1).
But are all productive purposes to be favored equally? Suppose a
famous comedian makes a television parody of a famous movie and,
in doing so, uses its plot, its sequence of action, and much of its dia-
logue.334 Surely this use is productive, for it results in a new television
feature that never existed before. But should the famous comedian be
excused from negotiating a license with the movie's copyright owner?
Professor Gordon argues forcefully for a negative answer. 335 In every
case where fair use is alleged, she would require the defendant to
prove market failure-i.e., to prove that the characteristics of the par-
ticular market and the particular use make negotiation of a license
impracticable or economically inefficient.336
As a matter of economic theory, this market failure criterion is
sound. It makes no sense to provide a fair use subsidy to a user when
a license could be efficiently negotiated. Indeed, classical economic
theory teaches that a free market will produce the most efficient-i.e.,
the most socially valuable-use of the copyrighted work.337 There-
materials, and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use
of the scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the original
work." Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass 1841) (citation omitted). Cf
Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1259-60 (2d Cir. 1986) (independent criticism
and comment makes accused work more than product of "facile use of the scissors"), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 2201 (1987), quoted infra text accompanying note 358.
333. See supra text accompanying note 121.
334. These are the facts of Benny v. Loew's. See Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th
Cir. 1956), aff'd men. sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43
(1958), discussed infra note 438.
335. See Gordon, supra note 7, at 304-05 & n.221.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91, 94. Professor Gordon describes three types
of market failure. The first occurs when transaction costs (the costs of negotiating a license)
exceed the benefits that would accrue to both parties from the license. See Gordon, supra note
7, at 288-90. The second occurs when the use produces external benefits, i.e., benefits that
accrue to society at large, rather than to the user, or benefits that are intangible and cannot be
monetized. In either case, the user may have no incentive to negotiate a license or to pay what
the license is actually worth. See id. at 291-94. The third type of market failure occurs when
the copyright owner has antidissemination motives, such as a desire to suppress criticism.
These motives may lead the copyright owner to ask too high a price for the license, or to refuse
to license altogether. Parody and criticism can cause market failure of this type if the
copyright owner would rather not have the parody or criticism published at all. See id. at 294-
98.
337. In essence, consumers in a free market will pay the most for the use that most benefits
them, and the producer of that use will therefore be able to offer the highest price for the
license. See id. at 260-61.
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fore, when licensing is economically feasible, allowing a prospective
user to make an "end run" around the marketplace by using the fair
use doctrine would only disturb the operation of the marketplace,
reduce economic efficiency, and lead to sub-optimal use. These con-
clusions seem valid as a matter of economic theory.
As a criterion for legal rules, however, the notion of market fail-
ure is undesirable because it is almost as slippery a concept as the
notion of fair use itself. True market failure seems difficult to divine.
Even when it can be recognized, it may be curable. Indeed, a finding
of infringement, instead of fair use, may cause efficient market mecha-
nisms to develop where none previously existed.338 In the bright light
of hindsight, it is easy to see that both the Second Circuit in Williams
& Wilkins and the Supreme Court in Sony missed this latter point and
therefore made fundamental errors. In Williams & Wilkins, the
developing market mechanism was the rise of central clearinghouses
that copy scientific articles for researchers on demand and remit a
portion of the fee to copyright holders.339 In Sony, the then-develop-
338. Professor Gordon herself recognizes that efficient market mechanisms may develop,
but she appears not to appreciate the significance of that fact for legal analysis:
Whether a market failure is curable, and whether such a cure would follow
upon a finding of infringement and generate substantial revenues, are difficult
factual questions. They must, however, be faced .... This point is particularly
important for new technologies, such as photocopying and videotaping. When a
new use for copyrighted works becomes available to the public, market
mechanisms may take time to develop.... In order to persuade users to [take
advantage of those mechanisms], however, the copyright owners might well need
a judicial declaration that the uncompensated use, previously minor and left
unfettered, constituted an infringement of copyright.
Id. at 279-80 (footnotes omitted).
The perceived need to wait for a cure for market failure creates two problems. First, the
difficulties of identifying "curable" market failures and, once they are identified, determining
how long to wait for a cure, compound the practical uncertainty of identifying market failure
in the first place. Second, nascent technologies, whose commercial futures may themselves be
uncertain and unpredictable, may exacerbate both the difficulty of identifying market failure
and the difficulty of predicting whether it can be cured (let alone how long the cure reasonably
should take). Moreover, it is precisely these new technologies that raise many of the most
troubling fair use cases.
These problems illustrate the dangers of attempting to apply abstract economic theory in
the realm of practical law. Rather than attempting to define the concepts of market failure and
cure-which have only indirect relevance to the copyright incentive--courts might do better
to address that incentive directly. They might, for example, attempt to determine the effect of
the accused use on reasonably foreseeable markets for the copyrighted work, because only that
effect arguably influences the incentive to produce copyrighted works of the same kind. This is
generally what Congress has instructed courts to do in Section 107(4) of the copyright act.
339. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. In addition to neglecting the development
of clearinghouses, the majority in Williams & Wilkins also may have overstated the difficulty
of market transactions between the parties before it. As the dissent noted, the library at each
defendant institution had central management and a budget that appeared ample to cover
estimated licensing fees. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1371
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ing market mechanism is now known to virtually every American:
the widespread sale and rental of prerecorded videotapes. By
allowing consumers to copy television programs for free, the Supreme
Court perhaps impeded the development of the then-nascent markets
in which consumers now rent or buy copies of those programs."
Thus in both cases, the apparent market failure was not only curable,
but in fact was soon cured.341 Yet the difficulty of predicting the cure
and its timing through foresight-not to mention the difficulty of dis-
tinguishing true market failure from the user's lack of industry or
reluctance to bargain-argues strongly against making market failure
a legal predicate for the entire fair use calculus, as Professor Gordon
suggests.342 Using such a theoretical economic concept as a threshold
standard for fair use would lend copyright cases all the simplicity of
(Ct. Cl. 1973) (Cowen, J., dissenting), aff'd without opinion, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam);
id. at 1384-85 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (quoting opinion of the district court in part). Thus,
there was little to prevent the libraries from negotiating blanket licenses with medical journal
publishers.
340. When a consumer rents or buys a videotape, part of the rental or purchase price is
remitted to the producer of the program as a royalty. The only licensing agreement is between
the rental or sale outlet (or the distributor that supplies it) and the copyright holder or its
agent. Thus, the copyright holder's financial interest is vindicated without the need to
negotiate individual licenses, thereby minimizing transaction costs.
Arguably, the opportunity to rent or buy a prerecorded tape is not the same as the
opportunity to record a broadcast program off the air. Thus, perhaps the current market
mechanism does not fully address the challenged behavior-unauthorized taping. Although
the cost of buying a prerecorded tape may not be comparable to the cost of off-the-air
recording, the cost of renting a prerecorded tape is arguably lower, at least when convenience
and quality are considered. Due to the promise of high quality that commercially recorded
tapes offer, as well as the convenience of not having to record for oneself and erase or skip over
commercials, the renting of prerecorded tapes is probably a good substitute for self-recording.
'In any event, the problem of channeling consumer behavior into legally sanctioned
courses is a matter of enforcement that is not unique to videotapes. For example,
unauthorized copying of microcomputer software has been widespread. See Gillin, InfoCorp
Study Finds Low Incidence of Piracy, PC WEEK, May 14, 1985, at 137 (InfoCorp survey
estimated $168 million loss of 1984 revenue due to software piracy, while a different survey in
FUTURE COMPUTING estimated that 50% of all business software was pirated, resulting in
$600 million loss of revenue).
341. Arguably these decisions did not harm the market interests of the copyright holders or
the copyright incentive because market mechanisms developed despite the fair use findings.
Such an argument, however, is a matter of factual conjecture-which common sense appears
to refute. It seems more likely that both the clearinghouse mechanism for medical research
articles and the market for prerecorded videotapes would have developed faster, and would
have been used more universally, were it not for the findings of "fair use" in Williams &
Wilkins and Sony, respectively.
Only a comprehensive survey of users can determine what proportion of users rely on the
doctrine of fair use, and what proportion use the marketplace mechanism. Yet, whatever
portion of users refuses to pay the market price, there is corresponding revenue to which the
copyright owner is entitled, and which the marketplace now could efficiently supply. There
can be little dispute about the existence of this portion; only its size is in doubt.
342. See supra text accompanying note 94.
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antitrust litigation and all the certainty of a roll of the dice. In any
event, the language of Section 107343 would not permit such a sweep-
ing standard even if it were administrable.
Accordingly, it seems appropriate to consider market failure not
as a threshold requirement, but as one element of the "purpose of
use." Where the market currently functions to permit the challenged
use for a price, the "purpose" factor should weigh against fair use,
even if the type of use is distinctly productive. Where there is no
viable current market, but there is evidence that one may develop,
courts should reduce accordingly the favorable influence of a produc-
tive purpose on the "purpose" factor. Finally, where there appears to
be no presently viable or reasonably foreseeable market mechanism, a
productive purpose should tilt the "purpose" factor in favor of fair
use.
Evaluation of the "purpose" factor thus should reduce to a sim-
ple two-part test. First, courts should inquire whether the accused use
falls within a productive category of use, such as those specified in the
statute and its legislative history. 3" If it does not, they should weigh
the "purpose" factor against fair use or give it negligible weight in the
fair use calculus. If the accused use is productive, courts then should
apply the second part of the test: they should determine whether
there are or will be reasonably efficient market mechanisms to permit
the challenged use for a price. If there are or will be such mecha-
nisms, then courts should weigh the "purpose" factor neutrally or
against fair use, notwithstanding a productive purpose. If no such
mechanisms are reasonably foreseeable, then a productive purpose
should weigh strongly in favor of fair use. The precise weight should
depend on the present viability of the market mechanisms or the like-
lihood of their developing, and the certainty that they apply to the
challenged use.
In applying this test, courts need not take a wooden approach.
Evaluating productivity should involve more than simply finding
whether a use falls within a favored category. To perform the sensi-
tive balancing that Congress intended, courts should evaluate each
use carefully and place it on a spectrum of productivity in light of
copyright policy. For example, courts should rate a Hollywood gos-
sip column directed at the movie industry less highly than an article
on presidential politics in The Washington Post, not because of judi-
cial aversion to gossip, 345 but because the gossip column has a smaller
343. See supra text accompanying note 118.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 311-12.
345. Judicial reluctance to base copyright judgments on the comparative merit of the
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audience and addresses issues of lesser national concern. The gossip
column's smaller audience evokes a weaker public interest in wide dis-
semination, and its humbler focus lies farther from the core value of
freedom of speech that the fair use doctrine helps to protect. 3 "
In determining whether a work falls within a favored "produc-
tive" category, courts may consider its originality and the value that
the user has added to the underlying work. Considering these aspects
of the use may help distinguish veiled attempts to exploit the commer-
cial value of the underlying work directly from genuine scholarship,
criticism, parody, and the like.347 However, deeper scrutiny of the
user's originality under the "purpose" factor is inappropriate for two
reasons. First, such scrutiny is more appropriate in applying the
"market effect" factor of the fair use calculus. If the accused work's
only effect on the potential market for the underlying work derives
from original material added by the user, there is no damnable market
effect.348 Second, certain uses that are inherently lacking in original-
ity are nevertheless favored in fair use analysis. For example, report-
ers are not paid to make up news. If a speech or publication is
newsworthy, they have little choice but to summarize, paraphrase, or
quote it verbatim in order to convey its content. To the extent the
expression employed makes the address or publication newsworthy,
contents of works of authorship is both well established and justified by policy. See infra note
367 and accompanying text. Yet this does not require judges to ignore the relative importance
of various classes of works to the advancement of human knowledge and public discourse. It is
one thing to compare two works of art, for example, and to provide greater copyright
protection for the "better" one, and quite another to recognize that certain works and certain
media more often implicate the fundamental values of progress and free expression that the
Copyright Clause promotes and the first amendment protects.
346. Although the dichotomy between idea and expression plays the primary role in
protecting first amendment values from erosion under copyright law, see supra notes 40, 54
and accompanying text, there is no reason why the fair use doctrine cannot play a supporting
role. See Note, supra note 54, at 327-28. Such a role should follow from the congruence of
first amendment values with the important copyright policy of encouraging wide dissemination
and use of works of authorship once created.
347. Although it may be difficult for courts to tell the difference between genuinely favored
uses and the merely colorable, there is no escaping the task. The job of separating the
genuinely creative use of an existing work from the sham is as old as fair use doctrine. In his
seminal decision, Justice Story described the process, in the field of literary criticism, as
follows:
[No one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original
work, if his design be really and truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair
and reasonable criticism. On the other hand, it is as clear, that if he thus cites the
most important parts of the work, with a view, not to criticize, but to supersede
the use of the original work, and substitute the review for it, such a use will be
deemed in law a piracy.
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
348. See infra text accompanying notes 418-24.
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reporters should have license for a certain amount of irreducible
"copying." To permit less would require the news media to resort to
second-best expression.
The decision of the Second Circuit in Maxtone-Graham v. Burt-
chael1349 illustrates proper application of these principles. There the
plaintiff, Maxtone-Graham, had written a book entitled Pregnant by
Mistake.3 0 This book consisted of edited interviews in which women
discussed their unwanted pregnancies and their decisions whether or
not to have an abortion.351 The book contained no commentary on
the interviews. The defendant, Burtchaell, a Catholic priest and pro-
fessor of theology, wrote a book of essays called Rachael Weeping,352
in which the title essay was intended to "critique the published
accounts of 'abortion veterans.' ",353 In that essay, Burtchaell quoted
liberally from the interviews in Pregnant by Mistake.354 Some of his
quotations were inaccurate, and some lacked proper attribution of
source.3"5 Based on undisputed facts, the district court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendant on the issue of fair use,356 and the
Second Circuit affirmed.357
Evaluating the "purpose and character of the use," the Second
Circuit quickly reached the heart of the matter:
The fair use provision of the Copyright Act expressly mentions
"criticism" and "comment" as favored under the statute, and we
think it indisputable that Burtchaell employed the material from
Pregnant by Mistake for just such purposes. Certainly, Rachael
Weeping is not merely the product of the "facile use of the scis-
sors," to borrow Justice Story's phrase.358
To demonstrate that the defendant's claim of "criticism" and "com-
mentary" was far from a sham, the Second Circuit noted that Burt-
chaell had "applied substantial intellectual labor to the verbatim
quotations, continually offering his own insights and opinions. '3 59
The Second Circuit then addressed two arguments of the plain-
tiff. The first argument was that inaccuracies in Burtchaell's quota-
349. 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 2201 (1987).
350. K. MAXTONE-GRAHAM, PREGNANT BY MISTAKE (1973).
351. See id.
352. J. BURTCHAELL, RACHAEL WEEPING: THE CASE AGAINST ABORTION (1982).
353. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d at 1256.
354. See id. at 1256-57.
355. See id. at 1256, 1261.
356. See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 631 F. Supp. 1432, 1438 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 803
F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2201 (1987).
357. See Burtchaell, 803 F.2d at 1255, 1265.
358. Id. at 1260. For Justice Story's phrasing, see supra note 332.
359. 803 F.2d at 1260.
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tions belied his scholarly purpose. Although the Second Circuit
agreed that many of the plaintiff's charges were "well-founded," and
that the errors were worthy of consideration in fair use analysis,36° it
concluded that the errors did not outweigh Burtchaell's scholarly
intent. It refused to make the difficult distinction between a "schol-
arly" and a "dogmatic" essay and declined to give much weight to
errors that apparently were inadvertent.361
The plaintiff's second argument was that the "purpose" factor
should weigh against a finding of fair use because the use was com-
mercial.362 The court, however, rejected the "suggestion that any
income-producing use is unfair virtually by definition. ' 363 After ana-
lyzing the Supreme Court's language in Sony and Nation Enterprises
and quoting from the House Report, it concluded that the Supreme
Court had not intended to change the law on the subject or to "attach
heightened significance to the element of commerciality. ' '364 The Sec-
ond Circuit reasoned that a strict dichotomy between commercial and
nonprofit uses would "obliterate" the doctrine of fair use because
most uses are commercial. 365 Noting that "[t]he commercial nature
of a use is a matter of degree, not an absolute," it ruled that the educa-
tional aspects of the defendant's work outweighed the commercial
ones.
366
In Burtchaell, the Second Circuit announced a standard for inac-
curacies in quotations that would give them little weight in fair use
analysis, unless they are so egregious as to amount to deliberate mis-
representation of the quoted work. This lenient standard appears to
be substantially correct. If a use on its face appears to lie within a
favored category for fair use purposes, such as criticism or commen-
tary, courts should be reluctant to evaluate the substantive merit or
360. See id. at 1261.
361. See id.
362. See id. at 1262.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. See id. The Second Circuit's refusal to attach "heightened significance" to
commerciality appears to be a correct interpretation of the doctrine of fair use. It is
questionable, however, whether it is a fair interpretation of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Sony and Nation Enterprises. See supra text accompanying notes 145-51, 156-59, 222.
At any rate, the Second Circuit did not rely entirely on its aggressive interpretation of
Supreme Court precedent to support its decision. Noting that the defendant's work, which
had sold 6,000 copies, was "hardly a commercial blockbuster," the Second Circuit concluded
its discussion of the "purpose" factor as follows: "Of course, even a minimal level of
commercial use weighs against a finding of fair use, but whether it affects the ultimate
determination depends on the totality of factors." Burtchaell, 803 F.2d at 1262. With this
weak ending, the Second Circuit no doubt protected itself from possible reversal, but it also
undercut its implicit criticism of the Supreme Court's presumption.
366. Id.
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content of the use-a task for which the judiciary has long and prop-
erly professed incompetence.367 Moreover, the substantive merit of a
copyrighted work has little to do with its legal protection. Burt-
chaell's work may have been poor scholarship, but it was scholarship
nevertheless.368
As the Second Circuit's opinion in Burtchaell implies, however,
inquiry into substantive content may be appropriate in two cases.
First, a claim of favored status may be only colorable, disguising the
user's real purpose of exploiting the underlying work commercially.
Second, the user may make substantial errors in quoting or otherwise
portraying the underlying work that misrepresent that work to the
public. In both cases, a limited investigation of substantive content
ought to be permissible because the applicable standard is not the
judge's abstract value system, but a comparison of the two works
themselves. In the former case, the court should compare the bor-
rowed portions of the underlying work with the underlying work itself
in light of their respective market impacts. If the accused work fulfills
significant demand for the original, and if its ability to do so seems to
derive from the portions it has borrowed, a claim that the user's work
is comment or criticism may be viewed with skepticism.369 In the
second case, the court should compare what the underlying work
367. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). In Bleistein,
the Supreme Court rejected a claim that a circus poster was not eligible for copyright
protection because it did not rise to the level of "fine art." Writing for the majority, Justice
Holmes reasoned:
Certainly works are not the less connected with the fine arts because their
pictorial quality attracts the crowd and therefore gives them a real use-if use
means to increase trade and to help to make money....
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of
the narrowest and most obvious limits.
Id. at 251.
This classic passage made two points. First, any theory of copyright that turns on the
substantive merit of creative works would be dangerous because it would encourage censorship
and restrict the free flow of expression, thus undermining a vital copyright policy. Second, it is
the marketplace, not any select group (whether judges or others), that determines the value of
a creative work and thereby the reward to its creator. These principles are no less fundamental
to copyright today than they were in 1903. See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 805
(D.C. Cir. 1978) ("Neither the Constitution nor the Copyright Act authorizes the Copyright
Office or the federal judiciary to serve as arbiters of national taste..."),cert. denied, 440 U.S.
908 (1979); see also Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir.) (obscene content
irrelevant to copyright protection), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982); Mitchell Bros. Film
Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 854-58 (5th Cir. 1979) (same), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 917 (1980); Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 1973) (fraudulent nature of
work irrelevant to copyright protection).
368. See supra text accompanying notes 358-61
369. The analysis, however, should focus on the plaintiff's loss of potential sales; success of
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actually says with what the user's work says it says-a task that
requires only sensitivity to the English language.370 In either case, the
comparison places less strain on the competence of the judiciary, and
is less an invitation to apply personal standards of aesthetics and
morality, than a determination of creative or aesthetic merit.
Yet even in these two cases, courts' examination of content
should be restrained. In the case of a merely colorable claim of "pro-
ductive" use, courts would have to repeat much of the analysis
described above in considering the market effect. Allowing market
considerations to dominate the "purpose" factor, as well as the criti-
cal "market effect" factor might give them more weight than Con-
gress apparently intended. Furthermore, accused works should not
be scrutinized too closely for errors and inaccuracies. Unless a user of
an underlying work has some room for opinion and original interpre-
tation, freedom of expression will suffer. Courts should weigh the
"purpose" factor against fair use only if the errors and inaccuracies
amount to a substantial distortion of the underlying work, and then
only if the distortion implicates copyright policy. The test, however,
should be objective. It should not depend upon the user's state of
mind, which has no impact on the market for or public perception of
the underlying work.371
As for the commercial/nonprofit question, the Second Circuit's
the defendant's work alone may show only the popularity of original matter that the user has
added. See infra text accompanying notes 418-19.
370. This task may become more difficult for nonverbal creative works, such as movies,
music, and fine art. Therefore, the standard perhaps should show even more tolerance for
error in describing those works. Although it may be clear that a painting is red even though a
critic says it is blue, if the critic says that a piece of abstract, nonrepresentational art reminds
her of cow dung, that opinion is hardly susceptible to objective verification.
371. In this regard, the Second Circuit's approach seems inappropriate. It would ignore
misrepresentations unless they are "so deliberate, and so misrepresentative of the original work
that no reasonable person could find them to be the product of mere carelessness." Maxtone-
Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1261 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 2201 (1987).
Thus, it would emphasize the user's state of mind and culpability by requiring more than mere
negligence.
This emphasis on intent appears misplaced because nothing of importance in copyright
law turns on the user's state of mind. Both the all-important market impact and the
commercial success of the user's work depend on the impressions of the public, not of the user
of the underlying work. More important, in practice intent is nearly always proved by
circumstantial evidence, and such proof requires evidence of the degree and effect of the
distortion. Thus, it seems more appropriate to emphasize the likely effect of the distortions-
their likely impact on ordinary, reasonable people reading or using the secondary work.
Only if two conditions are met should distortions tilt the "purpose" factor against fair use.
First, the distortions must be so great that they are likely to affect materially the impression of
the underlying work in the mind of an ordinary reader of the secondary work. Second, the
mistaken impressions must have some adverse effect on the market for the underlying work.
Allowing lesser distortions to weigh against fair use would disadvantage criticism and thus
FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT LAW
approach appears to be correct. Whether a use has a commercial
motive should make little difference in analyzing the "purpose" fac-
tor, or any other factor.372 Although the Second Circuit's opinion to
this effect may have misread Supreme Court precedent,373 in light of
the weak support for the Court's presumption it can hardly be viewed
as erroneous.
374
B. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
Courts generally agree that analysis of the "nature" factor
requires placing the underlying work on the spectrum from fact to
fancy.375 At one extreme lie so-called fact works, such as directories
contravene the principle that even a strong market impact due to criticism alone does not belie
fair use. See infra Section V(D)(4).
It bears emphasizing that what is at stake here is not the ultimate question of fair use vel
non, but a single factor in a multifactor analysis. A finding that inaccuracies are significant
need not skew the entire fair use calculus. Under some circumstances, however, a finding of
significant distortion should influence the outcome. For example, use of a preexisting work to
rebut a personal or political attack is favored in applying the "purpose" factor. See supra note
326. However, if the user materially distorts or misrepresents the preexisting work in making
the rebuttal, and if that distortion reduces the potential market for the original, the distortion
should cancel the ordinarily favorable treatment accorded a rebuttal, and perhaps should tilt
the "purpose" factor against fair use.
372. See supra Section IV(A).
373. See supra note 365.
374. For this reason, one hopes the Supreme Court will soon abjure or limit this
presumption. See supra note 285.
375. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985)
(dictum) (citing Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 560, 561 (1982)); id. at 594 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 3 M. NIMMER & D.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05[A][2], at 13-73 to -74 (1984)); Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984) (dictum) ("Copying a news
broadcast may have a stronger claim to fair use than copying a motion picture."); United Tel.
Co. of Mo. v. Johnson Pub. Co., 855 F.2d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)); Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d
1490, 1497 (1 1th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985); Consumers Union of United
States v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823
(1984). But see Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 751 F.2d 501, 509
(2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 79 (1987) (factual nature of work used given little
weight in evaluating commercial use for same factual purpose); Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689
F. Supp. 221, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (refusing to weigh factual nature of financial database in
favor of fair use due to plaintiff's substantial investment of time and labor in it).
The rationale of Telerate Systems-that the factual nature of databases does not weigh in
favor of their fair use when they are expensive to create-runs counter to the policy of
encouraging a free flow of facts and ideas, which underlies fair use doctrine and the first
amendment. The predominant weighting of the market effect adequately protects both the
database owner's pecuniary interest and the corresponding incentive for creativity. See infra
Section V(D)(3). Therefore, the mere fact that a work is difficult or expensive to create should
not determine its "nature" for fair use purposes.
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Nation Enterprises may limit the effect of the fact/
fancy spectrum in fair use analysis by allowing greater leeway to users of facts only when
precise quotation is necessary to convey the facts accurately. See Fisher, supra note 58, at
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and maps. They may be used somewhat liberally because copyright
does not protect facts or ideas, 376 and because certain facts are suscep-
tible of only limited means of expression.377 At the other extreme lie
creative works, such as poetry, novels, and the fine arts. They are less
susceptible to fair use because their expression is arbitrary and pre-
sumably not needed to convey a fact or idea.
Although courts do distinguish between fact works and creative
works, in truth there is no precise dividing line. Copyrighted works
occupy a continuous spectrum ranging from telephone directories at
one extreme to abstract fine art at the other. The effect and weight of
the "nature" factor depends largely upon where the underlying work
1683-84. Professor Fisher apparently approves of this limitation, for he argues both that
precise quotation is seldom necessary to convey facts and that factual works should not be
assumed to contribute more than "commentary or fiction" to public debate. See id. at 1683-84
& n.l14, 1770 n.481.
This view, however, appears flawed for three reasons. First, circumstances requiring close
duplication of expression to convey facts may be more common than at first appears. See infra
text accompanying notes 379-402. Second, copyright law protects against appropriation of the
structure, sequence, and organization of a work, as well as against verbatim copying. See
Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236-37, 1248 (3d Cir.
1986) (extending well-established principle to computer programs), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877
(1987); 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 47, § 13.03[A][1], at 13-20.1 to -20.2
("comprehensive nonliteral similarity" as a source of copyright infringement). Copyright
might prevent the author of a work of fiction from borrowing sequences of incidents in a plot,
see Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54-56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298
U.S. 669 (1936), but surely its grip on the sequence and organization of facts should be weaker.
An historian, for example, should have greater freedom to borrow the chronologically or
politically relevant order of historical events used by her predecessors than a novelist to
borrow the sequence of incidents in a dramatic plot.
Finally, promoting robust public debate is not the only function of the fact/fancy
spectrum in fair use analysis. An equally fundamental purpose is preserving the distinction
between patents and copyrights, as reflected in the dichotomy between facts and ideas, which
copyright does not protect, and an author's expression, which it does. See supra note 41 and
text accompanying notes 39-47.
It would be inconceivable, for example, for the Court in Nation Enterprises to have found
the use of 300 words out of 200,000 unfair if the work used had been a directory of
manufacturers instead of President Ford's autobiography. Indeed, at one extreme end, the
fact/fancy spectrum simply reflects the common sense notion that a collection of facts,
unprotectible by themselves, has nothing intrinsic that copyright can protect other than its
selection and arrangement, and that therefore an action for infringement of that selection and
arrangement must require substantial and close copying if free use of the underlying facts is
not to be curtailed. Surely the "Progress of Science" mentioned in the Copyright Clause
demands more leeway for a chemist who uses unpublished chemical abstracts in his published
research than for a biographer borrowing from a reclusive author's unpublished letters. Cf
Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 98-100 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
213 (1987).
376. See supra text accompanying notes 39-47.
377. See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984) (unauthorized book of "Scrabble" game strategy
makes fair use of game's copyrighted board and rules); see also supra note 54 (copyright
vanishes when means of expression of idea are limited because idea and expression merge).
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falls in that spectrum.378
Yet this relatively simple notion is not without qualification. In
some cases, the original author's mode of expression may in itself be a
fact. This was undoubtedly the case with former President Ford's
autobiography, as the dissent in Nation Enterprises argued. 379 The
very publication of the work was a major news event because it
recounted then-recent history of considerable public importance.
Moreoever, Ford was President and an important actor in the events
portrayed in his book, so his attitudes and perceptions of those events,
as reflected in his expression, also were newsworthy. For example,
given Ford's position as Nixon's successor, and as the President who
pardoned Nixon, it undoubtedly will make a difference in the judg-
ment of history that Ford referred to the Watergate tapes not as
potentially incriminating evidence, but as a "smoking gun. '380 This
phrase of Ford's became fact, not through any merger of expression
378. The Nation Enterprises Court, perhaps inadvertently, illustrated the relativity of the
fact/fiction distinction. Although it recognized the importance of the fact/fiction spectrum
and its application to Ford's autobiography-a factual work containing significant news--see
Nation Enters, 471 U.S. at 563-it did not consider the autobiography as a whole a "fact
work." Instead, the Court saw the work as containing "subjective descriptions and portraits of
public figures whose power lies in the author's individualized expression." Id. Because
Navasky had taken from those precise descriptions, his borrowing "exceed[ed] that necessary
to disseminate the facts." Id. at 563-64.
A fundamentally factual work like the autobiography of a former president may contain
significant elements of creative expression. Certainly it lies more on the creative end of the
spectrum than a telephone directory or a data base of chemical abstracts. One may doubt,
however, whether a user's taking of expressive portions of such a work transmutes it into a
creative or fanciful work for purposes of applying the "nature of the work" factor. In finding
such a transmutation, the Nation Enterprises Court seemed to confuse the "amount taken"
with the "nature of the work'"--contrary to the intent of Congress that each factor be
considered and weighed separately. Treated separately, the nature of Ford's work should have
weighed in favor of fair use because the work was largely factual and contained information of
great public importance.
379. The dissent explained:
With respect to the motivation for the pardon [of former President Nixon by
Mr. Ford] and the insights into the psyche of the fallen President, for example,
Mr. Ford's reflections and perceptions are so laden with emotion and deeply
personal value judgments that full understanding is immeasurably enhanced by
reproducing a limited portion of Mr. Ford's own words. The importance of the
work, after all, lies not only in revelation of previously unknown fact but also in
revelation of the thoughts, ideas, motivations, and fears of two Presidents at a
critical moment in our national history. Thus, while the question is not easily
resolved, it is difficult to say that the use of the six quotations [cited by the
majority] was gratuitous in relation to the news reporting purpose.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 601 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
380. In an appendix to its opinion, the Nation Enterprises Court republished the entire
Navasky article, with verbatim excepts from the Ford manuscript in boldface and Ford's
corresponding language in footnote. See id. at 570-79. For Ford's "smoking gun" language,
see id. at 571 n.2.
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and idea, but because the manner and vividness of the expression were
themselves historical facts of considerable importance. 38 1
The argument that expression itself is a fact or "news" should
not be confused with the doctrine of merger of idea and expression.38 2
Under the "merger" doctrine, copyright does not protect the expres-
sion of an idea when there are only a limited number of ways to
express it. In contrast, the "expression as fact" argument may apply
when there are many ways to express the same idea, but a particular
person's choice of one of those ways is itself a newsworthy event.383
The argument is analogous to the rule of evidentiary law for verbal
acts, which admits evidence of statements made outside a courtroom
as non-hearsay when the statements themselves are operative facts. 3 4
Because it is a rare fact or idea that cannot be expressed verbally
in more than a few ways, 385 the merger doctrine may be more applica-
ble to nonverbal works such as pictures, in which the content and
expression may be inextricably intertwined.386 Indeed, certain visual
works are valuable primarily for their information content. For
example, consider the famous Zapruder film of President Kennedy's
assassination at issue in Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates.387 To be
sure, this film contained the usual indicia of minimal creativity quali-
fying it for copyright protection, such as the author's choice of cam-
era, film, lens, and location.38  But it was not its "expression" that
made the film priceless. Rather, it was the film's unique ability to
convey accurate factual information about an event so shocking and
tragic that it strained the memory of all who observed it. Thus it is
not surprising that the Bernard Geis court found use of frames from
the film fair, relying in part on the "public interest in having the ful-
lest information available" about the assassination.389
381. Even the Nation Enterprises majority acknowledged as much. See id. at 563. The
majority apparently felt, however, that the remainder of Navasky's borrowings did not rise to
the same level of importance. See id. at 563-64.
382. See supra note 54.
383. But see Note, supra note 54, at 328-35 (arguing the doctrines are the same).
384. For example, the "verbal acts" doctrine may admit second-hand reports of a threat
against a federal judge, see United States v. Jones, 663 F.2d 567, 571 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec.
1981), or of fraudulent telephone calls to obtain the credit card numbers of victims of credit
card fraud. See United States v. Saavedra, 684 F.2d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1982).
385. See Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos. 621 F.2d
57, 61 n.6 (2d Cir. 1980).
386. See Note, supra note 54, at 330-31 (discussing Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293
F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)) (verbal descriptions of frames from the Zapruder film of
Kennedy assassination inadequate). But see id. at 331 (arguing same considerations may apply
to written works such as historical documents).
387. See Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.DN.Y. 1968).
388. See id. at 143.
389. Id. at 146. Although the court adverted to the four statutory fair use factors in an
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Although the Zapruder film is a shining example of the predomi-
nance of information value in visual expression, it is not alone. Pro-
fessor Nimmer viewed photographs of the aftermath of the My Lai
massacre in Vietnam in the same light: "No amount of words
describing the 'idea' of the massacre could substitute for the public
insight gained through the photographs." 3" Visual works such as
these often should be placed at the factual end of the fact-fancy spec-
trum, even if alternative means of expression are possible in theory,
because their market value depends not on their form of expression,
but on the factual information they convey.
On the other hand, not all visual expression belongs at the fac-
tual end of the spectrum. In Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz,
Liechtenstein v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. ,391 the defendant,
CBS, had made an unauthorized collection of excerpts from Charlie
Chaplin's films and had broadcast the collection as a "retrospective"
after his death. Arguing fair use, CBS said the collection was news-
worthy because it showed the great talent that had been "exiled" dur-
ing the communist "witch-hunts" of the McCarthy era.392 The court,
however, rejected this argument, both in the context of fair use and as
a separate first amendment defense.393 It reasoned as follows: "Under
CBS' view, the more successful an artist is, the less he can protect or
demand payment for the use of his work. Yet the copyright law
bestows a monopoly right on the copyright owner to encourage artis-
tic activity, and would be undermined by CBS' bootstrapping
argument. 394
Certainly a doctrine that classified artistic genius as news would
undermine the copyright incentive. Yet there is a better basis on
which to distinguish cases like Bernard Geis from those like Roy
Export: the Zapruder film depicted real events, while the Chaplin
films were the product of creative fancy. There may be rare cases in
which a work of fiction is news, but courts should be wary of such
claims, lest an artist's very prominence be used to defeat her copy-
early version of the then-pending copyright revision bill, it did not apply them in any
systematic manner. See id. at 145. Its opinion, however, can fairly be read as emphasizing the
purpose of the use-publicizing an alternative to the official view of President Kennedy's
death. See id. at 146.
390. 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 39, § 1.10[C], at 1-83.
391. 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 826 (1982). Although this case was decided under the Copyright Act of 1909, the court
applied the four fair use factors from then-pending Section 107, reasoning that they were not
intended to change the law. See id. at 1143 & n.4.
392. See id. at 1144, 1147-48.
393. See id. at 1147-48.
394. Id. at 1144.
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right. Where the work depicts real people and real events, however, a
claim that it is newsworthy deserves careful attention. Indeed, to the
extent that the factual nature of a work determines whether a claim of
news reporting is more than colorable, it may influence the evaluation
of the "purpose" factor, as well as the "nature of the copyrighted
work.
395
Not every visual work will display as much predominance of
information over expression as those in Bernard Geis or Nation Enter-
prises, but courts nevertheless should recognize the phenomenon.
Even verbal messages can reflect it. For example, consider a major
company's announcement of a product recall, or of a delay in intro-
ducing a previously announced new product. Business executives,
advertising personnel, and lawyers pore over the announcement, and
every word is freighted with meaning. Often only direct quotation
can properly convey its hidden nuances and studied ambiguity.
Although the nature of such a message is of course only one factor in
the fair use calculus, it should weigh in favor of fair use.
A case in point is Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Gen-
eral Signal Corp.396 There, the Second Circuit vacated an injunction
against further broadcasting of a television commercial for Regina
vacuum cleaners, which had quoted favorable results of testing by
Consumer Reports magazine.397 On the way to finding this use fair,
the court addressed the nature of the copyrighted work, namely, Con-
sumer Reports' copyrighted test results.398 It noted that Consumer
Reports was "primarily informational rather than creative" and there-
fore subject to a greater scope of fair use.399 In apparent response to
the plaintiff's argument that Regina had used the test results verba-
tim, the court reasoned that "Regina use[d] CU's words in the interest
of accuracy, not piracy. Where an evaluation or description is being
made, copying the exact words may be the only valid way precisely to
report the evaluation."'  Accordingly, the court concluded that the
395. See supra text accompanying notes 368-71.
396. 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).
397. See id. at 1046-48, 1055.
398. See id. at 1049-50. In order to maintain its independence and avoid even the
appearance of commercial taint, Consumer Reports had a published policy of discouraging
commercial use of its product test results. See id. at 1046, 1050. In violation of this policy, the
announcer in the Regina advertisement had described a particular Regina model as "'the only
lightweight that Consumer Reports says, Quote, was an adequate substitute for a full-sized
vacuum.'" Id. at 1047 (quoting voice-over announcer's copy of Regina commercial).
399. Id. at 1049.
400. Id. at 1049-50. The court cited Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co. to support this
proposition. See id. at 1050 (citing Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79
(1st Cir. 1967) (one of the sources of the merger doctrine)). It also cited its own opinion in
Nation Enterprises for the proposition that "where accurate reporting requires use of verbatim
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"nature" factor argued for fair use.4" A similar result should apply
in any case in which the exact wording of a copyrighted work has
significant legal, business, social, or political significance .42
Thus applying the "nature" factor in general involves two inquir-
ies. First, the court must determine the place of the copyrighted work
on the spectrum between fact and fancy. For visual works, this may
involve comparing their informational to their creative value and
exploring whether they depict real events. Normally, this inquiry will
resolve the issue: the "nature" factor will weigh more heavily in favor
of fair use the closer the copyrighted work lies to the fact end of the
spectrum. If the work lies near the "fancy" end of the spectrum,
however, the court should make a second inquiry. It should deter-
mine whether the author's particular manner of expression in the
copyrighted work is itself a fact, due to the significance or timing of
the work or the expression, the nature and purpose of the work, or
simply the importance of the author. If the expression has significance
as a "fact" or news, then the court should determine whether the user
took more of it than was reasonably necessary to convey the "fact" or
the newsworthy aspects of the expression. That determination, how-
ever, properly rests under the rubric of the third statutory factor, the
"amount taken."
C. The Amount Taken
Although the "amount taken" factor may seem straightforward,
it has three important subtleties. First, its analysis does not rest on
simple quantitative measurement but requires an examination of the
qualitative importance of the material borrowed and a careful balanc-
ing of both its quantitative and qualitative aspects. Second, because
quotations, fair use will be liberally applied." Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1050 (citing
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 471 U.S.
539 (1985)). Although the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision in Nation
Enterprises, it seemed to disagree not with the principle that the expression can be a fact, but
with the Second Circuit's application of that principle to the specific excerpts taken from the
Ford autobiography. See supra note 378.
401. See Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1049-50.
402. Professor Fisher argues that Consumers Union was wrongly decided because "the loss
of revenue to publishers of consumer magazines caused by legalizing the defendant's behavior
could well be enormous." Fisher, supra note 58, at 1741. However, if the risk of such
enormous losses indeed exists, it undoubtedly owes more to the defendant's broadcast of the
test results than to its use of brief excerpts of the language in which the plaintiff expressed
those results. There seems to be nothing that copyright law can or should do about such
losses; it is powerless to preclude the reporting of test results because it does not protect facts.
See supra text accompanying notes 39-43. Because defendants like Regina may report test
results in their own words, it seems reasonable to allow them to borrow brief excerpts of
precise language in order to protect themselves against claims of distortion or false advertising.
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quantitative measurement is simple compared to weighing intangibles,
intuition may lead lawyers, judges, and lay people to overemphasize
its importance and indeed the importance of the "amount taken" fac-
tor as a whole. Finally, the "amount taken" factor has a close rela-
tionship with other factors, principally the "purpose" and "market
effect" factors. There is thus a strong temptation to confuse this fac-
tor with -others. The field of parody helps illustrate the relationship of
the "amount taken" factor to its brethren.
1. QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE FACTORS
Fair use analysis requires examination of the quality of what is
taken as well as its quantity. 3 If a user takes the "heart" of a copy-
righted work, as was the case in Nation Enterprises,404 it matters little
that the numerical percentage taken was small. But what constitutes
the "heart" of a copyrighted work, and by what standard is it to be
determined?
The cases appear to apply a standard of intuition and judicial
insight, without particular articulation. The dissenters in Nation
Enterprises, in rare agreement with the majority, said the portions
taken were from "the most poignant expression in the Ford manu-
script." 4 5 Similarly, in Salinger v. Random House, Inc.,/° 6 the Sec-
ond Circuit called portions of a book taken in part from unpublished
letters of the famous author J.D. Salinger what "make the book worth
reading."'"" These descriptions are hardly standards that lend them-
selves to consistent and justifiable judicial application."
A suitable standard for the "amount taken" perhaps may be
derived from the policy underlying fair use analysis. Succinctly
403. All nine Justices on the Nation Enterprises Court agreed on this point. See Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-66 (1985); id. at 598 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir.) ("The taking is
significant not only from a quantitative standpoint but from a qualitative one as well."), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 213 (1987); Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 229 (S.D.N.Y.
2988) (copying of a few pages at a time from financial database is qualitatively substantial,
although quantitatively insubstantial).
404. See supra text accompanying note 228.
405. See Nation Enters,, 471 U.S. at 598 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
406. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 213 (1987).
407. See id. at 99.
408. In focusing on what made the user's work worth reading, the Salinger court also
confused the "amount taken" factor with the market effect. See infra text accompanying notes
419-24.
The Eighth Circuit also referred to portions taken from a telephone directory as its
"heart." See United Tel. Co. of Mo. v. Johnson Pub. Co., 855 F.2d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 1988).
However, it articulated a reason for doing so: the defendant had taken all the new listings, but
for which there would be no need for a new directory. See id.
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stated, that policy is to permit and encourage reasonable use of copy-
righted works without killing the incentive to produce them.40 9 In
light of that policy, courts might focus on the market impact of the
borrowed portions of the underlying copyrighted work. In other
words, they might ask how much importance the potential audience
for the underlying work would attach to the portions of that work
that its users borrowed. 10 Under this standard, courts could admit
evidence of the audience impact of the borrowed portions, including
surveys of appropriate potential audiences and testimony of experts
familiar with the type of work and the medium of dissemination.4 11
Although evidence of this sort need not be adduced in every case, and
in some cases might be impossible to obtain, its availability might
reduce the need to resort to unbridled judicial intuition.
Whether the test for amount taken is qualitative, quantitative, or
both, a second basic question arises: to which work, the underlying
work or the accused work, is the amount taken to be compared? In
general, infringement does not depend on the amount of the accused
work that has been borrowed.41 2 In the words of Judge Learned
Hand, quoted by the majority in Nation Enterprises, "'no plagiarist
can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not
pirate.' ",413 This longstanding principle of copyright law is reflected
in the statutory language, which refers to "the amount and substanti-
ality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole." '414 Without twisting the English language even more than
lawyers are accustomed to doing, it is impossible to interpret these
words as requiring or permitting a comparison of the amount taken to
the secondary work. 1
Nevertheless, there is a temptation to make that comparison.
409. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
410. See infra note 477.
411. Evidence of this audience impact would be related to, but would not precisely
duplicate, evidence of the potential market effect adduced for the fourth fair use factor. For
purposes of the "amount taken," the evidence would address whether the portions taken
accounted for the primary market appeal of the underlying work. For purposes of the market
effect, it would address whether the plaintiff lost potential revenue due to the defendant's use
and, if so, whether the loss arose from the use of the underlying work or other causes. See
infra text accompanying notes 418-19, 421-24. Thus, although many of the underlying facts
would be the same, the evidence in the two instances would be directed to different proof.
412. All nine Justices in Nation Enterprises agreed on this point. See Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985); id. at 598, 599 n.23 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
413. See id. at 565 (quoting Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936)).
414. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1982). For the text of Section 107, see supra text accompanying
note 118.
415. See Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 599 n.23 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1988]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
The Nation Enterprises Court fell into this trap,4 16 but it sought to
justify its actions on grounds of common sense. Before noting that
the portions of Ford's autobiography taken by The Nation constituted
thirteen percent of The Nation's own infringing article, it said: "[T]he
fact that a substantial portion of the infringing work was copied ver-
batim is evidence of the qualitative value of the copied material, both
to the originator and to the plagiarist who seeks to profit from mar-
keting someone else's copyrighted expression."4"7 Similarly, the Sec-
ond Circuit in Salinger, evaluating the quality of the portions of J.D.
Salinger's unpublished letters that his unauthorized biographer had
used, referred to what made the infringer's book worth reading.4 1
Although this reasoning has some merit, it is more appropriate to
the "purpose" or "market effect" factors than to the "amount taken."
The relationship between the proportion of the secondary work that is
borrowed and the qualitative value of the borrowed portions to the
underlying work is, in general, tenuous. The user may have chosen
excerpts poorly, may have focused upon an aspect of the underlying
work that was not of general interest, or simply may have been too
lazy to add anything of his own. In any such case, the fact that the
portions taken constitute the lion's share of the secondary work
would prove little with respect to their value in the underlying work.
Furthermore, copyright law seeks to preserve the profit potential
of underlying works and thereby the incentive for creating them in the
first place. It does not seek to prevent users of copyrighted works
from making money. If a user can take unpopular or obscure por-
tions of a preexisting work, add some new material, and produce a
best seller, more power to him! That is exactly what copyright policy
encourages. It is only when the portions taken to produce the best
seller were important to the original work, either in quantity or qual-
ity, that the use may be damnable, because then the user robs the
original work of its market appeal. Thus logic, policy, and the statu-
tory language are congruent in directing courts' attention exclusively
to the proportion and quality of the amount taken with respect to the
underlying work, at least insofar as the "amount taken" factor is
concerned.
416. See id. at 565-66.
417. Id. at 565 (emphasis added).
418. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
213 (1987).
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2. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE AMOUNT TAKEN TO THE MARKET
EFFECT AND THE PURPOSE OF THE USE
As the dissent in Nation Enterprises conceded, intuition and com-
mon sense argue for some comparison between the amount taken and
the user's work,419 despite the clear commands of the statute, copy-
right tradition, logic, and policy. Certainly a user's borrowing all, or
substantially all, of his work militates against a finding of fair use.42°
Moreover, the statute makes it clear that an abridgement-the para-
digmatic use involving little new material-requires authorization by
the author of the underlying work. 21 Certainly fair use analysis
419. See Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 599 n.23 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
420. See, e.g., Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 1983) (almost 50% of
teaching material on cake decorating copied verbatim); Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 780
(8th Cir. 1962) (original hymn incorporated into choral arrangement for performance); Public
Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (collected speeches of
famous admiral copied for publication), vacated and remanded on procedural grounds, 369
U.S. 111 (1962) (per curiam); Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1956)
(television parody: "plot, story, principal incidents, and ... sequence of events" taken from
earlier movie), aff'd without opinion sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's Inc.,
356 U.S. 43 (1958) (per curiam); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir.
1937) (telephone book: "Counsel have not disclosed a single authority, nor have we been able
to find one, which lends any support to the proposition that wholesale copying and publication
of material can ever be fair use."); Jackson v. MPI Home Video, 694 F. Supp. 483, 490 (N.D.
Ill. 1988) (taking of all of Jesse Jackson's speech at Democratic National Convention for
dissemination in videocassette form weighs against fair use); Encylopaedia Brittanica Educ.
Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243, 251 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (educational films systematically
copied by school district). But see Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345,
1353 & n.12, 1361 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (earlier cases only precluded copying of entire work for
distribution to others; House Report contemplates fair use defense for copying of entire work),
aff'd without opinion, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
The nearly automatic condemnation of taking an entire work is consistent with decisions,
such as Nation Enterprises, that hold the taking of a tiny portion unfair. See Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. at 569; id. at 579-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (taking of 300 words out of 200,000
from unpublished work unfair); Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1980) (use of 8% of background film on
Olympic champion, which user apparently found "essential," weighed against fair use); Roy
Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz, Liechtenstein v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 503 F.
Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826
(1982) (jury reasonably could have found taking of 2%, 6%, 2%, 1% and 1.7%, respectively,
from five films both quantitatively and qualitatively substantial, "at least with respect to some
of the films").
A user whose entire work consists of borrowed material risks a judgment of infringement
because he has added little of his own. Thus, the user stands accused of Justice Story's "facile
use of the scissors." See supra note 332. More important, if all of a user's work is borrowed,
there is a good chance it will usurp some, if not all, of the market for the underlying work.
Thus for fair use purposes the primary evil of a predominantly borrowed work lies not in the
amount it has taken, but in its likely market effect. Comparison of portions taken to the
secondary work therefore should be evaluated under that heading.
421. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (The definition of "derivative work" includes
"abridgment."); id. § 106(2) (copyright holder's exclusive right to prepare and authorize
preparation of derivative works); W. PATRY, supra note 5, at 22 n.20.
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should not approve what Justice Story called "facile use of the
scissors.'
4 2 2
This analysis, however, properly belongs more in a discussion of
market effect than in an analysis of the amount taken. Congress has
instructed courts, in analyzing the amount taken, to consider whether
the user took portions of the underlying copyrighted work that
accounted for its audience appeal. Indeed, courts should determine
what constitutes the "heart" of the underlying work not by abstract
literary speculation, but by reference to this target audience. A court
analyzing the market effect, however, initially should look at the audi-
ence for the user's work as a whole, not just the borrowed portions, in
order to determine whether the user's work has the potential to sup-
plant the plaintiff's work in the marketplace. When it finds a signifi-
cant potential market effect, the court then must determine whether
that effect is due to the borrowed portions of the user's work or to the
user's own creativity.423 This second inquiry is necessary to avoid
curtailing the incentive to create new works from old ones,124 but it
should be treated as part of the analysis of market effect.
Additional difficulties in applying the "amount taken" factor
arise from its close relation to the "purpose" factor. There is no
absolute standard by which to evaluate the amount taken, whether in
a quantitative or qualitative sense.' 25 As the standard is flexible, the
amount taken must be evaluated, not in a vacuum, but in relation to
the legitimate purpose claimed for the use. Consequently, the
"amount taken" and "purpose" factors are inextricably related, and
the former cannot be applied until after application of the latter. For
example, if the accused use is criticism or commentary, the amount
taken must be appropriate for that purpose. 26 Similarly, if the use is
parody, the amount taken should be appropriate to "conjure up" the
work parodied.427 Indeed, the crux of disagreement between the
422. See supra note 332.
423. See supra text accompanying notes 418-19.
424. No matter how great the market appeal of the user's work, the taking should be fair
unless a significant portion of the market effect can be traced to portions taken from the
underlying work. Otherwise, the user's creativity would be penalized, rather than rewarded.
425. See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986) ("There are
no absolute rules as to how much of a copyrighted work may be copied and still be considered
a fair use."), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 220 (1987). Indeed, quick comparison of the facts and
results in Sony and Nation Enterprises supports this point. See supra text accompanying notes
1-3.
426. See 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 47, § 13.05[D][1], at 13-90. 10 to - 90.12.
Cf Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding it error to grant summary
judgment based on insubstantiality of taking and not to allow trier of fact to consider "all
relevant facts"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
427. For a discussion of the "amount taken" in works of parody, see infra Section V(C)(3).
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majority and the dissent in Nation Enterprises appeared to be differing
views as to whether the taking was excessive for the purpose of news
reporting.4 28 As all of the Nation Enterprises Justices recognized, a
taking in excess of what is appropriate to the use weighs against a
finding of fair use.429
The relationship between the "amount taken" factor and the
market effect is different. It reflects something similar to causation,
but not as immediate. To defeat a fair use defense, a copyright
infringement plaintiff need not show actual, present market effect, but
must only show "some meaningful likelihood of future harm."43 The
inquiry is similar to an investigation of "likelihood of confusion" in an
action for trademark infringement or unfair competition, for it
addresses not existing conflict, but future probabilities.431
Some speculation is inevitable under such a standard. However,
to minimize the uncertainty of the standard and the potential for
unfairness to the defendant, there must be some link between the
accused use of the underlying copyrighted work and the claimed
effect on its potential market. The causal link between the taking and
the claimed market effect appears stronger to the extent the accused
work has taken important portions of the work used. To the extent it
has not, claims of market effect are tenuous. Thus, a proper determi-
nation of the market effect, as well as of the amount taken, requires
some evaluation of the importance of the portions taken from the
underlying work to the underlying work itself. Yet because courts
must also determine the causal impact of the portions taken on the
market effect of the secondary work in order to evaluate fairly the
market effect, it is understandable if they sometimes confuse the
428. See supra notes 253, 378. The dissent in Nation Enterprises thought that The Nation
had not taken more of the copyrightable aspects of Ford's autobiography than were necessary
to convey the facts, because it viewed much of the substance of the autobiography as
uncopyrightable facts and ideas. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 600-01 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
429. See id. at 563-64; id. at 600-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
430. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (emphasis
in original).
431. A trademark infringement plaintiff need not show actual confusion in the marketplace
between the allegedly infringing trademark and the plaintiff's mark; he need only demonstrate
a likelihood of confusion. See generally 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, § 23.2[A], at 50-51 (2d ed. 1984) ("The test of infringement is the likelihood of
confusion, not the proof of actual confusion." (emphasis in original)). The reason a
demonstration of actual present harm is not required to rebut a fair use defense in copyright
cases is the same: "such a requirement would leave the copyright holder with no defense
against predictable damage," Sony, 464 U.S. at 451; supra text accompanying note 157, and
therefore would frustrate the goal of injunctive relief-avoiding predictable damage and
repeated trips to the courthouse.
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"amount taken" factor with the market effect.432
3. APPLICATION TO PARODY
No field of creative expression better illustrates the interplay
between the amount taken and the other fair use factors than parody.
The amount taken is a central theme for works of parody because any
successful parody must take enough to "recall or conjure up" the
original work and thereby achieve the intended humorous effect.
The decision most often cited for this proposition is Berlin v. E.
C. Publications, Inc.433 There Mad Magazine published satiric lyrics,
without music, to twenty-five popular songs by Irving Berlin.434 The
lyrics were original burlesques, accompanied by instructions to the
reader to "sing to the tune of" Berlin's songs.43" Their subject matter
differed entirely from that of Berlin's songs; the only elements in com-
mon were the meter and an occasional borrowed phrase.4 36
In a suit by Berlin for copyright infringement, the Second Circuit
affirmed summary judgment for the defendants as to twenty-three of
the twenty-five songs.437 It addressed both the "recall or conjure up"
standard and an earlier, widely criticized standard that focused on the
substantiality of the taking438 and found that the satiric lyrics satisfied
432. The Nation Enterprises dissenters accused the majority of confusing both the nature of
the work (at least its unpublished status) and the market effect with the amount taken. See
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 597-98, 601-02 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
433. 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
434. Id. at 542.
435. Id. at 542-43.
436. Id. at 543.
437. Id. at 542, 545.
438. The "substantiality" standard was applied in Benny v. Loew's, Inc., one of two fair use
decisions affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court. See Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d
532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd without opinion sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loews,
Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958); supra note 128. In that case, Jack Benny had created a half-hour
television burlesque of the successful serious movie and play "Gas Light," which told the tale
of a man trying to convince his wife she had gone mad. See id. at 533-35.
The Ninth Circuit rejected Benny's fair use defense to a claim of copyright infringement,
reasoning that Benny had taken too much of the plot, sequence and dialogue of the original
works. See id. at 536-37. Without addressing the effect of the parody on the market for the
original works, the Ninth Circuit said: "The fact that a serious dramatic work is copied
practically verbatim, and then presented with actors walking on their hands or with other
grotesqueries, does not avoid infringement of the copyright." Id. at 536. In its analysis, the
Ninth Circuit focused almost entirely on the substantiality of the taking and paid little heed to
the claim that the use was a parody. See id. at 536-37.
The Berlin court noted with apparent approval criticism of the Benny decision for
focusing on the amount taken to the exclusion of other factors, such as the market effect. See
Berlin, 329 F.2d at 544.45; see also Wait Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756-57
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. O'Neill v. Walt Disney Prods., 439 U.S. 1132 (1979). In
Walt Disney, the Ninth Circuit criticized a broad reading of its focus on the substantiality of
the taking in Benny and reinterpreted Benny as "setting a threshold that eliminates from the
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both:
While brief phrases of the original lyrics were occasionally injected
into the parodies, this practice would seem necessary if the defend-
ants' efforts were to "recall or conjure up" the originals; the
humorous effect achieved when a familiar line is interposed in a
totally incongruous setting, traditionally a tool of parodists,
scarcely amounts to a "substantial" taking, if that standard is not
to be woodenly applied.439
Earlier in its opinion, after describing the significant differences
between the original songs and the parodies, the Second Circuit noted
that the plaintiff had claimed no market effect. It wryly observed,
"[Q]uite soundly, it is not suggested that 'Louella Schwartz Describes
Her Malady' might be an acceptable substitute for a potential patron
of 'A Pretty Girl Is Like A Melody.'"
Codification of the fair use doctrine has encouraged courts not
only to continue careful scrutiny of the amount taken in parody cases,
but to consider other factors as well. A good example is the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Fisher v. Dees." ' That case involved a parody of
the popular song "When Sonny Gets Blue," entitled "When Sonny
Sniffs Glue."" 2 In finding the parody a fair use, the Ninth Circuit
discussed only three of the statutory factors: purpose, amount taken,
and market effect." 3 Although it observed that parody is a favored
activity, 4 the court denied parody any presumptively favorable
effect. Instead, following the commercial presumption in Sony and
Nation Enterprises,445 it weighed the "purpose" factor against fair use
fair use defense copying that is virtually complete or almost verbatim." Id. at 756-57. This
interpretation of Benny appears proper. Accord Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase
Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 358-59 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
Professor Gordon lauded the finding of infringement in Benny because there were no
obvious impediments to market transactions between the television station and the copyright
owners, as indicated by a reported $100,000 settlement of the litigation. See Gordon, supra
note 7, at 304-05 n. 221 (citing Netterville, Copyright & Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry and
Humorous Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 233 (1962)).
The fact remains, however, that no court has considered whether the Benny burlesque
impinged on the market for "Gas Light." Perhaps the case can be explained on the ground
that Jack Benny's own use itself demonstrated a market for derivative works. See supra note
301.
439. Berlin, 329 F.2d at 545.
440. Id. at 543.
441. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
442. See id. at 434. The parody's opening lyrics were: "When Sonny sniffs glue, her eyes
get red and bulgy, then her hair begins to fall." The original song's opening lyrics were:
"When Sunny gets blue, her eyes get gray and cloudy, then the rain begins to fall." Id.
443. See id. at 436-39.
444. See id. at 435.
445. See supra notes 146.51, 157, 182 and accompanying text. See generally supra Section
IV(A).
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because the parody had a commercial purpose, but it held the pre-
sumption rebuttable. 44 6 Turning to the market effect, the court briefly
contrasted the two songs-a "lyrical song" about lost love and a rau-
cous and silly song about drug use-and concluded that they did not
"fulfill the same demand."" 7
The Ninth Circuit next considered the "recall or conjure up"
standard 448 and rejected the notion that a parodist's use should be
limited to conjuring up the original initially." 9 It listed three points
to consider when determining whether a parodic taking is excessive:
"the degree of public recognition of the original work, the ease of
conjuring up the original work in the chosen medium, and the focus
of the parody. ' 450 After analyzing the parody in light of these consid-
erations, the court concluded that the parody took "no more from the
original than [was] necessary to accomplish reasonably its parodic
purpose. ' 45 1 Thus, notwithstanding the weight it had given in assess-
ing the "purpose" factor to the Sony and Nation Enterprises presump-
tion against commercial fair use, the Ninth Circuit recognized that
proper consideration of the amount taken requires reference to the
parodic purpose of the work. In so doing, it recognized that a paro-
dist is not limited to an amount that barely "conjures up" the original
work, but may take more if a greater taking is appropriate to the
parodic purpose. The Second Circuit has reached a similar
conclusion.452
This conclusion is undoubtedly correct because a parodist's job is
only partly accomplished when the parody calls to mind the original
work. If the law permitted only enough taking to "conjure up" the
original, there would be no room left for poking fun at it. Yet
repeated borrowing in surprising or incongruous ways is often the
446. See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 437. "The defendant can rebut the presumption by convincing
the court that the parody does not unfairly diminish the economic value of the original." Id.
(citation omitted). Of course, the word "unfairly" in this passage begs the question and allows
the court to nullify the presumption-a fate it richly deserves.
447. Id. at 438.
448. Id. at 438-39.
449. See id. at 438 & n.4. The court noted that whether a taking is excessive under the
circumstances is a question of law. Id.
450. Id. at 439. The court cited its own earlier opinion in Air Pirates in which it had
rejected a fair use defense on the part of "underground" comics that had copied the drawings
of certain Disney characters too closely. See id. (citing Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581
F.2d 751, 757-58 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. O'Neill v. Walt Disney Prods., 439
U.S. 1132 (1979)).
451. Id. at 439.
452. "A parody is entitled at least to 'conjure up' the original." Elsmere Music, Inc. v.
National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (affirming fair
use defense for parody "I Love Sodom" of promotional song "I Love New York").
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heart of parody. Thus, the "conjure up" test should set only a mini-
mum threshold for taking in parody. The maximum permissible tak-
ing should be determined by the more general standard of
appropriateness for the purpose, with a view to prohibiting only color-
able attempts to exploit the underlying work.
Although the Ninth Circuit in Fisher appeared to recognize this
point, its fair use analysis was deficient in one respect. It did not
explicitly weigh and balance the fair use factors in reaching its conclu-
sion.453 This oversight is unfortunate, for courts have a tendency in
parody cases to focus on the substantiality of the taking to the exclu-
sion of other relevant factors, although this tendency has been prop-
erly criticized.454 Indeed, a comparison of the Second Circuit's
opinion in Berlin with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Fisher shows the
considerable assistance that a broader focus can give courts in reach-
ing just and reasoned results in parody cases.455
If this well-justified trend toward a broader focus continues, pro-
tection of parody under the fair use doctrine likely will expand. For
parodies, the first two statutory factors-the purpose of the use and
nature of the copyrighted work-ordinarily will be in balance because
genuine parody lies in a favored category of use, but most parodies
borrow from highly creative works. Thus the question of fair use in
parody cases ordinarily will turn on the balance between the last two
factors-the amount taken and the market effect.4"6 The parodist,
however, need not prevail on both of these factors in order to main-
tain a fair use defense. For example, the adverse influence of a margi-
nal or not particularly significant market effect might be overwhelmed
by the favorable effect of a minimal taking. In any event, fair use
should be found when proof of a market effect is lacking, regardless of
the amount taken,457 for two reasons. First, the market effect is the
most important factor.458 Second, a parody that has no adverse effect
on the market for the underlying work is a new creative work that
453. The court's summation consisted of two short sentences setting forth its conclusions.
See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 440.
454. See supra note 438.
455. Noting that it had "consistently focused" on the amount taken in evaluating fair use
defenses for parodies, the Fisher court noted seemed eager to retrench from an obsessive focus
on that factor alone. See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438 (citing Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581
F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. O'Neill v. Walt Disney Prods., 439 U.S.
1132 (1979)).
456. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp.
351, 358 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
457. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J., dissenting)
("[A] substantial taking for parody purposes is permissible where... the parody does not
fulfill the demand for the copyrighted work.").
458. See supra text accompanying notes 297-98.
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does not diminish the original author's incentive for creativity.
Therefore copyright policy strongly supports its creation.459
4. DETERMINING WHAT CONSTITUTES THE COPYRIGHTED WORK
Because the amount taken is measured with respect to the under-
lying work, the analysis of that factor in some cases requires a thresh-
old determination: what that work comprises. This issue may arise,
if, for example, the underlying work is a portion of a collective work,
such as a cover of a magazine, 460 an article in a magazine, 46' a single-
page feature in a magazine,462 or an individual feature on a news
broadcast. 63 Courts consider three criteria in determining whether a
particular single item constitutes a whole "copyrighted work" for
purposes of fair use analysis: whether it contains the "essence" of
whole work,4 6 whether it can stand on its own as a work of author-
ship,465 and whether it is separately marketable. 466
Of these criteria, only the last seems useful. The first or
"essence" criterion is hardly definitive or administrable. The second
might be interpreted as involving creative or aesthetic evaluation,
thereby raising questions of judicial competence and perhaps allowing
judges to impose their personal aesthetic values on others.467 On the
other hand, if the second criterion is interpreted as relying on a test of
viability in the marketplace, it devolves into the third. The third cri-
terion, separate marketability, therefore appears to be the best of the
three because it directly addresses the policy of providing market
incentives for creativity and is susceptible of proof by competent evi-
dence, such as expert testimony and direct proof.
459. The estimation of market effect must take into account the chance, however unlikely,
that the owner of copyright in the underlying work himself would make or commission a
similar parody. See supra notes 301, 438.
460. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1 171,
1176, 1177 & n.15 (5th Cir. 1980) (cover of TV Guide magazine, copied for comparative
advertising purposes, was not whole work used, but only portion of it, because cover omitted
"essence" of magazine-television schedules and articles).
461. See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044,
1050 (2d Cir. 1983) (comparing amount taken to length of article, rather than whole magazine,
without discussion of legal issue), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).
462. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1154-55 (9th Cir.
1986) (single-page parody "advertisement" stands alone as entire work).
463. See Pacific & S. Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1497 (11th Cir. 1984) (videotaped
feature from television news program constituted entire work because it "[stood] alone" as
coherent narrative), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985).
464. See Triangle Publications, 626 F.2d at 1177; Hustler Magazine, 796 F.2d at 1154.
465. See Hustler Magazine, 796 F.2d at 1155; Duncan, 744 F.2d at 1497.
466. See Duncan, 744 F.2d at 1497 (videotaped feature sold separately).
467. These are the same concerns that have made the judiciary reluctant to evaluate the
content of copyrighted works generally. See supra note 367.
[Vol. 43:233
FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT LAW
D. The Market Effect
The final statutory fair use factor-"the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work"- 468 is the
most important of the four4 69 because it directly addresses the funda-
mental goal of copyright law: encouraging creativity by securing
financial rewards to authors through the exercise of their exclusive
statutory rights.470 If the use of a copyrighted work by someone other
than the copyright holder does not reduce its existing or potential
market, that use does not impair the incentive for creativity, and
therefore does not impinge upon the fundamental goal of copyright
law. At the same time, that use advances both goals of copyright law
through the creation of a new work based upon the old one and conse-
quent increased dissemination of borrowed portions of the copy-
righted work. Accordingly, a use that has no adverse effect upon the
market for the copyrighted work is likely to be fair.
1. THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Although the "market effect" factor is firmly based in copyright
policy, applying it is not easy. A threshold question is who bears the
burden of proof. If the Sony majority's pronouncement 471 is taken
literally, the answer depends upon whether or not the use is commer-
cial. If the use is commercial, the defendant bears the burden, as is
generally appropriate for an element of an affirmative defense.472
However, this rule applies only when the defendant's use is for profit
because then a market effect is presumed. When the defendant's use
is noncommercial, a market effect "must be demonstrated. 473
With due respect to the Sony Court, this conditional allocation
of the burden makes no sense. The difficulty of proving or disproving
market effect does not turn on the defendant's profit motives. Con-
gress recognized that use by noncommercial enterprises, such as pub-
lic broadcasting entities, may have a profound effect on the markets
for copyrighted works.474 There is no reason to suppose that non-
profit enterprises in general would have any more or less difficulty
proving market effect than commercial operations of similar scope.
468. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
469. See supra text accompanying notes 297-98.
470. For a discussion of the goals of copyright law, see supra notes 56-59 and accompanying
text.
471. See supra text accompanying note 157.
472. See supra note 160.
473. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). See supra
text accompanying note 157.
474. See supra note 268.
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Hence there is little reason to allocate burdens of proof conditionally,
based on the defendant's profit motives.
Yet if the burden of proof should not shift depending on the pur-
pose of the defendant's use, on whom should it lie? Although fair use
is an affirmative defense, it appears appropriate for the plaintiff to
bear the burden of proof of market effect, at least initially, for several
reasons. 75 First, the plaintiff already bears the burden of proof on
the issue of infringement as a whole, and a claim of market effect goes
to the heart not only of the defendant's fair use defense, but also of the
plaintiff's case in chief. If the plaintiff wins her case in chief on the
issue of liability, she may have to prove something similar to market
effect in order to recover damages. 76 Requiring her to take the small
additional step of extrapolating damage calculations to potential
future markets does not seem to be an unfair burden.
Second, and more important, in most cases the plaintiff has bet-
ter information regarding the potential market effect than the defend-
ant. For example, the plaintiff may have prepared marketing studies
for the work allegedly unfairly used, or for similar works. Those
studies, describing the likely market for the work, would provide
essential evidence in assessing the market effect of the accused use.477
At any rate, the defendant is not likely to have significant information
about the potential market for the plaintiff's work, particularly if the
defendant's use is in another medium entirely-as often happens in
475. Requiring the plaintiff to bear the burden of proof of market effect is not inconsistent
with the traditional view that fair use is an affirmative defense, because the market effect is
only a single factor in the fair use calculus. The defendant could continue to bear the burden
of proof on the fair use defense as a whole. For example, if the evidence were equally balanced
after evaluation of all the relevant factors (including any not required by statute) the decision
could favor the plaintiff.
476. Damages are not an element of the offense of copyright infringement. A plaintiff may
seek an injunction against further infringement, impoundment and destruction of copies and
materials used in the infringement, the infringer's profits, and statutory damages, all without
proof of loss. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 503, 504(a)(1), 504(b), 504(c) (1982), supra note 84.
However, if a plaintiff does seek to recover damages, the evidence will be similar to that used to
demonstrate market effect, although perhaps less speculative.
When the plaintiff seeks the defendant's profits, the defendant bears the burden of proof of
causation with respect to those profits. The plaintiff need only show the defendant's gross
revenue from the infringing use, and the defendant then must prove any sources of that
revenue other than the infringement, as well as all deductions from gross revenue. See supra
note 233. The defendant's profits, however, are only an indirect measure of the effect of the
defendant's use on the market for the plaintiff's work, while actual damages usually will be a
direct measure.
477. The market effect at issue is the effect of the defendant's use on the plaintiff's potential
market for the copyrighted work. Although assessing this effect may require some
understanding of the market for the defendant's work, that market is relevant only insofar as it
overlaps the plaintiff's potential market. The primary focus of "market effect" analysis is the
plaintiff's potential market, not the defendant's.
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fair use cases. Requiring the defendant to elicit -this information
through laborious discovery when it is at the plaintiff's disposal
would only prolong litigation and encourage evasion of the discovery
process.
Finally, forcing the defendant to disprove a market effect
requires that he prove a negative-a difficult task in the best of cases.
The task might be virtually impossible without some guidance as to
which of the infinity of possible markets should be addressed. It
therefore seems both fair and appropriate to require the plaintiff to
bear the burden of proof on the issue of market effect, or at least the
burden of coming forward with evidence to identify the particular
markets potentially affected. Although the Sony Court would restrict
this approach to cases of noncommercial use, there appears to be little
reason to do so.
2. THE FUNCTIONAL TEST
Before turning to a more general discussion of the market effect,
it is useful to examine a test developed by Professor Nimmer that is
closely related to that factor. Under his test, courts compare the pur-
poses or functions of the original and accused works. If they are the
same, that fact weighs heavily against a finding of fair use, regardless
of whether or not the two works are in the same medium.17  The test
uses congruence of function as a proxy for market effect, presuming
some market effect when the two works have the same function. This
"functional test" has some support in case law4 79 and in the legislative
history of the copyright statute, although support in the legislative
history is limited to the educational field. 80
478. See 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 47, § 13.05[B], at 13-84 to -90.3.
479. See, e.g., Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786
F.2d 1400, 1409 (9th Cir. 1986) (unauthorized copies of real estate multiple listing books sold
and distributed to consumers for same purpose as authorized copies: providing information to
sell homes); Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 751 F.2d 501, 509
(2d Cir. 1984) (unauthorized copies of municipal bond information in "called bond cards"
used for same commercial purpose as cards), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 79 (1987); Marcus v.
Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 1983) (unauthorized copy of booklet for teaching cake
decorating in home economics class used in "learning activity package" for same purpose);
Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir.) (use of photographs and sound recordings
of adult film in city council's nuisance abatement proceeding not for same "intrinsic" use and
therefore weighs in favor of fair use), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982); Iowa State Univ.
Research Found. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) (television
network broadcast of students' film biography of Olympic wrestling champion fulfilled the
same basic purpose as film); Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz, Liechtenstein v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1144-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (unauthorized
use of Charlie Chaplin's films in television network's broadcast "obituary" fulfilled same
function as films), afl'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
480. A House Report on an early version of the copyright revision bill stated, "Textbooks
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The difficulty with the functional test, however, is that it has no
basis in the statute. If function means the purpose of the use, 48 1 the
statute is unambiguous. It treats the purpose of a use as an absolute
and asks only whether the purpose is among the favored categories,
such as news reporting, commentary, criticism, and the like. 482 The
statute does not view the purpose of a use in a relative sense, i.e., in
relation to the purpose of the underlying work. Indeed, except for a
limited passage from an early House Report," 3 there is nothing in the
legislative history to suggest that courts are to compare the purposes
of the two works in applying the "purpose" factor.
On the other hand, attempting to apply the functional test as part
of the "market effect" factor would confuse that factor with the "pur-
pose" factor and, more important, would substitute facile categoriza-
tion for proof of the realities of the marketplace. Whether two works
appear to have a common function should make no difference in fair
use analysis, because the statutory test is whether the accused work is
likely to have an adverse impact on the potential market for the origi-
nal. Although congruence of function makes a market effect possible,
it does not by itself demonstrate the probability of that effect. That
probability must be established by proof.
For example, suppose the The Washington Post received a verbal
report from an unnamed source at the Pentagon, identifying a mem-
ber of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and claiming that he had recommended
a preemptive nuclear strike against a hostile nation. Further, suppose
and other material prepared primarily for the school market would be less susceptible to
reproduction for classroom use [under the fair use doctrine] than material prepared for general
public distribution." H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1967), quoted with approval
in Marcus, 695 F.2d at 1175. This early language appears to have been approved by the House
Report on the bill eventually enacted. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 67 (Prior
discussion "still has value as an analysis of various aspects of the problem.").
The language of the report, however, only addresses educational materials, which have a
limited market. It should not be considered blanket approval of Professor Nimmer's
"functional test."
481. Some courts have made a "functional" analysis in evaluating the "purpose of the use."
See Supermarket of Homes, 786 F.2d at 1402; Marcus, 695 F.2d at 1175; Jartech, 666 F.2d at
407. Three courts inexplicably treat the "functional test" as part of their analysis of the nature
of the copyrighted work. See Moody's Investors Serv., 751 F.2d at 509; Iowa State Univ.
Research Found., 621 F.2d at 61; Roy Export, 503 F. Supp. at 1144-45. The substance of their
analysis, however, appears to be the proposition that similarity of function between the
accused and copyrighted works should outweigh the alleged creative, noncommercial, or
educational nature of the unauthorized use, respectively. Apparently, these courts reasoned
that the unauthorized use, being for the same purpose as the copyrighted work, was likely to
usurp whatever potential market the copyrighted work may have had. This reasoning is of
course better addressed to the "market effect" factor than to the "purpose" or "nature" factor.
482. See supra text accompanying notes 311-19.
483. See supra note 480.
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that The Post received the report as an "exclusive," with the under-
standing that The Post would release its own summary of the report,
with background, the next day. That summary undoubtedly would be
"news" of the highest order, which every news service in the country
would pick up. Yet because other news services, by hypothesis, would
have no original sources for their stories (The Post had an "exclu-
sive") they could do no more than parrot what The Post reported.
Due to the sensitivity of the subject matter and the risk of a libel
action by the named Chief of Staff, other news services therefore
might be excused if they stuck closely to The Post's language in their
stories.
Application of the functional test would tend to condemn this
use of The Post's expression because the purposes of the use and of
The Post's original publication would be precisely the same: reporting
current news for profit. Yet a more careful analysis of market effect
might well produce a neutral result, or even tilt toward a finding of
fair use. After all, by hypothesis, The Post would have published this
important news first and would have received the expected benefit
from its "scoop." Later developments in the Pentagon, the White
House, or the international arena undoubtedly would eclipse the
importance of The Post's particular wording of its original exclusive
story. In that case, there might well be no cognizable market effect,
despite the congruent purpose of the two works.
Instead of mindlessly comparing the functions of the two works
in such cases, courts should require plaintiffs to produce evidence of a
potential market effect. As for the "purpose" factor, courts should
give favored purposes such as news reporting the usual benefit of the
doubt, particularly in a case such as this, where the matter reported is
of such importance. Indeed, the doctrine of fair use was largely devel-
oped for just such cases.
The field of parody provides a second example of the confusion
that the functional test might sow. In MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,484 the
Second Circuit considered a bawdy parody of the famous wartime
ballad "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Company B," entitled the "Cun-
nilingus Champion of Company C."'485 Noting that both songs had
been performed on stage and sold in recorded and printed form, the
court found them to be competitive, and without any market analysis,
gave that finding some weight in rejecting a fair use defense.486 A
484. 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
485. MCA, 677 F.2d at 182. The song was created for a raunchy off-Broadway musical
entitled "Let My People Come." Id. at 181.
486. See id. at 185. The Second Circuit rested its conclusion primarily on the extent of the
19881
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vehement dissent criticized the majority for deducing a market effect
solely from the fact that both songs had been exploited in the same
media.487 It argued that "the two works respond to wholly differing
demands and that a customer for one would not buy the other in its
place. A raucous and explicitly sexual satire is not a substitute for the
innocence of Bugle Boy."488 As the dissent also noted,48 9 the Second
Circuit had reached the opposite result in a similar case involving the
milder parody "I Love Sodom" of the promotional song "I Love New
York. 490
Although the MCA majority did not explicitly apply the "func-
tional test," its reasoning was equivalent. Without considering the
market effect in detail, it presumed a market effect because the two
works were songs, functioned as entertainment, and had been com-
mercialized in the same way. Such reasoning does little more than
allow a court to substitute facile labels for analysis and proof.
This is not to say that congruence of function has no place in fair
use analysis. It may serve as evidence to be considered in an analysis
of market effect. However, it should not dominate that analysis or
skew evaluation of the "purpose of the use." Unless a plaintiff can
produce some evidence of potential market effect, congruence of pur-
pose alone ought not destroy a fair use defense, or even tilt the market
effect factor against fair use.
3. THE PROBLEM OF BREADTH
Aside from the burden of proof and nonstatutory tests, the chief
difficulty of the "market effect" factor is the broad scope of markets
that it attempts to address. Under the Sony Court's standard,4 91
plaintiffs are allowed two extrapolations in proving492 the market
taking, which the district had found unfairly excessive, and on the district court's finding that
the accused work had not been intended as a satire or parody of anything in particular. See id.
487. See id. at 191 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). The dissent also criticized the majority for
giving no more than lip service to the principles that a parody need not address the underlying
work itself, but may satirize general social, political, or economic conditions, and that a
parodist may take more than is strictly necessary to "conjure up" the original. See id. at 189-
90. The majority's decision, however, may have been motivated more by disdain for the
defendants and the subject of their work than by strict application of fair use law. See id. at
184 n. 1; see also id. at 191 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) ("We cannot, under the guise of deciding
a copyright issue, act as a board of censors outlawing X-rated performances.").
488. Id. at 191.
489. See id. at 189.
490. See Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
491. See supra text accompanying note 157.
492. For ease of discussion, it is assumed that plaintiffs bear the burden of proving market
effect, but not of negating the fair use defense as a whole. See supra text accompanying notes
475-78 and note 475.
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effect of an allegedly infringing use. First, they may extrapolate the
future of the defendant's use, in order to demonstrate what sort of
market effect it might have "if it should become widespread."4 93 Pre-
sumably this language permits plaintiffs to demonstrate the likely
effect of similar use of the same copyrighted material by others, for a
finding of fair use would serve as a precedent that would permit and
might encourage others to duplicate the accused use. 94 In addition,
it might permit plaintiffs to introduce evidence regarding all media in
which the alleged infringer and others might distribute the accused
work and potentially infringing derivative works based on it.495 For
example, if accused work is a novel, the plaintiff might show that it
could be adapted for theater, screen, or television.
The second extrapolation permitted by the Sony standard
addresses the plaintiff's potential markets. It admits testimony as to
all potential markets for the copyrighted work and any adverse effect
of the accused use, as extrapolated, on those markets. This second
extrapolation undoubtedly includes markets for derivative works
based on the copyrighted work, as the Supreme Court held in Nation
Enterprises.496 Thus, a proper evaluation of market effect may require
courts to determine, for example, whether the plaintiff's work might
be produced in new media, translated into other languages, or pub-
lished or performed in new markets.497
To be sure, a wide-ranging analysis of potential markets appears
493. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984), quoted at
supra text accompanying note 157.
494. The Nation Enterprises Court explicitly acknowledged the precedential effect of fair
use decisions on the markets for copyrighted works. See supra text accompanying note 236.
495. Allowing evidence of putative uses by putative future defendants does not undermine
the argument that the plaintiff normally will have the best evidence of market effect. See supra
text accompanying notes 476-78. The focus of the inquiry remains the plaintiff's market, see
supra note 477, and extrapolation of the defendant's market may be beyond either party's
direct knowledge.
496. See supra text accompanying note 234; see also Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d
1490, 1496-97 (11th Cir. 1984) (market for excerpts of appearances of individuals on
newscasts, which defendant exploited), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985); Iowa State Univ.
Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1980) (use of
film in television broadcasts); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977) (possible
republication or sale of motion picture rights in copyrighted letters that had been out of print
for 20 years), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz,
Leichtenstein v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145-46 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (detailed discussion of this principle in context of "retrospective" drawn from excerpts
of individual films), affid, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
497. Although the Sony majority mentioned potential markets for the copyrighted
television programs at issue, it focused primarily on existing markets, such as reruns, theater
showings, and film rentals. See supra text accompanying notes 162-63. The four dissenters
questioned this focus and noted then-undeveloped future markets, including the sale and rental
of prerecorded tapes or discs. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
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justified on policy grounds,498 especially in times, like the present,
when rapid advances in technology are continually creating new
media of expression. Exploitation of new media of expression simul-
taneously serves both goals of copyright law, encouraging creation of
new works of authorship and broadly disseminating those already cre-
ated. Moreover, exploitation of new media may require massive
investment deserving special encouragement. Thus, to skimp on
copyright protection for nascent media in the name of an
overgenerous reading of fair use would undercut both pillars of copy-
right policy. 499 For these reasons, recent commentators are unani-
mous in supporting a broad view of markets potentially affected by an
accused use."°°
483, 497-98 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); supra note 185. Neither the majority nor the
dissent, however, discussed then-undeveloped markets indepth.
Nevertheless, it is significant that the four dissenting Justices considered undeveloped
markets even with respect to private, noncommercial activity such as private home
videotaping. Undoubtedly, all nine Justices would have considered such markets in evaluating
commercial activity, given the majority's presumption that such activity is unfair. See supra
text accompanying note 157.
498. See supra text accompanying notes 469-71.
499. Uncertainty in protection of authors' and publishers' economic interests can
profoundly affect the development of new media. A thriving industry in compact disks
developed quickly because legal protection for phonorecords was already available and the
high cost of manufacturing compact disks to some extent made legal protection superfluous.
In contrast, the United States digital audio tape industry was stillborn due in large measure to
uncertainty over practical protection for the interests of owners of copyrighted works.
Digital tape technology makes it easy for consumers to copy recordings of music without
degradation of quality. Record producers feared that this technology would encourage
massive unauthorized copying, and thereby destroy their markets for records. As a result,
although the recording technology had been available for some time, importation of equipment
into the United States was held in limbo for almost two years while copyright holders
unsuccessfully petitioned Congress to require technical (hardware) modifications to prevent
unauthorized copying. See Fantel, Barriers to DAT Recorders Are Breaking Down, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 24, 1988, § 2 at 31, col. 1 (Sunday ed.); Yoder, Digital Tape Is Inevitable; So Why
the Delay?, Wall St. J., Aug. 12, 1986, at 31, col. 2.
500. See Gordon supra note 7, at 278-81 (suggesting, inter alia, that courts consider harm in
light of potential market mechanisms that may develop in the future if the accused use is found
unfair); Fisher, supra note 58, at 1729 n.298 (concurring with Professor Gordon on this point);
id. at 1740-43 (criticizing courts and earlier commentators for taking too narrow a view of the
effects of users' actions on original creators' incentives to create); id. at 1781-82 n.524
(suggesting that, in most cases, the mere fact that a plaintiff has brought suit should be enough
to require an investigation of marketplace harm); see also Jackson v. MPI Home Video, 694 F.
Supp. 483 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (finding market effect despite lack of evidence that plaintiff would
ever market his Convention speech, which he had widely publicized for free).
Professor Fisher also suggests that any adverse impact on a copyright owner's ability to
engage in price discrimination should be evaluated as a separate factor, weighing against fair
use, because price discrimination increases the monopoly rewards to authors while equalizing
users' access to copyrighted works. See id. at 1709-10, 1774, 1782. As an example, he cites the
publishing of a pirate paperback before the original author either has reaped the full rewards of
her higher-priced hardback edition or has published her own delayed paperback edition. See
id. at 1709-10. Absent the pirate paperback edition, the author could engage in price
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Nevertheless, the Sony Court's standards for potential markets
are so open-ended that they invite courts to sail forth upon a sea of
speculation. 0 1 How are courts to stay afloat, let alone steer a steady
course toward precision and certainty in their decisions? Perhaps the
answer lies in paying more attention to the quantitative aspects of
potential markets. Nowhere in Sony or Nation Enterprises did the
Supreme Court address the magnitude of the market impact, or even
its importance relative to the size of the market as a whole.502 Conse-
quently, the Sony Court could dismiss the impact of millions of indi-
vidual decisions, repeated without limit, to copy entire television
programs. On the other hand, the Nation Enterprises Court could
discrimination by extracting a higher price for the hardback edition, presumably including a
premium not only for the higher quality of the hardback edition, but also for earlier access to
its contents. (The pirate paperback would usurp the portion of the premium attributable to the
earlier access, but presumably not the portion attributable to higher quality.).
Undoubtedly, the notion that price discrimination by copyright owners can improve the
economic efficiency of copyright incentives without decreasing that of dissemination and use is
something that the courts may wish to keep in mind. Nevertheless, it hardly qualifies as a
separate factor in the fair use calculus. Price differences arising solely from physical
differences in the form or medium in which a work is produced, or in the terms of its licensing,
undoubtedly outnumber instances of true price discrimination. More important, in cases such
as this example, all markets involved in the "price discrimination" will fall under the rubric of
"potential markets" in the "market effect" analysis as long as potential markets are construed
to include markets for derivative works-a proposition with which Professors Gordon and
Fisher, the Supreme Court, and this Article all generally concur. See Fisher, supra note 58, at
1742-43; Gordon, supra note 7, at 278-81; supra notes 496-97 and accompanying text. Because
direct impacts on the sales of the hypothetical author's hardback and paperback are both
readily foreseeable, they fit comfortably within the "market effect" factor under Section 107,
and there is no need to introduce a new factor in the analysis or to amend the statute.
501. See supra text accompanying notes 298-302.
502. Professor Fisher also recognizes that the magnitude of the market impact must be
considered. See Fisher, supra note 58, at 1672 & n.58. As a remedy, he suggests a complex
economic calculation in which courts would: (1) compute incentive/loss ratios for all
foreseeable types of uses of the same copyrighted work, as well as for the accused use; (2)
calculate the aggregate effect on overall economic efficiency for copyright owners and users of
that type of copyrighted work as successive uses are prohibited, in the order of decreasing
incentive/loss ratios; and (3) prohibit the use (and all successive uses) at which that aggregate
effect turns over, i.e., stops increasing and starts to decrease with each successive type of use of
decreasing incentive/loss ratio. See id. at 1705-17.
Even with a number of simplifying assumptions, this calculation requires determining all
the uses of the same type of copyrighted work "that might be considered fair or unfair" and
the incentive/loss ratios for all those uses. See id. at 1706-07. Determining these in turn might
require the judge to estimate the royalty at which a monopolist would license a monopsonist to
produce a derivative work, or the ways in which readers of literary reviews, students, and
professors might respond to a prohibition on the use of excerpts in reviews, learning, and
teaching, respectively. See id. at 1710 n.239, 1712-14. Furthermore, calculating the aggregate
efficiency effects would require the judge to estimate the impact of the various sorts of
economic incentives for each putative use, not only upon the universe of authors of the
particular type of copyrighted work at issue, but also upon those who might become such
authors. See id. at 1715 & n.257. The complexity of this sort of calculation makes it
impractical as a tool for judicial decisionmaking. See supra note 105.
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find a legally significant market impact in the loss of a $12,500 install-
ment licensing fee. 50 3 In light of subsequent developments in the
video industry, it is hard to imagine that the market impact of mil-
lions of unauthorized home copies would amount to less than
$12,500, the loss attributed to The Nation's prepublication "scoop."
Yet it is not the absolute magnitude of the market impact that
matters. Rather, it is the effect of the market impact on the incentive
to create. All things being equal, a greater pecuniary impact will have
a greater effect on that incentive. But all things are seldom equal, and
the incentive in practice no doubt depends upon the relative size of
the market to begin with, as well as the size, strength, and nature of
the copyright owner and others similarly situated. Even the millions
of copies of television programs that Sony allowed consumers to make
might be immaterial if they amounted to, for example, only one per-
cent of television producers' expected revenues. Under those circum-
stances, it would be hard to argue that a one percent loss in revenue
seriously affected producers' incentive to create.
At first glance, calculating the market impact in numerical terms
may seem too mercenary an approach. After all, does the law allow
stealing as long as one doesn't steal too much? Copyright infringe-
ment, however, is not stealing, and fair use is always a matter of
degree. If courts carefully parse the number and proportion of words
taken from an underlying work, why should they not parse as care-
fully the number and proportion of dollars taken from a potential
market? The latter ratio may always be more uncertain than the for-
mer, but without some effort to quantify the market effect, even if
only by a rough estimate of relative magnitude, courts will have a
difficult time making a realistic assessment of damage to the copyright
incentive. They may shed great light on the minutiae of quotation
versus paraphrasing but will leave the factual underpinnings of copy-
right policy in the dark.
In any event, assessing the market effect requires addressing
potential markets, and therefore courts cannot float entirely free of
the stream of speculation. Moreover, since the Supreme Court has
503. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566-69 (1985). It
is inconceivable that Gerald Ford was paid less than a six-figure advance for his two years of
work in preparing the manuscript of his autobiography. It may be assumed that the publishers
expected profits of roughly the same magnitude. In perspective, the $12,500 loss due to The
Nation's prepublication scoop might appear less than a fatal blow to the copyright incentive.
Nor would a finding of fair use in Nation Enterprises have destroyed the incentive of first
serialization rights, as the Court feared, see supra text accompanying note 236, if that result
had been based on the relative pecuniary advantage achieved by The Nation's scoop. In that
instance, the case would serve as a precedent only in situations in which the relative monetary
impact were similarly small.
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decreed fair use to be a mixed question of law and fact,5  even appel-
late judges may be drawn into that stream. To stay afloat, courts
must demand that plaintiffs505 produce some evidence of a market
effect and estimate the relative impact of the challenged use on their
primary and potential markets. Otherwise, assessment of the "market
effect" factor-the most important in the fair use calculus-will be
ruled by judicial hunches.
Proper consideration of quantitative factors may require mini-
trials on potential damages, complete with expert witnesses and
accountants. This complexity, however, seems unavoidable. Without
it, copyright infringement plaintiffs might prevail on the issue of fair
use simply by identifying the types of markets potentially affected,
without quantitative foundation; this result would unnecessarily tip
the balance of copyright policy in favor of creation, and against dis-
semination and use, of copyrighted works. Only through some esti-
mate of the market effect's magnitude can a proper balance be struck.
Although evidence of potential markets necessarily will be more
uncertain than proof of damages, where such evidence is available
courts should encourage every effort on the part of litigants to intro-
duce it, in order to make market effect analysis more realistic and
precise. Where the issues of liability and damages are tried sepa-
rately, courts perhaps could consolidate the fair use and damages
phases of the trial to avoid inefficiency.
4. THE EFFECT OF CRITICISM
However broad in scope the "market effect" factor may be, it
does not address indirect harm arising from parody or criticism. In
the words of the Ninth Circuit in Fisher: "[T]he economic effect of
the parody .'. . is not its potential to destroy or diminish the market
for the original-any bad review can have that effect-but rather
whether it fulfills the demand for the original. Biting criticism sup-
presses demand; copyright infringement usurps it."5 °6 This distinc-
tion is fundamental to the notion of fair use. Weighing the critical
504. See Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 560 (citing Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan. 744 F.2d 1490,
1495 n.8 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985)); 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER,
supra note 47, § 13.05, at 13-63 to -64 & n.8.
505. See supra note 492.
506. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986) (parody of popular song) (emphasis
in original).
In this age of electronic publishing, there is a third possibility: unauthorized use of a
database may impair its market by degrading the performance of the database system. See
Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (impairment of service to
other database customers, caused by unauthorized use, is adverse market impact cognizable in
fair use analysis). Since the database owner may be able to avoid this degradation of service at
1988]
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effect of a secondary work, rather than its effect in supplanting
demand for the original, would penalize a parody or critique precisely
when it is most effective in its criticism and therefore most deserving
of protection under the fair use doctrine.507
Because of this distinction, one court has suggested that a non-
competitive work can have no market effect.508 Such a rule, however,
would be too extreme. An infringing work need not be directly and
currently competitive with the original work in order to have a mar-
little expense, fair use analysis should focus not on the actual degradation of service, but on
whether the unauthorized use usurps a potential market that belongs to the database owner.
507. The case of Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., suggests an interesting
variant of this principle. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148
(9th Cir. 1986). The dispute involved the publication of a salacious parody advertisement,
describing Jerry Falwell's first sexual encounter, reportedly with his mother in an outhouse.
Falwell, the leader of the Moral Majority, used mass mailings of copies of the ad in a fund-
raising drive to support an action against Hustler for libel. A divided Ninth Circuit found this
use fair, perceiving little market effect. See id. at 1156; supra note 300.
Professor Fisher views the Ninth Circuit's no-harm conclusion as "plainly incorrect,"
noting that the Moral Majority's use of the copies to support a litigation fund "may well...
reduce the eagerness of Hustler and other magazines to publish parodies of public figures in the
future." Fisher, 'supra note 58, at 1741 n.352. Although such a disincentive is indeed likely,
query whether it is a market effect of which copyright law should take cognizance. No
usurpation of market is involved; instead, as in the case of criticism, the harm flows from a
source extraneous to copyright policy-in this case the use of the courts to vindicate an alleged
personal right to be free from defamation. Assuming arguendo that the ad was grossly libelous
and that Falwell had no other way to finance the action, it is not clear that copyright policy
demands a finding of infringement, thereby rendering Falwell liable for disgorgement of
profits, and perhaps closing his door to the courtroom. On the contrary, it seems that
copyright concerns are peripheral to this dispute,oand that the real issue is the dividing line
between legitimate free expression and defamation or other tortious conduct-a line better
drawn under state law, in light of first amendment principles. See generally Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-50 (1974) (in suit by private citizen, first amendment permits
states to impose liability for defamation under any standard other than liability without fault,
but recovery must be limited to actual damages absent at least recklessness); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (first amendment requires at least recklessness to
hold media liable for defamation of public official).
Extending these principles to Falwell's diversity action against Hustler for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the Supreme Court struck down a jury's award of
compensatory and punitive damages. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 878-89,
883 (1988). Falwell's libel claim had failed because the jury found the parody ad could not
reasonably be understood as describing real events. See id. at 878. In the Court's opinion, this
finding belied knowing or reckless misconduct on Hustler's part, and the first amendment,
which gives speech about public figures "breathing space," therefore precluded holding Hustler
liable in damages for its publication of the ad under the theory of intentional infliction of
emotional distress as well. See id. at 880, 882-83.
508. See New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 223
(D.N.J. 1977) (absence of market effect presumed for noncompetitor). Interestingly, however,
no such presumption was necessary to reach the result in this case. The alleged infringer
created an index that could not be used without reference to the original index allegedly
infringed. See supra note 277, Therefore the court found that the secondary index was more
likely to augment than to impair the market for the original. See Roxbury Data, 434 F. Supp.
at 223-24.
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ket effect; it is enough if it usurps a potential market. If the infringing
work serves as a market substitute for the original and thereby dimin-
ishes sales, or if it is likely to diminish future sales in reasonably fore-
seeable markets as yet unexploited, those facts should weigh against
fair use, at least to the extent that they can reasonably be quantified.
But the diminution in sales must come from fulfillment of the demand
for the original, not from criticism. A "devastating critique [may
diminish] sales by convincing the public that the original work was of
poor quality, ' '509 but that does not make the criticism unfair.
By focusing on the impact of a user's work in meeting the
demand for the original, courts can directly assess any reduction in
the constitutional incentive for creativity. To determine this effect
more precisely, courts can encourage litigants to address both the
quantitative and qualitative aspects of the market effect by providing
evidence of specific potential markets that may be affected and of the
magnitude of each effect. On the basis of this evidence, courts then
may determine the relative aggregate diminution in potential markets
for the underlying work arising out of the accused use, which should
serve as a measure of the lost incentive. Finally, by properly allocat-
ing the burden of proof, courts can ensure fairness and encourage liti-
gants to come forward with this evidence. Perhaps then the market
effect will be the most useful, as well as the most important, factor in
fair use analysis.
E. Nonstatutory Factors
Congress has made clear, and the Supreme Court has reiterated,
that the four factors specified in Section 107 are nonexclusive, and
that other considerations are permissible.510 Because the fair use doc-
trine is designed to cover unforeseeable circumstances, it is impossible
even in theory to specify all considerations that might be relevant in
particular cases. Courts therefore should be free to consider nonstatu-
tory factors whenever they appear pertinent. Already, courts have
discovered two factors, good faith and unpublished status, that
deserve separate discussion.
L GOOD FAITH
In Nation Enterprises, the majority made much of the defendant's
use of a "purloined manuscript. ' 511 Quoting the maxim that "[flair
509. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1051
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).
510. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
511. See supra text accompanying notes 220-22.
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use presupposes 'good faith' and 'fair dealing' "512 the Court weighed
the unauthorized status of The Nation's article more heavily than its
news reporting purpose and tilted the "purpose" factor against fair
use.
513
This analysis. is subject to criticism on several grounds. First,
from the standpoint of faithfulness to statutory language, a user's
course of dealing with the holder of copyright in the underlying work
has little relation to the "purpose" of the use. Second, and more
important, there is little reason to infuse the doctrine of fair use with
notions of commercial ethics.
Unlike the doctrine of trade secrecy,5 14 the doctrine of fair use
has no substantial basis in commercial morality. Like copyright law
generally, fair use has an economic purpose. The morality vel non of
transactions between users and copyright holders has little to do with
that purpose. Indeed, the very term "fair use" is a misnomer because
the doctrine, as codified today, does not focus on notions of ethics and
fairness, but on market impacts and the relative public benefits of use
versus incentives for creation.515
The final reason for de-emphasizing questions of good or bad
faith in copyright cases is the division of labor between state and fed-
eral courts. Bad faith may be relevant in claims of unfair competition
under state law,51 6 but copyright law condemns unauthorized copying
whether done in good faith or bad. Indeed, courts have found that
state claims based on unfair competition survive preemption by copy-
right law precisely because those state claims involve additional ele-
ments of misrepresentation, deception, or bad faith that are not
required for copyright liability.51 7 Any consideration of bad faith
512. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562-63 (1984)
(quoting Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (quoting
Schulman, Fair Use and the Revision of the Copyright Act, 53 IOWA L. REV. 832 (1968))).
513. See id.
514. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-82 (1974) (twin purposes of
trade secret law are to encourage innovation and to maintain standards of commercial ethics).
Behind simplistic notions of commercial morality, however, weightier principles of policy and
economics lurk. See id. at 485-87. The Court stated that preemption of trade secret law would
encourage industrial self-help and cause unnecessary investment in physical security, greater
restriction on employee mobility, limits on employees' access to knowledge, and reluctance to
license trade secrets. In turn, all these effects would impede dissemination of knowledge and
would impair employee mobility and a free market in technology. Id.
515. Although Congress referred to the fair use doctrine as an "equitable rule of reason,"
history shows that from the beginning it has been an accommodation between conflicting
statutory policies that is based more on economics and the needs of the marketplace than on
notions of fairness. See supra note 6.
516. See generally 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 431, § 23.32, at 104-06.
517. See, e.g., Donald Frederick Evans & Assocs., Inc. v. Continental Homes, Inc., 785
F.2d 897, 913-14 (11th Cir. 1986) (misrepresentation by builder that his homes, designed in
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claims in the context of a fair use defense to a copyright infringement
action therefore would overlap the adjudication of state unfair compe-
tition claims and might strengthen arguments that federal copyright
law is preemptive. Thus excessive attention to bad faith in federal
copyright litigation would not only defocus copyright doctrine, but
might well undermine claims of bad faith in state courts.
In any event, the Nation Enterprises Court's reference to good
faith and morality was misguided because the case that it cited, Time
Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates,5" 8 is but weak authority for its conclu-
sion on this point, as the dissenters correctly noted. 9 In Bernard
Geis, the author of the accused work had abused a position of trust to
make copies of the original work,52° and yet the court found his use
fair, based on other factors.52" ' In contrast, Navasky of The Nation
only received his copy of Ford's manuscript from an anonymous
source; he did not make it himself.522
Lower courts have been more cautious in addressing the issue of
bad faith. For example, for reasons of policy, both the Second and
Ninth Circuits have rejected claims that a user who borrows after
being refused permission is ipso facto acting in bad faith.523 In the
words of the Second Circuit, defendants "should not be penalized for
part from floor plans copied without authorization, were the same as those built from
authorized plans of plaintiff/architect actionable as unfair competition; state claim not
preempted under 1976 Act); Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz, Liechtenstein v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1151-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (1909
Copyright Act condemns infringement, even if done in good faith, but New York unfair
competition law bans "commercial immorality"; therefore, no preemption under 1909 Act.),
aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
518. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
519. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 593 & n.17 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
520. Without authorization, he had surreptitiously taken photographs of his employer's
copy of the famous Zapruder film of President Kennedy's assassination. Then, after his
repeated requests to use the film had been denied, he had charcoal sketches made of certain
frames, which he published in a book criticizing the official report on the assassination. See
Bernard Geis, 293 F. Supp. at 133, 135-36, 138-39.
521. See id. at 146. Despite an "initial reluctance" stemming from the defendant's
"deliberate appropriation," the court held his use fair and granted him summary judgment.
See id. Among other things, the facts that published copies of the frames were available, that
the defendant had offered all profits from his use as a license fee, and that he had probably
acted on advice of counsel, moved the court to overcome its "initial reluctance" on this point.
See id. The parallel to Nation Enterprises, also involving presidential events of great public
importance, is striking.
522. See Nation Enters, 471 U.S. at 543.
523. See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1264 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 2201 (1987); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436-37 (9th Cir. 1986). But cf Roy
Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz, Liechtenstein v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 503 F.
Supp. 1137, 1146-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding bad faith, as additional factor tending to negate
fair use, based on use after repeated refusals of requests for license, acquisition of authorized
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erring on the side of safety" and asking for permission before proceed-
ing. 24 This rationale applies a fortiori to such traditionally favored
uses as parody, criticism, and comment, for which permission is not
likely to be forthcoming. As the Ninth Circuit sagely observed,
"Even though such gestures are predictably futile, we refuse to dis-
courage them." '525
Yet whatever their validity, claims of bad faith have little place
in the statutory structure built by Congress. The purpose of a use is
none the less news reporting, parody, or criticism because the user is a
scoundrel. Some very important works of authorship owe their exist-
ence to unpleasant people. 526 Unpleasant conduct, however, is
peripheral to the concerns of copyright law. Accordingly, bad faith
should be considered, if at all, as a separate nonstatutory factor and
given relatively little weight.
2. UNPUBLISHED STATUS
In Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court described the unpub-
lished status of Ford's autobiography as "a critical element of its
'nature.' "527 Although the Court's concern with unpublished works
is well-founded, 2 ' the unpublished status of an original work is better
considered as a separate factor, rather than as part of the "nature of
the copyrighted work."
If considered as part of the nature of the work, unpublished sta-
tus is likely to subsume the primary consideration-the position of
the work on the spectrum between fact and fiction 529 -a consideration
that has independent importance for the fair use calculus. The bor-
rowed work's position on that spectrum should not be so submerged
because that position directly implicates the fundamental policies that
underlie fair use doctrine. If a work is primarily factual, it should
admit a broad scope of fair use in order to encourage the use and
copy by misrepresentation, and defendant's violation of its own and industry's guidelines.),
aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
524. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d at 1264.
525. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 437. A more interesting question arises when the accused use
constitutes a breach of contract-for example, when a use is in excess of limitations in a license
agreement. Even in such cases, however, there appears to be little reason to deny the
defendant the benefit of a fair use defense by calling the breach bad faith and giving it
significant weight in the fair use calculus. If the defendant has failed to honor a private
bargain, he should be liable only for breach of contract unless that failure offends copyright
policy.
526. See generally, I J. BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSTON, L.L.D. (1924).
527. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985); supra
note 225 and accompanying text.
528. See supra Section IV(B).
529. See supra text accompanying notes 291-94, 374-78.
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dissemination of information. If it is primarily creative, the scope of
fair use should be narrower in order to protect the author's creative
expression. These considerations retain their force regardless of publi-
cation, but simplistic "presumptions" against prepublication fair use
would obliterate them.53
0
More important, the significance of unpublished status itself may
depend on the position of the copyrighted work on the spectrum of
fact and fiction. As the Supreme Court noted in Nation Enterprises,
the special deference due unpublished works derives in part from
notions of privacy and an individual's right not to speak.531  These
policies are at their zenith in the realm of private letters, 532 autobio-
graphical works, and the like-all of which lie somewhere in the mid-
dle of the spectrum from fact to fiction. They have lesser applicability,
however, to works at either end of that spectrum. For example, if an
author of a fantasy objects to its publication, the objection probably
derives from dissatisfaction with its quality, rather than with its dis-
closure of private facts or personal opinions. At the other extreme, an
author's refusal to publish scientific works or fact compilations is
more likely to arise from concerns about quality and accuracy than
from fears of invasion of privacy. Only on the middle ground, where
stand semi-factual works such as autobiographies, letters, and per-
sonal papers, are concerns of privacy directly implicated.
Admittedly, these distinctions are fine. There is some basis in
policy for upholding an author's right to control all types of unpub-
lished works, for an author's exclusive control of unpublished mate-
rial may lead to more refinement of the work and better expression.
Yet that control also may lead to suppression, for which the only jus-
tification appears to lie in notions of privacy and first amendment val-
ues. Those values have more relevance for some types of works than
for others, and this fact should be reflected in any sensitive balancing
530. Finding Jesse Jackson's speech at the Democratic National Convention "an extended
piece of oratory," a court weighed its "nature". against fair use, although it had been
extensively disseminated by the defendant, saying, "While the right of first publication is a
very important right it is not the be all and end all of copyright protection." Jackson v. MPI
Home Video, 694 F. Supp. 483, 490 (N.D. 11. 1988).
531. See supra text accompanying notes 210,, 214.
532. In Salinger v. Random House, Inc., the Second Circuit considered the nature of
unpublished letters of the famous author, which the defendant had quoted and paraphrased in
an unauthorized biography. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 213 (1987). It reviewed the Supreme Court's treatment of unpublished
status in Nation Enterprises and noted that the "entire discussion of unpublished works
conveys the idea that such works normally enjoy complete protection against copying any
protected expression." Id. at 97. Although the Second Circuit properly considered and
balanced all the four factors, it found that the second factor weighed "heavily in favor of
Salinger." Id.
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of fair use factors. An author's concern with putative damage to her
reputation by premature publication of literary or scientific works
might be satisfied if the user simply avoided attribution of authorship.
But this expedient might be unsuccessful for private letters and auto-
biographical works, whose factual content might disclose the author's
identity. Focusing exclusively upon a work's unpublished status in
determining its nature would ignore these very real distinctions and
treat all unpublished works alike. Accordingly, the nature of a copy-
righted work should be evaluated in the traditional manner, and its
unpublished status should be considered as a separate factor, to be
weighed and balanced with the others.
F. Revisiting Sony and Nation Enterprises
How would the Sony and Nation Enterprises Courts have ruled if
they had used the analytical structure suggested above? The result in
Sony very likely would have been different, and the reasoning in
Nation Enterprises would have changed considerably, perhaps leading
to a different result.
In Sony, the purpose of the accused use was primarily solipsistic
entertainment, with perhaps some personal education as well. There
was no, evidence of any use for the benefit of persons other than the
copiers. Personal uses are not among those traditionally favored in
fair use analysis; nor are they productive. Accordingly, in Sony the
first statutory factor should have weighed against a finding of fair use.
The second and third factors also should have weighed against
fair use. Because most of the television programs copied were fic-
tional entertainment programs-traditionally a highly protected cate-
gory-the "nature" factor should have favored the plaintiffs. The
"amount taken" factor should have favored the plaintiffs because fair
use rarely allows the taking of an entire work.
Under the proposed analysis, the plaintiffs would have borne the
burden of proving market effect. Because the first three factors would
have tilted against fair use, however, the Court should have required
only a modest showing. Even in the absence of demonstrated effect,
unanimity among the other factors probably should have precluded a
finding of fair use. After all, if one considers the analogous situation
of millions of consumers photocopying entire books for their personal
libraries, it is difficult to conceive of circumstances under which such
use would be fair, even if the consumers limited themselves to one
reading of each copy. The only closely analogous case, Williams &
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Wilkins,5"' involved copying by research laboratory employees for
professional, not personal use, and even then the finding of fair use
hung by a thread.
This analysis, however, would not necessarily have required a
contrary result in the Sony decision as a whole. The Sony Court could
have reached the same result on the primary issue in the case, contrib-
utory infringement, by holding that authorized time-shifting was a
sufficient "substantial noninfringing use."' 534 Alternatively, the Court
might have honestly put its thumb on the scales in order to exorcise
the specter of copyright injunctions against individual consumers.
For example, it might have observed that the law should not impose
liability where it cannot provide a suitable remedy and therefore
might have concluded that supervening public policy considerations
required a finding of fair use.
Nation Enterprises was a much closer case. The purpose of the
accused use was news reporting, a traditionally favored category, so
the first factor should have tilted toward fair use. Because the copy-
righted work was an autobiography, it fell roughly in the center of the
fact/fancy spectrum. However, this particular autobiography was of
special historical importance, and arguably most of the expression
that the defendant took from it verbatim was necessary to convey his-
torical fact. Accordingly, the "nature of the copyrighted work"
should have been treated as favoring fair use.
Honestly viewed, the "amount taken" by The Nation should have
been indeterminate. Although the amount taken was qualitatively
substantial, it was quantitatively negligible when compared (as it
should have been) with the extensive length of Ford's autobiography.
Moreover, most of the portions taken arguably constituted historical
fact. Thus, the first two statutory factors should have weighed in
favor of fair use, and the third should have been treated as
indeterminate.
Notwithstanding the dissent's protestations, 35 Time's cancella-
tion of its prepublication excerpts did show a definite market effect.
Yet the plaintiff never demonstrated the magnitude of this market
effect relative to the total revenue expected from the book. Appar-
ently the publishers had kept the initial $12,500 installment, so, in the
absence of any showing that the lost second installment of $12,500
533. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd mer.
420 U.S. 376 (1975), discussed supra in Section II(B)(2)(a).
534. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
535. See supra text accompanying notes 255-56, 263.
1988]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
was substantial compared to anticipated revenue from the book, the
market effect should have weighed against fair use only marginally.
As for the manuscript's unpublished status, the Nation, Enter-
prises Court grossly overestimated its importance under the circum-
stances. Although the manuscript was an autobiography-precisely
the type of work that implicates privacy and the first amendment
right not to speak 53 6-its publication was imminent, and therefore
there was no evidence of any real privacy interest. Similarly, the
author's interest in creative control 537 appeared weak because the
entire manuscript was ready for publication and, in any event, Ford
apparently had reserved no creative control over Time's publication
of excerpts. Thus the manuscript's unpublished status, though impor-
tant in theory, should not have been viewed as determinative under
the facts of Nation Enterprises.
On balance, then, a tally of the five applicable factors should
have read as follows: purpose factor for fair use, nature factor for fair
use, amount taken indeterminate, market effect marginally against
fair use, and unpublished status indeterminate. Under these circum-
stances, the Court should have refused to find infringement solely on
the basis of the 300 words admittedly taken verbatim and, like the
dissent, should have considered the summaries and paraphrasings in
The Nation's article.5 38
Consideration of the nonverbatim borrowings, however, would
have influenced only the "amount taken" factor. Even if those bor-
rowings had been close enough to Ford's original expression to consti-
tute infringement in the absence of fair use, the tally of factors still
would have favored fair use, although only marginally. Perhaps the
Court then might have properly ruled against fair use by relying on
importance of the market effect, which tilted against fair use. Yet the
relative magnitude of the market effect, and consequently the impact
on the copyright incentive, seemed anything but conclusive in this
case. Moreover, given the public importance of copyrighted work and
the historical value of its content, there seems to have been plenty of
justification for weighing the "purpose" and "nature" factors heavily
in this case, without in the least creating a "public figure exception to
copyright" in general.539  Accordingly, although either outcome
would have been supportable, a finding of fair use seems preferable
under the facts of Nation Enterprises.
536. See supra text accompanying notes 531-32.
537. See supra note 58 and text accompanying note 209.
538. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
539. See supra text accompanying note 216.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Congress performed a noble experiment in passing Section 107 of
the Copyright Act of 1976. It attempted to distill an amorphous and
unmanageable body of case law into four specific analytical factors,
while allowing others to be considered as well. It did not attempt to
quantify the unquantifiable by imposing rules, standards, or presump-
tions. Instead, it fractionalized the witches' brew into four elixirs in
the hope that the courts would partake of them, in appropriate pro-
portions, and achieve greater wisdom. Undoubtedly Congress hoped
its refinement of the brew would assist decisionmaking, facilitate judi-
cial review, reduce uncertainty, and perhaps ultimately produce a
workable set of standards.
This noble experiment can succeed only if courts respect the con-
gressional mandate. Because consideration of the four specific factors
is mandatory, courts should analyze each of them in every fair use
case, even if only in a single sentence. To assist in clarifying and sim-
plifying the law, they should keep the four factors analytically distinct
and examine separately such additional considerations as bad faith
and unpublished status. Finally, and most important, courts should
explicitly weigh and balance the four factors, together with any addi-
tional factors that they find relevant, both to reach a reasoned conclu-
sion in each case and to provide an explicit basis for comparing fair
use decisions based upon differing facts.
There is no good reason for courts to avoid this task; nor is there
reason to fear that faithfulness to congressional intent will distort the
doctrine of fair use. The four elixirs can be combined in any propor-
tions, and additional spice can be added, so that courts may mix and
season them to taste, consistently with both copyright policy and pre-
existing law. Failure to adhere to Congress' plan-so well illustrated
by the Supreme Court's Sony and Nation Enterprises "presump-
tions"-will only sow confusion and uncertainty in the lower courts.
Yet despite the false start in Sony and Nation Enterprises, the
prospects for clarifying fair use in the lower courts are good. For the
most part, the federal courts have been diligent in observing the con-
gressional mandate, and their efforts are bearing fruit. If this process
continues, perhaps some day the doctrine of fair use will no longer be
"the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright." 54°
540. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d
Cir. 1939)).
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